courtroom violation in New York

2014Defendant did not object when the court directed the prosecutor to turn off the overhead projector upon which certain evidence was displayed to the members of the public seated in the courtroom, and thus failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court thereby closed the courtroom in violation of defendant’s right to a public trial (see People v George, 20 NY3d 75, 80-81 [2012], cert denied 569 US —, 133 S Ct 1736 [2013]; People v Spears, 94 AD3d 498, 499 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1001 [2012]).

2014Defendant did not object when the court directed the prosecutor to turn off the overhead projector upon which certain evidence was displayed to the members of the public seated in the courtroom, and thus failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court thereby closed the courtroom in violation of defendant’s right to a public trial (see People v George, 20 NY3d 75, 80-81 [2012], cert denied 569 US —, 133 S Ct 1736 [2013]; People v Spears, 94 AD3d 498, 499 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1001 [2012]).

2014Defendant did not object when the court directed the prosecutor to turn off the overhead projector upon which certain evidence was displayed to the members of the public seated in the courtroom, and thus failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court thereby closed the courtroom in violation of defendant’s right to a public trial (see People v George, 20 NY3d 75, 80-81 [2012], cert denied 569 US —, 133 S Ct 1736 [2013]; People v Spears, 94 AD3d 498, 499 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1001 [2012]).

2014Defendant did not object when the court directed the prosecutor to turn off the overhead projector upon which certain evidence was displayed to the members of the public seated in the courtroom, and thus failed to preserve for our review his contention that the court thereby closed the courtroom in violation of defendant’s right to a public trial (see People v George, 20 NY3d 75, 80-81 [2012], cert denied 569 US —, 133 S Ct 1736 [2013]; People v Spears, 94 AD3d 498, 499 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1001 [2012]).

2024We also note that none of the judicially-noticed documents or facts are reflected in the record on appeal, preventing meaningful appellate review ( cf. CPLR 4511 [c]; CPLR 4532-b). [FN24] Inasmuch as the mother contends that Family Court's conduct and rulings show that it prejudged this matter, we cannot agree, as Family Court has broad authority to control the courtroom and to rule on the admission of evidence, which may include questioning witnesses to help clarify testimony and expedite the proceedings ( see Matter of Michelle L. v Steven M. , 227 AD3d 1159 , 1165 [3d Dept 2024]; Matter of

2024We also note that none of the judicially-noticed documents or facts are reflected in the record on appeal, preventing meaningful appellate review ( cf. CPLR 4511 [c]; CPLR 4532-b). [FN24] Inasmuch as the mother contends that Family Court's conduct and rulings show that it prejudged this matter, we cannot agree, as Family Court has broad authority to control the courtroom and to rule on the admission of evidence, which may include questioning witnesses to help clarify testimony and expedite the proceedings ( see Matter of Michelle L. v Steven M. , 227 AD3d 1159 , 1165 [3d Dept 2024]; Matter of

2017While the trial court possesses broad authority to control the courtroom and rule on the admission of evidence ( see Feldsberg v Nitschke , 49 NY2d 636, 643-644 [1980]), given the extremely lengthy one-month adjournment of cross-examination, both the court's instruction to bar all contact between counsel and her client (even if not covering tenant's testimony), and the court's subsequent exclusion of the Medicare records was an improvident exercise of its discretion ( see Matter of Elmore v Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent.

2017While the trial court possesses broad authority to control the courtroom and rule on the admission of evidence ( see Feldsberg v Nitschke , 49 NY2d 636, 643-644 [1980]), given the extremely lengthy one-month adjournment of cross-examination, both the court's instruction to bar all contact between counsel and her client (even if not covering tenant's testimony), and the court's subsequent exclusion of the Medicare records was an improvident exercise of its discretion ( see Matter of Elmore v Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent.

2003That Supreme Court did not explicitly consider alternatives to closure — the third Waller prong — is not error where the record was sufficient to support closure of the courtroom and where defense counsel did not advocate for any less restrictive *138 options (see People v Ramos, 90 NY2d 490, 504-505 [1997]; People v Martinez, 82 NY2d 436, 444 [1993]; see also Ayala v Speckard, 131 F3d 62 , 71 [2d Cir 1997], cert denied 524 US 958 [1998]).

1994At bar, the required "delicate balancing” (People v Martinez, 82 NY2d 436, 442 ; People v Kin Kan, supra, at 58) between the defendant’s individualized right to a public trial and the officers’ concerns for their safety and continued ability to operate in an undercover capacity leads us to conclude that the closure of the courtroom to defense counsel’s supervisors was broader than constitutionally permissible, and thus violated the defendant’s right to a public trial.

2023Because those contentions rely on matters outside the record, however, we conclude that they must be raised by way of a CPL article 440 motion ( see People v Fricke , 216 AD3d 1446, 1448 [4th Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 928 [2023]; see generally People v Mahoney , 175 AD3d 1034 , 1036 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 35 NY3d 943 [2020]).

2016The rulings at issue were within the trial court’s broad authority to control the courtroom and rule on the admission of evidence (see Feldsberg v Nitschke, 49 NY2d 636, 643-644 [1980]; Campbell v Rogers & Wells, 218 AD2d 576, 579 [1st Dept 1995]).

2003Although the court never resolved the parties’ factual dispute as to whether or not this actually occurred, Hoyt abandoned the issue (see People v Graves, 85 NY2d 1024, 1027 [1995]).

2003That Supreme Court did not explicitly consider alternatives to closure — the third Waller prong — is not error where the record was sufficient to support closure of the courtroom and where defense counsel did not advocate for any less restrictive *138 options (see People v Ramos, 90 NY2d 490, 504-505 [1997]; People v Martinez, 82 NY2d 436, 444 [1993]; see also Ayala v Speckard, 131 F3d 62 , 71 [2d Cir 1997], cert denied 524 US 958 [1998]).

2003That Supreme Court did not explicitly consider alternatives to closure — the third Waller prong — is not error where the record was sufficient to support closure of the courtroom and where defense counsel did not advocate for any less restrictive *138 options (see People v Ramos, 90 NY2d 490, 504-505 [1997]; People v Martinez, 82 NY2d 436, 444 [1993]; see also Ayala v Speckard, 131 F3d 62 , 71 [2d Cir 1997], cert denied 524 US 958 [1998]).

2003That Supreme Court did not explicitly consider alternatives to closure — the third Waller prong — is not error where the record was sufficient to support closure of the courtroom and where defense counsel did not advocate for any less restrictive *138 options (see People v Ramos, 90 NY2d 490, 504-505 [1997]; People v Martinez, 82 NY2d 436, 444 [1993]; see also Ayala v Speckard, 131 F3d 62 , 71 [2d Cir 1997], cert denied 524 US 958 [1998]).

1994At bar, the required "delicate balancing” (People v Martinez, 82 NY2d 436, 442 ; People v Kin Kan, supra, at 58) between the defendant’s individualized right to a public trial and the officers’ concerns for their safety and continued ability to operate in an undercover capacity leads us to conclude that the closure of the courtroom to defense counsel’s supervisors was broader than constitutionally permissible, and thus violated the defendant’s right to a public trial.