12 California opinions name it 2 courts 1936–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Morrisongreen2 sentences1994(United States v. Morrison, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 365 [ 66 L.Ed.2d at p. 589 ].) 3 The Temple of Justice Unlike prior cases, here the misconduct took place within the hallowed confines of the courtroom where the rule of law and fairness should be revered. 1994(United States v. Morrison, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 365 [ 66 L.Ed.2d at p. 589 ].) 3 The Temple of Justice Unlike prior cases, here the misconduct took place within the hallowed confines of the courtroom where the rule of law and fairness should be revered. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ortegagreen2 sentences1986“The defendant could not enforce the [exclusion] rule, and to deprive him of the benefit of [the witnesses’] testimony for [their] disobedience, without fault on his part, was manifestly unjust and illegal.” ( 20 Cal. at p. 436 ; People v. Mack (1931) 115 Cal.App. 588, 590 [ 2 P.2d 209 ]; Mintzer v. Wilson (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 85, 91-92 [ 68 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Tanner (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 181, 187 [ 175 P.2d 26 ]; People v. Ortega (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 893 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ]; Annot. (1967) 14 A.L.R.3d 16 .) Thus, absent fault on the defendant’s part in permitting a witness to remain in 1986“The defendant could not enforce the [exclusion] rule, and to deprive him of the benefit of [the witnesses’] testimony for [their] disobedience, without fault on his part, was manifestly unjust and illegal.” ( 20 Cal. at p. 436 ; People v. Mack (1931) 115 Cal.App. 588, 590 [ 2 P.2d 209 ]; Mintzer v. Wilson (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 85, 91-92 [ 68 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Tanner (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 181, 187 [ 175 P.2d 26 ]; People v. Ortega (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 893 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ]; Annot. (1967) 14 A.L.R.3d 16 .) Thus, absent fault on the defendant’s part in permitting a witness to remain in | 1 | 1 |
Mintzer v. Wilsongreen2 sentences1986“The defendant could not enforce the [exclusion] rule, and to deprive him of the benefit of [the witnesses’] testimony for [their] disobedience, without fault on his part, was manifestly unjust and illegal.” ( 20 Cal. at p. 436 ; People v. Mack (1931) 115 Cal.App. 588, 590 [ 2 P.2d 209 ]; Mintzer v. Wilson (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 85, 91-92 [ 68 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Tanner (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 181, 187 [ 175 P.2d 26 ]; People v. Ortega (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 893 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ]; Annot. (1967) 14 A.L.R.3d 16 .) Thus, absent fault on the defendant’s part in permitting a witness to remain in 1986“The defendant could not enforce the [exclusion] rule, and to deprive him of the benefit of [the witnesses’] testimony for [their] disobedience, without fault on his part, was manifestly unjust and illegal.” ( 20 Cal. at p. 436 ; People v. Mack (1931) 115 Cal.App. 588, 590 [ 2 P.2d 209 ]; Mintzer v. Wilson (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 85, 91-92 [ 68 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Tanner (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 181, 187 [ 175 P.2d 26 ]; People v. Ortega (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 893 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ]; Annot. (1967) 14 A.L.R.3d 16 .) Thus, absent fault on the defendant’s part in permitting a witness to remain in | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tannergreen2 sentences1986“The defendant could not enforce the [exclusion] rule, and to deprive him of the benefit of [the witnesses’] testimony for [their] disobedience, without fault on his part, was manifestly unjust and illegal.” ( 20 Cal. at p. 436 ; People v. Mack (1931) 115 Cal.App. 588, 590 [ 2 P.2d 209 ]; Mintzer v. Wilson (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 85, 91-92 [ 68 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Tanner (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 181, 187 [ 175 P.2d 26 ]; People v. Ortega (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 893 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ]; Annot. (1967) 14 A.L.R.3d 16 .) Thus, absent fault on the defendant’s part in permitting a witness to remain in 1986“The defendant could not enforce the [exclusion] rule, and to deprive him of the benefit of [the witnesses’] testimony for [their] disobedience, without fault on his part, was manifestly unjust and illegal.” ( 20 Cal. at p. 436 ; People v. Mack (1931) 115 Cal.App. 588, 590 [ 2 P.2d 209 ]; Mintzer v. Wilson (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 85, 91-92 [ 68 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Tanner (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 181, 187 [ 175 P.2d 26 ]; People v. Ortega (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 893 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ]; Annot. (1967) 14 A.L.R.3d 16 .) Thus, absent fault on the defendant’s part in permitting a witness to remain in | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mackgreen2 sentences1986“The defendant could not enforce the [exclusion] rule, and to deprive him of the benefit of [the witnesses’] testimony for [their] disobedience, without fault on his part, was manifestly unjust and illegal.” ( 20 Cal. at p. 436 ; People v. Mack (1931) 115 Cal.App. 588, 590 [ 2 P.2d 209 ]; Mintzer v. Wilson (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 85, 91-92 [ 68 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Tanner (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 181, 187 [ 175 P.2d 26 ]; People v. Ortega (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 893 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ]; Annot. (1967) 14 A.L.R.3d 16 .) Thus, absent fault on the defendant’s part in permitting a witness to remain in 1986“The defendant could not enforce the [exclusion] rule, and to deprive him of the benefit of [the witnesses’] testimony for [their] disobedience, without fault on his part, was manifestly unjust and illegal.” ( 20 Cal. at p. 436 ; People v. Mack (1931) 115 Cal.App. 588, 590 [ 2 P.2d 209 ]; Mintzer v. Wilson (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 85, 91-92 [ 68 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Tanner (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 181, 187 [ 175 P.2d 26 ]; People v. Ortega (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 893 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ]; Annot. (1967) 14 A.L.R.3d 16 .) Thus, absent fault on the defendant’s part in permitting a witness to remain in | 1 | 1 |
People v. Thomasgreen1 sentence1961“The word ‘specific’ (adjective) means ‘Precisely formulated or restricted; definite, . . . explicit; of an exact or particular nature. ...” (People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 898 [ 156 P.2d 7 ].) In view of what took place when the jury returned to the courtroom for instruction as to what was meant by “specific,” it is not reasonably probable that the instructions on general intent caused the jury to misunderstand the instruction as to specific intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title to or possession of the automobile. | 1 | 1 |
People v. McAllistergreen2 sentences1959Any statement in that opinion implying that these two methods are exclusive, however, is dicta, since to decide the matter under consideration it was necessary for the court to hold only that the method there employed was proper or improper. [7] Incidental statements or conclusions not necessary to the decision are not to be regarded as authority. ( People v. McAllister, 15 Cal.2d 519, 523 [ 102 P.2d 1072 ].) [6b] Moreover, later cases lend support to the view that the procedure used by the trial judge in the present case is also proper. ( Dempsey v. Market Street Ry. 1959Any statement in that opinion implying that these two methods are exclusive, however, is dicta, since to decide the matter under consideration it was necessary for the court to hold only that the method there employed was proper or improper. [7] Incidental statements or conclusions not necessary to the decision are not to be regarded as authority. ( People v. McAllister, 15 Cal.2d 519, 523 [ 102 P.2d 1072 ].) [6b] Moreover, later cases lend support to the view that the procedure used by the trial judge in the present case is also proper. ( Dempsey v. Market Street Ry. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United Railroads of San Francisco v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1959It was urged that an order granting such a motion could not be effective unless the judge “betake himself to the courtroom in which the hearing had been had and there mount the bench and formally and audibly pronounce an order granting the motion for a new trial, and that by no other method could such an order be lawfully rendered.” ( 197 Cal. at 692 .) The court rejected this contention and held that, in addition to the suggested method, the method followed by the trial judge was entirely proper. 1959It was urged that an order granting such a motion could not be effective unless the judge "betake himself to the courtroom in which the hearing had been had and there mount the bench and formally and audibly pronounce an order granting the motion for a new trial, and that by no other method could such an order be lawfully rendered." ( 197 Cal. at 692 .) The court rejected this contention and held that, in addition to the suggested method, the method followed by the trial judge was entirely proper. | 2 | 1936–1959 |
People v. Sanchez
green
1 sentence2022Finally, there is no indication that the trial court gave any greater consideration to statements of participants who appeared in 6 Relying on this court’s opinion in People v. Sanchez (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1409 (Sanchez), Whitmore contends the harmless error standard does not apply and that the error is subject to per se reversal. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Valencia
green
1 sentence2019First, strictly as a matter of textual analysis, the trial court’s reading of section 1382 conforms with the rule against surplusage in statutory construction (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357 ), while Daws’s proposed reading does not. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Marsden
green
1 sentence2019Several days into the prosecution's case-in-chief, Tejeda complained of dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, and the trial court cleared the courtroom for a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 , 123−124 (Marsden). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Fox v. Superior Court of City & Cnty. of S.F.
green
1 sentence2019We review the court’s exercise of its inherent authority for abuse of discretion, bearing in mind that “ ‘the determination of whether the trial court selected the proper legal standard[] in making [a discretionary] determination is reviewed de novo.’ ” (Fox v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 529, 533 .) Exercising our independent judgment on the predicate question of statutory construction presented here, four considerations lead us to conclude that the trial court’s interpretation of section 1382, subdivision (a)(3)(A) was correct, and that, as a result, the trial judge did not abuse he | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Cunningham
green
1 sentence2016(People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 989 .) Those circumstances include “the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the offense, the witness’s degree of attention at the time of the offense, the accuracy of his or her prior description of the suspect, the level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the lapse of time between the offense and the identification.” (Ibid.) In challenging the identification procedure as being unduly suggestive, Cabrera argues that “[t]he photos were shown in an unregulated manner outside the courtroom where | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Lister v. Bowen CA1/2
green
1 sentence2014We decline to reweigh the evidence. “‘“When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”’” (Lister v. Bowen, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 333 .) Based on the evidence presented, we cannot say ‘““the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.”’” (Ibid.) Because all mother has shown was that she had was “‘a subjective fear” father would “‘commit abusive acts in the future’” (id. at p. 332), the court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s request to renew the restraining or | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Morrow v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2010In Morrow “[t]he eavesdropping occurred inside a courtroom and was orchestrated by the prosecutor, an officer of the court.” (Morrow, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 1260 .) Thus, “the misconduct took place within the hallowed confines of the courtroom where the rule of law and fairness should be revered.” (Id., at p. 1261.) Furthermore, the misconduct violated the “higher ethical standards” that courts expect from prosecutors. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Boscovitch
neutral
2 sentences1986"The defendant could not enforce the [exclusion] rule, and to deprive him of the benefit of [the witnesses'] testimony for [their] disobedience, without fault on his part, was manifestly unjust and illegal." ( 20 Cal. at p. 436 ; People v. Mack (1931) 115 Cal. App. 588, 590 [ 2 P.2d 209 ]; Mintzer v. Wilson (1937) 21 Cal. App.2d 85, 91-92 [ 68 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Tanner (1946) 77 Cal. App.2d 181, 187 [ 175 P.2d 26 ]; People v. Ortega (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 884, 893 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 260 ]; Annot. (1967) 14 A.L.R.3d 16 .) Thus, absent fault on the defendant's part in permitting a witness to remai 1986“The defendant could not enforce the [exclusion] rule, and to deprive him of the benefit of [the witnesses’] testimony for [their] disobedience, without fault on his part, was manifestly unjust and illegal.” ( 20 Cal. at p. 436 ; People v. Mack (1931) 115 Cal.App. 588, 590 [ 2 P.2d 209 ]; Mintzer v. Wilson (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 85, 91-92 [ 68 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Tanner (1946) 77 Cal.App.2d 181, 187 [ 175 P.2d 26 ]; People v. Ortega (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 893 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 260 ]; Annot. (1967) 14 A.L.R.3d 16 .) Thus, absent fault on the defendant’s part in permitting a witness to remain in | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Prizant
green
2 sentences1961The defendants contend that the failure to exclude “all persons” from the courtroom was error, citing People v. Elliott, 54 Cal.2d 498 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 354 P.2d 225 ] and People v. Prizant, 186 Cal.App.2d 542 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 282 ] in support of their contention. 1961The defendants contend that the failure to exclude “all persons” from the courtroom was error, citing People v. Elliott, 54 Cal.2d 498 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 354 P.2d 225 ] and People v. Prizant, 186 Cal.App.2d 542 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 282 ] in support of their contention. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
People v. Elliot
green
2 sentences1961The defendants contend that the failure to exclude “all persons” from the courtroom was error, citing People v. Elliott, 54 Cal.2d 498 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 354 P.2d 225 ] and People v. Prizant, 186 Cal.App.2d 542 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 282 ] in support of their contention. 1961The defendants contend that the failure to exclude “all persons” from the courtroom was error, citing People v. Elliott, 54 Cal.2d 498 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 753 , 354 P.2d 225 ] and People v. Prizant, 186 Cal.App.2d 542 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 282 ] in support of their contention. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.