Wells Fargo motion in New York

2021This Court's June 11, 2019 dismissal of Wells Fargo's prior, 2013 foreclosure action on RPAPL 1304 grounds triggered the six-month grace period provided by CPLR 205(a) ( 173 AD3d 491 [1st Dept 2019]; see CitiMortgage, Inc. v Moran , 188 AD3d 407, 408 [1st Dept 2020]).

2021This Court's June 11, 2019 dismissal of Wells Fargo's prior, 2013 foreclosure action on RPAPL 1304 grounds triggered the six-month grace period provided by CPLR 205(a) ( 173 AD3d 491 [1st Dept 2019]; see CitiMortgage, Inc. v Moran , 188 AD3d 407, 408 [1st Dept 2020]).

2014Real Property Law § 266 protects the “title of a purchaser or incumbrancer for a valuable consideration, unless it appears that he [or she] had previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his [or her] immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor.” Thus, a mortgagee is not protected in its title if it had previous notice of potential fraud by the immediate seller, or knowledge of facts which put it on inquiry notice as to the existence of a right in potential conflict with its own (see Maiorano v Garson, 65 AD3d 1300, 1303 [2009]).

2014Real Property Law § 266 protects the “title of a purchaser or incumbrancer for a valuable consideration, unless it appears that he [or she] had previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his [or her] immediate grantor, or of the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor.” Thus, a mortgagee is not protected in its title if it had previous notice of potential fraud by the immediate seller, or knowledge of facts which put it on inquiry notice as to the existence of a right in potential conflict with its own (see Maiorano v Garson, 65 AD3d 1300, 1303 [2009]).

2014Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Wells Fargo’s motion which was for summary judgment on its counterclaim for equitable subrogation (see Arbor Commercial Mtge., LLC v Associates at the Palm, LLC, 95 AD3d 1147, 1149 [2012]; Cashel v Cashel, 94 AD3d 684, 688 [2012]).

2014Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Wells Fargo’s motion which was for summary judgment on its counterclaim for equitable subrogation (see Arbor Commercial Mtge., LLC v Associates at the Palm, LLC, 95 AD3d 1147, 1149 [2012]; Cashel v Cashel, 94 AD3d 684, 688 [2012]).

2014Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Wells Fargo’s motion which was for summary judgment on its counterclaim for equitable subrogation (see Arbor Commercial Mtge., LLC v Associates at the Palm, LLC, 95 AD3d 1147, 1149 [2012]; Cashel v Cashel, 94 AD3d 684, 688 [2012]).

2014Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Wells Fargo’s motion which was for summary judgment on its counterclaim for equitable subrogation (see Arbor Commercial Mtge., LLC v Associates at the Palm, LLC, 95 AD3d 1147, 1149 [2012]; Cashel v Cashel, 94 AD3d 684, 688 [2012]).

2019However, to prevent that unreviewable order from spawning adverse legal consequences due to its res judicata effect, this Court vacated so much of the order as awarded the defendants summary judgment dismissing the complaint ( see Mannino v Wells Fargo Home Mtge., Inc. , 120 AD3d 638, 639 ).

2017However, to prevent that unreviewable order from spawning adverse legal consequences due to its res judicata effect, this Court vacated so much of the order as awarded the defendants summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Mannino v Wells Fargo Home Mtge., Inc., 120 AD3d 638, 639 [2014]).

2022Under the doctrine of res judicata, "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" ( Chapman Steamer Collective, LLC v KeyBank N.A. , 163 AD3d 760 , 761 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Eaddy v US Bank N.A. , 180 AD3d 756, 758 ).

2017In light of our determination, that portion of the appeal which is referable to Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss the original complaint insofar as asserted against it has been rendered academic, since the original complaint was superseded by the amended complaint (see Gotlin v City of New York, 90 AD3d 605, 608 [2011]; Bobash, Inc. v Festinger, 57 AD3d 464, 465 [2008]; DePasquale v Estate of DePasquale, 44 AD3d 606, 607 [2007]).

2017In light of our determination, that portion of the appeal which is referable to Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss the original complaint insofar as asserted against it has been rendered academic, since the original complaint was superseded by the amended complaint (see Gotlin v City of New York, 90 AD3d 605, 608 [2011]; Bobash, Inc. v Festinger, 57 AD3d 464, 465 [2008]; DePasquale v Estate of DePasquale, 44 AD3d 606, 607 [2007]).

2017In light of our determination, that portion of the appeal which is referable to Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss the original complaint insofar as asserted against it has been rendered academic, since the original complaint was superseded by the amended complaint (see Gotlin v City of New York, 90 AD3d 605, 608 [2011]; Bobash, Inc. v Festinger, 57 AD3d 464, 465 [2008]; DePasquale v Estate of DePasquale, 44 AD3d 606, 607 [2007]).

2016“In order to commence a foreclosure action, a plaintiff must have a legal or equitable interest in the mortgage” (US Bank N.A. v Faruque, 120 AD3d 575, 576 [2014]; see HSBC Bank USA v Hernandez, 92 AD3d 843, 843 [2012]).

2016“In order to commence a foreclosure action, a plaintiff must have a legal or equitable interest in the mortgage” (US Bank N.A. v Faruque, 120 AD3d 575, 576 [2014]; see HSBC Bank USA v Hernandez, 92 AD3d 843, 843 [2012]).

2015Wells Fargo established, prima facie, that it did not make a material misrepresentation of an existing fact *943 in the underlying action (see Tenore v Kantrowitz, Goldhamer & Graifman, P.C., 121 AD3d 775 [2014]; see also HSBC Bank USA, NA. v Sage, 112 AD3d 1126 , 1127-1128 [2013]; Deutsche Bank Natl.

2015For the same reasons, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, searched the record and awarded summary judgment to the nonmoving attorney defendants dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Mohamed v Blackowl, 116 AD3d 678, 679 [2014]).

2015Co., 89 NY2d 425, 429-430 [1996]).

2011Bankers Corp. v Nicholas, 69 AD3d 680, 680 [2010]).

2011The provision barring others of their interest in, or of their rights of equity of redemption in the mortgaged premises, of necessity relates to the final concluding act, that of a sale of the premises”]; cf. Forbes v Aaron, 81 AD3d 876, 877 [2011]; Bethel United Pentecostal Church v Westbury 55 Realty Corp., 304 AD2d 689, 692-693 [2003]).

2011“A defendant seeking to vacate a default in appearing or answering must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action” (Citimortgage, Inc. v Brown, 83 AD3d 644, 644 [2011]; see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]).

2011Furthermore, the judgment of foreclosure and sale in the previous action, which barred all defendants therein from asserting, inter alia, any rights, claims, and interest in the subject property, does not preclude the Wells Fargo defendants from advancing their claims here, as the foreclosure sale of the premises ultimately was not conducted (see Nutt v Cuming, 155 NY 309, 313 [1898] [“A judgment entered in a foreclosure action is final for all purposes of review, but in other respects it is interlocutory . . .

2011The provision barring others of their interest in, or of their rights of equity of redemption in the mortgaged premises, of necessity relates to the final concluding act, that of a sale of the premises”]; cf. Forbes v Aaron, 81 AD3d 876, 877 [2011]; Bethel United Pentecostal Church v Westbury 55 Realty Corp., 304 AD2d 689, 692-693 [2003]).

2011Corp., 9 NY3d 124, 127-128 [2007]).