Wells Fargo motion in Texas

2012See Rhône-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979).

2012See Rhône-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel , 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979).

2012See Rhône-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979).

2012See Rhône-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel , 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979).

2012See Speck v. First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Houston, 235 S.W.3d 811, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

2012See Speck v. First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Houston , 235 S.W.3d 811, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

2021See Kachina Pipeline Co., v. Lillis, 471 S.W.3d 445, 455 (Tex. 2015) (op. on reh’g) (stating that when an appellate court reverses a declaratory judgment, it may reverse an attorney’s fee award and remand to determine the appropriate award of costs and fees); City of Mansfield v. Savering, No. 02-19-00174-CV, 2020 WL 4006674 , at *13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 16, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same). 30 Wells Fargo points out in its brief that the interpretation of the trust instrument is dispositive of the entire appeal if the trial court erroneously construed the instrument in Tina’s favor.

2020STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court must apply the standards established in Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).

2018“To foreclose under a security instrument in Texas with a power of sale, the lender must demonstrate that: (1) a debt exists; (2) the debt is secured by a lien created under Art. 16, § 50(a)(6) of the Texas Constitution; (3) plaintiffs are in default under the note and security instrument; and (4) plaintiffs received notice of default and acceleration.” Huston v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 988 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740 (S.D.

2018“To foreclose under a security instrument in Texas with a power of sale, the lender must demonstrate that: (1) a debt exists; (2) the debt is secured by a lien created under Art. 16, § 50(a)(6) of the Texas Constitution; (3) plaintiffs are in default under the note and security instrument; and (4) plaintiffs received notice of default and acceleration.” Huston v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 988 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740 (S.D.

2016Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1992), there is an important exception to this rule for contracts providing credit to a debtor.

2015See Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994); Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. 1996); In re B.I.V., 870 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. 1994).

2015See Montenegro v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 419 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, pet. denied). 2 The Property has been occupied by Lynda Williams and her son since July 2003. 2 DISCUSSION Jurisdiction Forcible detainer is a procedure to determine the right to immediate possession of real property when there is no unlawful entry and is intended to be a speedy, simple, and inexpensive procedure for obtaining possession without resorting to a suit on the title.

2015See Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994); Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. 1996); In re B.I.V., 870 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. 1994).

2015“Parties are restricted on appeal to the theory on which the case was tried.” Davis v. Campbell, 572 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex.1978).

2015See Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994); Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. 1996); In re B.I.V., 870 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. 1994).

2014See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819 .

2014See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819 .

2010Because no evidence demonstrates that Wells Fargo has any interest affected by the receivership, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Wells Fargo’s motion. 3  Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835 , 838–39 (Tex. 2004). 4  Looney v. Doss, 189 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex. Civ.

2010We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to dissolve a receivership under an abuse of discretion standard. 2 To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without 2  See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 871, 879 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (stating that because a motion to release property from receivership has the same goal as motions to dissolve injunctions, an appellate court reviews them under same standards); see also Dayton Reavis Corp. v. Rampart Capital Corp., 968 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. dism’d

2010App.—Fort Worth 1945, no writ). 5  See Gibson v. Bostick Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 148 S.W.3d 482, 493 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.) (“In any foreclosure suit, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a valid obligation owing to him by the defendant because foreclosure is merely a method of assuring payment of the plaintiff's claim.”); Mortgage Elec.

2010See, e.g. , In re Estate of Kuykendall , 206 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. App.-- Texarkana 2006, no pet.) (upholding instructed verdict on claim of tortious interference with inheritance because "[p]laintiffs offered nothing to establish there was anything to which they were entitled that Harold prevented them from receiving.").

2010We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to dissolve a receivership under an abuse of discretion standard. 2 To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without 2  See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 871, 879 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (stating that because a motion to release property from receivership has the same goal as motions to dissolve injunctions, an appellate court reviews them under same standards); see also Dayton Reavis Corp. v. Rampart Capital Corp., 968 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. dism’d

2010We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to dissolve a receivership under an abuse of discretion standard. 2 To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide whether the trial court acted without 2  See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 871, 879 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (stating that because a motion to release property from receivership has the same goal as motions to dissolve injunctions, an appellate court reviews them under same standards); see also Dayton Reavis Corp. v. Rampart Capital Corp., 968 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. dism’d

2010Because no evidence demonstrates that Wells Fargo has any interest affected by the receivership, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Wells Fargo’s motion. 3  Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835 , 838–39 (Tex. 2004). 4  Looney v. Doss, 189 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex. Civ.

2009Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. 2000). 2 sell the same as under execution.” The trial court also signed a separate order granting Wells Fargo’s motion for issuance of an order of sale and reciting the same order of sale language that it added to the summary judgment.