party presentation principle in Ohio

2026In ignoring the party presentation rule, the majority inappropriately injected itself into the arguments and effectively became an advocate for a party, rather than embracing the role of neutral arbiter that is assigned to courts. {¶ 37} “‘In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation.’” Schindler v. Cornett, 2014- Ohio-3352, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.), quoting Greenlaw v. U.S., 554 U.S. 237, 243-244 (2008).

2026The Court found that the Ninth District “violated the party-presentation principle when it reversed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration on the grounds that the trial court did not hold an oral hearing on the motion.” Id.

2026Smith did not comply with the party-presentation principle recently emphasized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Old World, 2025-Ohio-1875 at ¶ 4 .

2026This implicates the party-presentation principle. {¶ 59} Our adversarial system of adjudication depends on the party- presentation principle—the idea that “‘we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.’” Snyder v. Old World Classics, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-1875, ¶ 4, quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008).

2026GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. v. Columbus Police Dept., 2025-Ohio-5243, ¶ 41; see also Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 447, 461-467 (2009) (discussing exceptions to the party-presentation principle). {¶ 60} As important as party presentation is to the adversarial process, there is a more fundamental value at stake: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

2026GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. v. Columbus Police Dept., 2025-Ohio-5243, ¶ 41 ; see also Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 447 , 461-467 (2009) (discussing exceptions to the party-presentation principle). {¶ 96} As important as party presentation is to the adversarial process, there is a more fundamental value at stake: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

2026The basic premise is that “‘[parties represented by competent counsel] know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief.’” (Bracketed text in original.) United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375- 376 (2020), quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

2026The basic premise is that “‘[parties represented by competent counsel] know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief.’” (Bracketed text in original.) United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 , 375- 376 (2020), quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

2026GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. v. Columbus Police Dept., 2025-Ohio-5243, ¶ 41; see also Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 447, 461-467 (2009) (discussing exceptions to the party-presentation principle). {¶ 60} As important as party presentation is to the adversarial process, there is a more fundamental value at stake: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

2026GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc. v. Columbus Police Dept., 2025-Ohio-5243, ¶ 41 ; see also Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 447 , 461-467 (2009) (discussing exceptions to the party-presentation principle). {¶ 96} As important as party presentation is to the adversarial process, there is a more fundamental value at stake: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

2024The principle of party presentation, however, requires that “we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision” and “assign[s] to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” (Emphasis added.) Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008); see also Von Stein v. Brandenburg, 2023-Ohio-4481, ¶ 16, fn. 5 (12th Dist.) (explaining the party-presentation principle and its exceptions). {¶ 45} The concurring opinion attempts to vindicate the majority’s approach while also conceding that “Ware does not explicitly question Pierce’s employment status,” concurring opinio

2024Relations Bd., 63 Ohio St.3d 498, 504 (1992), for the proposition that “[n]o specific form of request is required by R.C. 149.43.” But that quoted language doesn’t mean that asking the employee of a private company for a menu somehow puts that employee on notice that the requestor is submitting a public-records request. 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 2023-Ohio-4481, ¶ 16, fn. 5 (12th Dist.) (explaining the party-presentation principle and its exceptions). {¶ 45} The concurring opinion attempts to vindicate the majority’s approach while also conceding that “Ware does not explicitly question Pierce’s

2026That’s not how an adversarial system of adjudication works.” Xue Juan Chen v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir. 2013). {¶ 59} But the party-presentation principle is not “ironclad,” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 376 (2020), and there are exceptions to it.

2026The basic premise is that “‘[parties represented by competent counsel] know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief.’” (Bracketed text in original.) United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375- 376 (2020), quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

2026The parties may advance legal theories about what they think the law is, but it is the judiciary that has “the ultimate authority to render definitive interpretations of the law,” TWISM Ents., L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, 2022-Ohio-4677, ¶ 33.

2026The parties may advance legal theories about what they think the law is, but it is the judiciary that has “the ultimate authority to render definitive interpretations of the law,” TWISM Ents., L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, 2022-Ohio-4677, ¶ 33 .

2026See State v. Clark, 2025-Ohio-4410, ¶ 32 (Hawkins, J., concurring) (noting that an appellate court can adhere to the principles of the party presentation rule through supplemental briefing). 5 grounds due to noncompliance with filing requirements).

2026See State v. Fisher, 2024-Ohio-4484, ¶ 161, fn. 1 (8th Dist.) (“Appellate courts rule on assignments of error, not mere arguments.”), citing State v. Gripper, 2013-Ohio-2740 , ¶ 24, fn. 2 (10th Dist.).

2026Co., 2026-Ohio-626, ¶ 41 (under the party presentation rule, an appellate court should ordinarily decide cases based on the issues raised by the parties).

2026Howard v. Chief Inspector’s Office, 2026-Ohio-1428, ¶ 60 (Kennedy, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Yet the majority nonetheless raises a novel argument of its own creation—an argument so novel that the chief inspector’s office did not think of it”). {¶ 101} For these reasons, the party-presentation principle does not bar me or the majority from addressing the question whether this court has jurisdiction to decide the State’s third proposition of law in the first instance. {¶ 102} Before addressing the majority’s resolution of the State’s third proposition of law, I am compel

2026Snyder v. Old World Classics, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio- 1875, ¶ 4; In re J.D., 2026-Ohio-1310, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.) (noting that the propriety of raising res judicata when not preserved by a party was questionable).

2026That’s not how an adversarial system of adjudication works.” Xue Juan Chen v. Holder, 737 F.3d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir. 2013). {¶ 59} But the party-presentation principle is not “ironclad,” United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 376 (2020), and there are exceptions to it.

2025Id. at ¶ 2, 4. 4 of a complete record or a substitute statement of the evidence as permitted by App.R. 9(C) and (D), an appellate court must presume regularity in the trial court’s proceedings and accept the validity of its judgment.’” State v. Weideman, 2024-Ohio-5152, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting Skycasters, LLC v. Kister, 2021-Ohio-4154, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.). {¶12} A review of the record shows Thomas did not utilize App.R. 9(C) or (D) to prepare a statement of the evidence.

2025See Snyder v. Old World Classics, L.L.C., 2025- Ohio-1875, ¶ 4 (“Under the principle of party presentation, ‘we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.’”), citing Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008); see also State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 469 (2014) (“We are not obligated to search the record or formulate legal arguments on behalf of the parties, because ‘“appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but [preside] essentially as arbiters

2025United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1299 (8th Cir.1987) (Arnold, J., concurring) (Courts “have enough work to do without assuming an activist role and becoming advocates.”).

2025Id. at ¶ 2, 4. 4 of a complete record or a substitute statement of the evidence as permitted by App.R. 9(C) and (D), an appellate court must presume regularity in the trial court’s proceedings and accept the validity of its judgment.’” State v. Weideman, 2024-Ohio-5152, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting Skycasters, LLC v. Kister, 2021-Ohio-4154, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.). {¶12} A review of the record shows Thomas did not utilize App.R. 9(C) or (D) to prepare a statement of the evidence.

2025See Snyder v. Old World Classics, L.L.C., 2025- Ohio-1875, ¶ 4 (“Under the principle of party presentation, ‘we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.’”), citing Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008); see also State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 469 (2014) (“We are not obligated to search the record or formulate legal arguments on behalf of the parties, because ‘“appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but [preside] essentially as arbiters

2025See Snyder v. Old World Classics, L.L.C., 2025- Ohio-1875, ¶ 4 (“Under the principle of party presentation, ‘we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.’”), citing Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008); see also State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 469 (2014) (“We are not obligated to search the record or formulate legal arguments on behalf of the parties, because ‘“appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but [preside] essentially as arbiters

2024Relations Bd., 63 Ohio St.3d 498, 504 (1992), for the proposition that “[n]o specific form of request is required by R.C. 149.43.” But that quoted language doesn’t mean that asking the employee of a private company for a menu somehow puts that employee on notice that the requestor is submitting a public-records request. 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 2023-Ohio-4481, ¶ 16, fn. 5 (12th Dist.) (explaining the party-presentation principle and its exceptions). {¶ 45} The concurring opinion attempts to vindicate the majority’s approach while also conceding that “Ware does not explicitly question Pierce’s