party presentation principle in Colorado

2026People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161, ¶ 39 (citing People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2006)). ¶ 70 In recent years, the Colorado supreme court has applied and explained the party presentation principle: “Under our adversarial system of justice, we adhere to the party presentation principle, which relies on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.” Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 . ¶ 71 There may be some tension between the appellate doctrine that a court may affirm (but not reverse) on any ground supported 1 I

2026See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 (“Under our adversarial system of justice, we adhere to the party presentation principle, which relies on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.”).

2026Under the party presentation principle, “we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision” based on “the premise that the parties know what is 41 best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief.” Compos v. People, 2021 CO 19 , ¶ 35 (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008)). ¶ 78 To this end, in reliance on the parties’ apparent agreement regarding the operative statutory language, we spent considerable time at oral argument exploring what appeared to be a significant charging error.

2025See Compos v. People, 2021 CO 19 , ¶ 35 (noting that under the party presentation principle, parties “are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief” (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008))). ¶ 14 To the extent mother raises other challenges to the court’s decision regarding the children’s education, she does not show how the federal education laws she references conflict with or displace Colorado law concerning families and children.

2021See, e.g., Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 (The party presentation principle “relies on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.”); accord United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. ___ , ___, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020). 19 ¶ 46 We conclude the district court properly declined to merge Curtis’s forgery conviction into his mail ballot offense conviction.

2021See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (“The party presentation principle is supple, not ironclad.”).

2026Rather, it is animated by the party presentation principle That principle holds parties responsible for framing the issues to be resolved and calls upon courts to be neutral arbiters as they consider any matters raised United States v Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020) In general, our adversarial system of adjudication "is designed around the premise" that where, as here, parties are represented by competent counsel, they "know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief" Id. at 375-76 (quoting Castro v United States , 540 U.S.

2026Under that principle, courts "rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision." Greenlaw v. United 19 States, 554 U.S 237, 243 (2008) This principle recognizes that courts "should not[] sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right" Id . at 244 (quoting United States v Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298,1301 (8th Cir 1987) (Arnold, J, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)) Instead, our adversarial system "is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief" Id . (quoting Castro v Uni

2026Rather, it is animated by the party presentation principle That principle holds parties responsible for framing the issues to be resolved and calls upon courts to be neutral arbiters as they consider any matters raised United States v Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020) In general, our adversarial system of adjudication "is designed around the premise" that where, as here, parties are represented by competent counsel, they "know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief" Id. at 375-76 (quoting Castro v United States , 540 U.S.

2026Rather, it is animated by the party presentation principle That principle holds parties responsible for framing the issues to be resolved and calls upon courts to be neutral arbiters as they consider any matters raised United States v Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020) In general, our adversarial system of adjudication "is designed around the premise" that where, as here, parties are represented by competent counsel, they "know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and argument entitling them to relief" Id. at 375-76 (quoting Castro v United States , 540 U.S.

2026And “a claim that [a] sentence is unconstitutional . . . properly falls under Rule 35(c).” Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, ¶ 26 (also stating that the party presentation principle “does not prevent a court from properly characterizing an issue that has been improperly characterized by a party.”); People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 670 (Colo. App. 2006) (“The substance of a postconviction motion controls whether it is designated as a Crim.

2026See CRE 611(a); cf. Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, ¶ 26 (the party presentation principle doesn’t “prevent a court from properly characterizing an issue that has been improperly characterized by a party”). ¶ 37 Accordingly, the district court didn’t err under the party presentation principle by limiting French’s cross-examination of Soria.

2026See Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Crystal Ridge Dev., Inc., 783 F.3d 976, 980 (4th Cir. 2015).

2016But as a general rule, "(olur adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief," Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 248-44 , 128 S.Ct. 2559 , 171 LEdJd2d 399 (2008) (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Castro v, United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 , 124 S.Ct. 786 , 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). 137 I recognize that the party presentation rule does not constrain our obligation to ascertain controlling law, Se

2026But as a general rule, "[o]ur adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief." Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008) (alteration in original) (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). ¶96 In light of this settled law, we have long recognized "the basic principle of appellate jurisprudence that arguments not advanced on appeal are general

2025See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 (“Under our adversarial system of justice, we adhere to the party presentation principle, which relies on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.”); Moody v. People, 159 P.3d 611, 614 (Colo. 2007) (“[A]rguments not advanced on appeal are generally deemed waived.”).

2025See Compos v. People, 2021 CO 19 , ¶ 35, 484 P.3d 159, 165 (explaining that, under the party presentation principle, “we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter” (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008)). ¶ 37 Plain error review requires a determination of “whether (1) there was an error, (2) the error was ‘plain,’ or clear and obvious, and (3) the error was substantial, meaning that it so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of

2024That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.... [A]s a general rule, "[o]ur adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and 46 are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief." ¶87 Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008) (second alteration in original) (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)); accord United States v. Si

2026People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161, ¶ 39 (citing People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2006)). ¶ 70 In recent years, the Colorado supreme court has applied and explained the party presentation principle: “Under our adversarial system of justice, we adhere to the party presentation principle, which relies on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.” Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 . ¶ 71 There may be some tension between the appellate doctrine that a court may affirm (but not reverse) on any ground supported 1 I

2026Under that principle, courts "rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision." Greenlaw v. United 19 States, 554 U.S 237, 243 (2008) This principle recognizes that courts "should not[] sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right" Id . at 244 (quoting United States v Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298,1301 (8th Cir 1987) (Arnold, J, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)) Instead, our adversarial system "is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief" Id . (quoting Castro v Uni

2026People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161, ¶ 39 (citing People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2006)). ¶ 70 In recent years, the Colorado supreme court has applied and explained the party presentation principle: “Under our adversarial system of justice, we adhere to the party presentation principle, which relies on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.” Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 . ¶ 71 There may be some tension between the appellate doctrine that a court may affirm (but not reverse) on any ground supported 1 I

2026And “a claim that [a] sentence is unconstitutional . . . properly falls under Rule 35(c).” Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, ¶ 26 (also stating that the party presentation principle “does not prevent a court from properly characterizing an issue that has been improperly characterized by a party.”); People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 670 (Colo. App. 2006) (“The substance of a postconviction motion controls whether it is designated as a Crim.

2026The principle is “supple, not ironclad.” People v. Lulei, 2026 CO 17, ¶ 30 (quoting United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 376 (2020)).

2026See People v. Hendrickson, 45 P.3d 786, 788 (Colo. App. 2001) (a trial court “must exercise its discretion to preclude inquiries that have no probative value, are irrelevant, or are prejudicial”). 14 ¶ 36 French doesn’t point us to any authority suggesting that the party presentation principle overrode the court’s responsibility under CRE 611(a) to exercise reasonable control over the presentation of evidence.

2025Co., 208 P.3d 238, 241 (Colo. 2009). ¶ 30 By concluding that the court erred by not adjudicating the parents’ name dispute under section 14-10-131, we acknowledge that, at first blush, it may appear that we are violating the party presentation principle.

2025Appellate Attorney Fees ¶ 24 Farmers requests an award of appellate attorney fees and costs under section 13-17-102, arguing that Treppeda’s appeal “lacks substantial justification and legal support.” Because we reverse the award of attorney fees, we deny Farmers’ request. 3 Although Farmers also argued to the district court that Treppeda’s claim was frivolous under section 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2025, the court did not award fees on that basis, Marcellot v. Exempla, Inc., 2012 COA 200, ¶ 11 (issues not decided by the trial court will not be addressed on appeal), and Farmers did not argue on app

2025See Compos v. People, 2021 CO 19 , ¶ 35, 484 P.3d 159, 165 (explaining that, under the party presentation principle, “we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter” (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008)). ¶ 37 Plain error review requires a determination of “whether (1) there was an error, (2) the error was ‘plain,’ or clear and obvious, and (3) the error was substantial, meaning that it so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of

2025See Compos v. People, 2021 CO 19 , ¶ 35, 484 P.3d 159, 165 (explaining that, under the party presentation principle, “we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter” (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008)). ¶ 37 Plain error review requires a determination of “whether (1) there was an error, (2) the error was ‘plain,’ or clear and obvious, and (3) the error was substantial, meaning that it so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of

2025Absent ambiguity in the written instrument itself, “we will not look beyond the four corners of the agreement to determine the meaning intended by the parties.” Ad Two, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 9 P.3d 373, 376-77 (Colo. 2000).1 ¶9 In conducting this review, we are also bound by the party presentation principle.

2025See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 (“Under our adversarial system of justice, we adhere to the party presentation principle, which relies on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and assigns to courts the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.”); see also People v. Ham, 734 P.2d 623, 627 (Colo. 1987) (noting that third-party interventions in criminal cases should only be allowed under “truly exceptional circumstances”). 4 justify continuing to hold Murphy’s property as to the ongoing investigation. ¶9 The City argued in its brief that, though timely, Murphy’s June 20 reque

2024See United States v. Campbell , 26 F.4th 860, 895 ( 11th Cir. 2022 ) (Newsom and Jordan, JJ., dissenting) . ¶89 Here, as noted above, and as the majority concedes, Maj. op. ¶¶ 21, 49 , Masterpiece and Phillips did not make the argument on which the majority relies, even after we issued an order requiring that they submit supplemental briefing addressing the district court 's authority in light of the applicable statutes .

2024See United States v. Campbell , 26 F.4th 860, 895 (11th Cir. 2022) (Newsom and Jordan, JJ., dissenting). ¶89 Here, as noted above, and as the majority concedes, Maj. op. ¶¶ 21, 49, Masterpiece and Phillips did not make the argument on which the majority relies, even after we issued an order requiring that they submit supplemental briefing addressing the district court's authority in light of the applicable statutes.

2021Finally, we note that the principle of party presentation “does not prevent a court from properly characterizing an issue that has been improperly characterized by a party.” Lucero v. People, 2017 CO 49, ¶ 26 , 394 P.3d 1128, 1134 . 4 The UCCJEA provides for two other forms of non-emergency jurisdiction (“more-appropriate-forum” and “last-resort” jurisdiction), but section 14-13-203(1) provides that a court may modify an out-of-state child-custody determination only if it has home-state or significant-connection jurisdiction. 13 happen: (1) the out-of-state court or the Colorado court must det

2021See Weeks , ¶ 11.