compulsory process clause in Oregon

2022They were mod- eled off the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, (1970) (ABA Standards), Standard 4.7, and are designed to support con- stitutional rights: “As stated, the fundamental right that the compulsory process clause aims to protect is ‘the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.’ * * * The ultimate aim of the recipro- cal discovery statutes is largely congruent with that goal in the sense that such statutes insure

2022They were mod- eled off the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, (1970) (ABA Standards), Standard 4.7, and are designed to support con- stitutional rights: “As stated, the fundamental right that the compulsory process clause aims to protect is ‘the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.’ * * * The ultimate aim of the recipro- cal discovery statutes is largely congruent with that goal in the sense that such statutes insure

2001In deciding that the trial court lacked authority to so order the district attorney, the Supreme Court noted that its own jurisprudence interpreting the Compulsory Process Clause of the Oregon Constitution “impl[ies] that the compulsory process clause guarantees the right to call witnesses and obtain their testimony at trial.” Id. (citing Lonergan, 201 Or at 188 ) (emphasis in original).

1982Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or. 163 , 269 P.2d 491 (1954), we noted the literal meaning of the compulsory process clause and held that the provision *317 secures to the defendant the right to process to obtain the attendance of witnesses, saying: "Under Art. 1, § 11, Oregon Const., the accused not only is guaranteed the right `to meet the witnesses face to face', but also the right of having `compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor'.

2020In Webb v. Texas, 409 US 95 , 93 S Ct 351 , 34 L Ed 2d 330 (1972), the trial judge gave the defendant’s only witness (and only that witness) a strongly-worded warning about perjury, a warn- ing which implied that the judge “expected [the witness] to lie, and went on to assure him that if he lied, he would be prosecuted and probably convicted for perjury[.]” Webb, 409 US at 97 .

2020In Webb v. Texas, 409 US 95 , 93 S Ct 351 , 34 L Ed 2d 330 (1972), the trial judge gave the defendant’s only witness (and only that witness) a strongly-worded warning about perjury, a warn- ing which implied that the judge “expected [the witness] to lie, and went on to assure him that if he lied, he would be prosecuted and probably convicted for perjury[.]” Webb, 409 US at 97 .

2020Next, relying on a line of due process cases, includ- ing Brady, the Court held that, to establish a compulsory process clause violation, a defendant “must at least make some plausible showing of how [the witnesses’] testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense.” Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 US at 867 .

1985The trial court relied on United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 US 858 , 102 S Ct 3440 , 73 L Ed 2d 1193 (1982), which sets forth the compulsory process standard we are to apply under the federal constitution in criminal cases involving illegal alien witnesses. 3 In that case, the defendant was charged with knowingly transporting an alien illegally into the United States.

2022They were mod- eled off the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, (1970) (ABA Standards), Standard 4.7, and are designed to support con- stitutional rights: “As stated, the fundamental right that the compulsory process clause aims to protect is ‘the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.’ * * * The ultimate aim of the recipro- cal discovery statutes is largely congruent with that goal in the sense that such statutes insure

2022They were mod- eled off the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, (1970) (ABA Standards), Standard 4.7, and are designed to support con- stitutional rights: “As stated, the fundamental right that the compulsory process clause aims to protect is ‘the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.’ * * * The ultimate aim of the recipro- cal discovery statutes is largely congruent with that goal in the sense that such statutes insure

2022But the compulsory process clause, adopted to ensure that defendants have tools to deal with witnesses who would not testify unless compelled, protects at least the right to try.” Weaver, 367 Or at 24 .

2020Weaver, 296 Or App at 463 .

2020By “material,” the Court meant not that the evidence would be relevant to a mat- ter in dispute, but as a term of art used in many federal cases, beginning with United States v. Agurs, 427 US 97 , 96 S Ct 2392 , 49 L Ed 2d 342 (1976), to refer to evidence with a reasonable probability of affecting the result of the trial.7 Indeed, the Court reasoned that, “[b]ecause determina- tions of materiality are often best made in light of all of the evidence adduced at trial, judges may wish to defer ruling on motions until after the presentation of evidence.” Id. at 874.

2020By “material,” the Court meant not that the evidence would be relevant to a mat- ter in dispute, but as a term of art used in many federal cases, beginning with United States v. Agurs, 427 US 97 , 96 S Ct 2392 , 49 L Ed 2d 342 (1976), to refer to evidence with a reasonable probability of affecting the result of the trial.7 Indeed, the Court reasoned that, “[b]ecause determina- tions of materiality are often best made in light of all of the evidence adduced at trial, judges may wish to defer ruling on motions until after the presentation of evidence.” Id. at 874.

2020The state relies on State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335 , 15 P3d 22 (2000).

2020The state relies on State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335 , 15 P3d 22 (2000).

2015The compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment secures to a criminal defendant the right to call himself or herself to the witness stand to testify in his or her own defense: “Logically included in the accused’s right to call witnesses whose testimony is material and favorable to his defense * * * is a right to testify himself, should he decide it is in his favor to do so.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US 44, 52 , 107 S Ct 2704 , 97 L Ed 2d 37 (1987) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 3 As the Court has observed, “the most important witness for the defense in many criminal cases i

2015The compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment secures to a criminal defendant the right to call himself or herself to the witness stand to testify in his or her own defense: “Logically included in the accused’s right to call witnesses whose testimony is material and favorable to his defense * * * is a right to testify himself, should he decide it is in his favor to do so.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US 44, 52 , 107 S Ct 2704 , 97 L Ed 2d 37 (1987) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 3 As the Court has observed, “the most important witness for the defense in many criminal cases i

1996Those claims are not presented on appeal. 3 In addition to petitioner’s testimony and defense counsel’s affidavit, the evidence before the trial court included the transcript of the criminal trial, exhibits from that trial, including the “scripts,” and an affidavit from the prosecutor describing how the prosecution would have attacked defendant’s version of the events if she had testified. 4 In Rock , the Court held that the accused’s right to be heard derives from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee “that no one shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law,” from the compulsory pr

1982It is perfectly sound to conclude that they intended instead to protect the main and evolving principles of the common law without their accompanying minutiae, and to leave to future courts the task of applying those principles in specific cases. * * *" [31] People v. Chavez, Colo., 621 P.2d 1362 (1981); Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1973); State v. Albright, 96 Wis.2d 122 , 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980); Ingle v. State, 92 Nev. 104 , 546 P.2d 598 (1976); People v. Knox, 58 Ill.

1982Cf. Westen, supra note 13 at 114-115 (footnote omitted): People v. Chavez, 621 P2d 1362 (Colo 1981); Hughes v. State, 513 P2d 1115 (Alaska 1973); State v. Albright, 96 Wis 2d 122 , 291 NW2d 487 (1980); Ingle v. State, 92 Nev 104, 546 P2d 598 (1976); People v. Knox, 58 Ill App 3d 761, 16 Ill Dec 182, 374 NE2d 957 (1978); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F2d 592, 595 (5th Cir 1960), modified 289 F2d 928 (5th Cir 1961) (en banc) (“[I]t is basic to due process that an accused person have a fair opportunity to tell his story in a fair trial.”); Fowle v. United States, 410 F2d 48, 53-54 (9th Cir 1969).

1982Hackett v. Mulcahy, 493 F. Supp. 1329 (D.C.N.J. 1980); State v. Grant, 10 Wash. App. 468 , 519 P.2d 261 (1974); and see United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.1981); Ronson v. Commissioner of Corrections of State of New York, 604 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.1979) (preclusion of witness permitted only if nondisclosure prejudiced the prosecution and defendant is personally responsible for nondisclosure).

1982Hackett v. Mulcahy, 493 F Supp 1329 (DC NJ 1980); State v. Grant, 10 Wash App 468, 519 P2d 261 (1974); and see United States v. Davis, 639 F2d 239 (5th Cir 1981); Ronson v. Commissioner of Corrections of State of New York, 604 F2d 176 (2d Cir 1979) (preclusion of witness permitted only if nondisclosure prejudiced the prosecution and defendent is personally responsible for nondisclosure).

1982Hackett v. Mulcahy, 493 F. Supp. 1329 (D.C.N.J. 1980); State v. Grant, 10 Wash. App. 468 , 519 P.2d 261 (1974); and see United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.1981); Ronson v. Commissioner of Corrections of State of New York, 604 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.1979) (preclusion of witness permitted only if nondisclosure prejudiced the prosecution and defendant is personally responsible for nondisclosure).

1982It is perfectly sound to conclude that they intended instead to protect the main and evolving principles of the common law without their accompanying minutiae, and to leave to future courts the task of applying those principles in specific cases. * * *" [31] People v. Chavez, Colo., 621 P.2d 1362 (1981); Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1973); State v. Albright, 96 Wis.2d 122 , 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980); Ingle v. State, 92 Nev. 104 , 546 P.2d 598 (1976); People v. Knox, 58 Ill.

1982It is perfectly sound to conclude that they intended instead to protect the main and evolving principles of the common law without their accompanying minutiae, and to leave to future courts the task of applying those principles in specific cases. * * *" [31] People v. Chavez, Colo., 621 P.2d 1362 (1981); Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1973); State v. Albright, 96 Wis.2d 122 , 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980); Ingle v. State, 92 Nev. 104 , 546 P.2d 598 (1976); People v. Knox, 58 Ill.

1982Hackett v. Mulcahy, 493 F. Supp. 1329 (D.C.N.J. 1980); State v. Grant, 10 Wash. App. 468 , 519 P.2d 261 (1974); and see United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.1981); Ronson v. Commissioner of Corrections of State of New York, 604 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.1979) (preclusion of witness permitted only if nondisclosure prejudiced the prosecution and defendant is personally responsible for nondisclosure).

1982Hackett v. Mulcahy, 493 F. Supp. 1329 (D.C.N.J. 1980); State v. Grant, 10 Wash. App. 468 , 519 P.2d 261 (1974); and see United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.1981); Ronson v. Commissioner of Corrections of State of New York, 604 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.1979) (preclusion of witness permitted only if nondisclosure prejudiced the prosecution and defendant is personally responsible for nondisclosure).

1982Hackett v. Mulcahy, 493 F. Supp. 1329 (D.C.N.J. 1980); State v. Grant, 10 Wash. App. 468 , 519 P.2d 261 (1974); and see United States v. Davis, 639 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.1981); Ronson v. Commissioner of Corrections of State of New York, 604 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.1979) (preclusion of witness permitted only if nondisclosure prejudiced the prosecution and defendant is personally responsible for nondisclosure).

1982It is perfectly sound to conclude that they intended instead to protect the main and evolving principles of the common law without their accompanying minutiae, and to leave to future courts the task of applying those principles in specific cases. * * *" [31] People v. Chavez, Colo., 621 P.2d 1362 (1981); Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1973); State v. Albright, 96 Wis.2d 122 , 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980); Ingle v. State, 92 Nev. 104 , 546 P.2d 598 (1976); People v. Knox, 58 Ill.

1982It is perfectly sound to conclude that they intended instead to protect the main and evolving principles of the common law without their accompanying minutiae, and to leave to future courts the task of applying those principles in specific cases. * * *" [31] People v. Chavez, Colo., 621 P.2d 1362 (1981); Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1973); State v. Albright, 96 Wis.2d 122 , 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980); Ingle v. State, 92 Nev. 104 , 546 P.2d 598 (1976); People v. Knox, 58 Ill.

1982It is perfectly sound to conclude that they intended instead to protect the main and evolving principles of the common law without their accompanying minutiae, and to leave to future courts the task of applying those principles in specific cases. * * *" [31] People v. Chavez, Colo., 621 P.2d 1362 (1981); Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1973); State v. Albright, 96 Wis.2d 122 , 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980); Ingle v. State, 92 Nev. 104 , 546 P.2d 598 (1976); People v. Knox, 58 Ill.

1982Cf. Westen, supra note 13 at 114-115 (footnote omitted): People v. Chavez, 621 P2d 1362 (Colo 1981); Hughes v. State, 513 P2d 1115 (Alaska 1973); State v. Albright, 96 Wis 2d 122 , 291 NW2d 487 (1980); Ingle v. State, 92 Nev 104, 546 P2d 598 (1976); People v. Knox, 58 Ill App 3d 761, 16 Ill Dec 182, 374 NE2d 957 (1978); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F2d 592, 595 (5th Cir 1960), modified 289 F2d 928 (5th Cir 1961) (en banc) (“[I]t is basic to due process that an accused person have a fair opportunity to tell his story in a fair trial.”); Fowle v. United States, 410 F2d 48, 53-54 (9th Cir 1969).

1982It is perfectly sound to conclude that they intended instead to protect the main and evolving principles of the common law without their accompanying minutiae, and to leave to future courts the task of applying those principles in specific cases. * * *" [31] People v. Chavez, Colo., 621 P.2d 1362 (1981); Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1973); State v. Albright, 96 Wis.2d 122 , 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980); Ingle v. State, 92 Nev. 104 , 546 P.2d 598 (1976); People v. Knox, 58 Ill.

1982Cf. Westen, supra note 13 at 114-115 (footnote omitted): People v. Chavez, 621 P2d 1362 (Colo 1981); Hughes v. State, 513 P2d 1115 (Alaska 1973); State v. Albright, 96 Wis 2d 122 , 291 NW2d 487 (1980); Ingle v. State, 92 Nev 104, 546 P2d 598 (1976); People v. Knox, 58 Ill App 3d 761, 16 Ill Dec 182, 374 NE2d 957 (1978); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F2d 592, 595 (5th Cir 1960), modified 289 F2d 928 (5th Cir 1961) (en banc) (“[I]t is basic to due process that an accused person have a fair opportunity to tell his story in a fair trial.”); Fowle v. United States, 410 F2d 48, 53-54 (9th Cir 1969).