17 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc.green2 sentences2025Because a UTPA violation can take many forms and result in different kinds of ascertainable loss, “[w]het- her reliance is required to establish causation turns on the nature of the unlawful trade practice and the ascertain- able loss alleged.” Pearson, 358 Or at 126 (citing Discount 4 The trial court, the Court of Appeals, and even the parties at times have described plaintiffs’ various theories as alleging distinct “claims.” For example, the controlling questions of law certified to the Court of Appeals refer to plain- tiffs’ different “claims” under three distinct provisions of the UTPA. 2025Because a UTPA violation can take many forms and result in different kinds of ascertainable loss, “[w]het- her reliance is required to establish causation turns on the nature of the unlawful trade practice and the ascertain- able loss alleged.” Pearson, 358 Or at 126 (citing Discount 4 The trial court, the Court of Appeals, and even the parties at times have described plaintiffs’ various theories as alleging distinct “claims.” For example, the controlling questions of law certified to the Court of Appeals refer to plain- tiffs’ different “claims” under three distinct provisions of the UTPA. | 3 | 8 |
State Ex Rel. Redden v. Discount Fabrics, Inc.green2 sentences2013Three years later, in State ex rel Redden v. Discount Fabrics, 289 Or 375, 384 , 615 P2d 1034 (1980), the Supreme Court explained that its holding in Sanders illustrated the differences between a UTPA claim and a common-law fraud claim: Although reliance is an element of common-law fraud, it is not necessarily an element of a UTPA claim. 289 Or at 384 . 12 The court reiterated its Sanders holding, stating that, in a UTPA action, “whether reliance [is] a necessary element depend[s] upon the type of violation alleged and *** reliance [is] not required in nondisclosure cases.” Id. 2013Three years later, in State ex rel Redden v. Discount Fabrics, 289 Or 375, 384 , 615 P2d 1034 (1980), the Supreme Court explained that its holding in Sanders illustrated the differences between a UTPA claim and a common-law fraud claim: Although reliance is an element of common-law fraud, it is not necessarily an element of a UTPA claim. 289 Or at 384 . 12 The court reiterated its Sanders holding, stating that, in a UTPA action, “whether reliance [is] a necessary element depend[s] upon the type of violation alleged and *** reliance [is] not required in nondisclosure cases.” Id. | 2 | 3 |
Sanders v. Francisgreen2 sentences2013That is not the law in Oregon, where the Supreme Court has held that whether proof of reliance is required for a UTPA claim depends on the unlawful trade practice alleged, Sanders, 277 Or at 598-99 , and we have held that, in a case where a plaintiff claims to have acted on an express representation, proof of reliance is essential, Feitler, 170 Or App at 708 . 14 Plaintiffs also contend that “no proof [of reliance] is necessary where the defendant is under an independent duty to speak the truth.” They cite Tri-West Const. v. Hernandez, 43 Or App 961, 971-72 , 607 P2d 1375 (1979), rev den, 288 2013That is not the law in Oregon, where the Supreme Court has held that whether proof of reliance is required for a UTPA claim depends on the unlawful trade practice alleged, Sanders, 277 Or at 598-99 , and we have held that, in a case where a plaintiff claims to have acted on an express representation, proof of reliance is essential, Feitler, 170 Or App at 708 . 14 Plaintiffs also contend that “no proof [of reliance] is necessary where the defendant is under an independent duty to speak the truth.” They cite Tri-West Const. v. Hernandez, 43 Or App 961, 971-72 , 607 P2d 1375 (1979), rev den, 288 | 2 | 3 |
Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc.green2 sentences2015Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 257 Or App 106, 172, 306 P3d 665 (2013). 2015Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 257 Or App 106, 172, 306 P3d 665 (2013). | 1 | 2 |
Raudebaugh v. Action Pest Control, Inc.green2 sentences2013As the Supreme Court has explained, the elements of a UTPA claim are “distinct and separate “ from the elements of common-law fraud, and a violation of the UTPA is “much more easily shown.” Wolverton v. Stanwood, 278 Or 709, 713 , 565 P2d 755 (1977); Raudebaugh v. Action Pest Control, Inc., 59 Or App 166, 171 , 650 P2d 1006 (1982) (“Had the legislature intended that a consumer prove all the elements of eommon[-]law fraud in order to recover damages, it would have been unnecessary to create a cause of action by statute.”). 2013As the Supreme Court has explained, the elements of a UTPA claim are “distinct and separate “ from the elements of common-law fraud, and a violation of the UTPA is “much more easily shown.” Wolverton v. Stanwood, 278 Or 709, 713 , 565 P2d 755 (1977); Raudebaugh v. Action Pest Control, Inc., 59 Or App 166, 171 , 650 P2d 1006 (1982) (“Had the legislature intended that a consumer prove all the elements of eommon[-]law fraud in order to recover damages, it would have been unnecessary to create a cause of action by statute.”). | 1 | 1 |
Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.green2 sentences2010See Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 207 Or App 532 [, 142 P3d 1079 (2006), aff'd, 344 Or 403 , 183 P3d 181 (2008)].” That statement suggests that the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ UTPA claim for failure to allege recoverable damages under the UTPA — that is, that plaintiffs failed to allege an “ascertainable loss” as a “result of’ defendant’s alleged misrepresentations. 2010See Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 207 Or App 532 [, 142 P3d 1079 (2006), aff'd, 344 Or 403 , 183 P3d 181 (2008)].” That statement suggests that the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ UTPA claim for failure to allege recoverable damages under the UTPA — that is, that plaintiffs failed to allege an “ascertainable loss” as a “result of’ defendant’s alleged misrepresentations. | 1 | 1 |
Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.green2 sentences2010See Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 207 Or App 532 [, 142 P3d 1079 (2006), aff'd, 344 Or 403 , 183 P3d 181 (2008)].” That statement suggests that the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ UTPA claim for failure to allege recoverable damages under the UTPA — that is, that plaintiffs failed to allege an “ascertainable loss” as a “result of’ defendant’s alleged misrepresentations. 2010See Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 207 Or App 532 [, 142 P3d 1079 (2006), aff'd, 344 Or 403 , 183 P3d 181 (2008)].” That statement suggests that the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ UTPA claim for failure to allege recoverable damages under the UTPA — that is, that plaintiffs failed to allege an “ascertainable loss” as a “result of’ defendant’s alleged misrepresentations. | 1 | 1 |
Roach v. Meadgreen2 sentences1996The court erred in denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the UTPA claim.” Id. at 87-88 (footnotes omitted). 1996The court erred in denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the UTPA claim.” Id. at 87-88 (footnotes omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Scharfstein v. BP W. Coast Prods., LLC
green
2 sentences2025The court rejected plain- tiffs’ reliance on Scharfstein v. BP West Coast Products, LLC, 292 Or App 69 , 423 P3d 757 , rev den, 363 Or 815 (2018), cert dismissed, ___ US ___, 140 S Ct 16 (2019)—a case in which the court held that reliance was not required for the plain- tiffs’ UTPA claim. 2025The court rejected plain- tiffs’ reliance on Scharfstein v. BP West Coast Products, LLC, 292 Or App 69 , 423 P3d 757 , rev den, 363 Or 815 (2018), cert dismissed, ___ US ___, 140 S Ct 16 (2019)—a case in which the court held that reliance was not required for the plain- tiffs’ UTPA claim. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Mccormick v. State
green
2 sentences2025The court rejected plain- tiffs’ reliance on Scharfstein v. BP West Coast Products, LLC, 292 Or App 69 , 423 P3d 757 , rev den, 363 Or 815 (2018), cert dismissed, ___ US ___, 140 S Ct 16 (2019)—a case in which the court held that reliance was not required for the plain- tiffs’ UTPA claim. 2025The court rejected plain- tiffs’ reliance on Scharfstein v. BP West Coast Products, LLC, 292 Or App 69 , 423 P3d 757 , rev den, 363 Or 815 (2018), cert dismissed, ___ US ___, 140 S Ct 16 (2019)—a case in which the court held that reliance was not required for the plain- tiffs’ UTPA claim. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co.
green
2 sentences2025The court rejected plain- tiffs’ reliance on Scharfstein v. BP West Coast Products, LLC, 292 Or App 69 , 423 P3d 757 , rev den, 363 Or 815 (2018), cert dismissed, ___ US ___, 140 S Ct 16 (2019)—a case in which the court held that reliance was not required for the plain- tiffs’ UTPA claim. 2025The court rejected plain- tiffs’ reliance on Scharfstein v. BP West Coast Products, LLC, 292 Or App 69 , 423 P3d 757 , rev den, 363 Or 815 (2018), cert dismissed, ___ US ___, 140 S Ct 16 (2019)—a case in which the court held that reliance was not required for the plain- tiffs’ UTPA claim. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Weigel v. Ron Tonkin Chevrolet Co.
green
2 sentences2015Weigel, 298 Or at 134-37 . 2015Weigel, 298 Or at 134-37 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Providence Health & Services-Oregon v. Mancuso
green
2 sentences2023Regarding the remainder of the UTPA claim that Cite as 323 Or App 573 (2023) 579 was not preempted by ERISA, the trial court found that there was no evidence that defendant (or the attorneys of FisherBroyles on behalf of defendant) made the misrepre- sentations alleged by plaintiff. 2023Cite as 323 Or App 573 (2023) 583 trial court found that all of the other alleged misrepresen- tations in plaintiff’s UTPA claim required no interpretation of the Plan to determine falsity, but that alleged misrepre- sentation (c) was different, and required interpretation of the terms of the Plan to determine its falsity. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Assn.
green
1 sentence2022The court in Pearson II also noted, in its discussion of plaintiffs diminished value theory, with regard to a price- inflation type claim, that that theory was not viable on the record before it: “It may be, as plaintiffs represented to the trial court, that through expert testimony, they had some specialized Cite as 321 Or App 213 (2022) 233 economic theory to present to establish on a classwide basis that each of the class members suffered a diminished value loss. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State ex rel Rosenblum v. Living Essentials, LLC
green
2 sentences2021What may be false is the implication that the specific dosage of B-vitamins in a given bottle of 5HE will have a noticeable effect on the energy level of a Cite as 313 Or App 176 (2021) 203 consumer, absent caffeine, during the five hours following consumption.” The court recognized that defendants’ represen- tations “may carry some false implications as to the effect of the specific NCI in a bottle of Decaf 5HE.” (Emphasis in original.) In response to precisely the same point that the state now makes on appeal—that the court should have entered judgment for the state because it had found all 2021What may be false is the implication that the specific dosage of B-vitamins in a given bottle of 5HE will have a noticeable effect on the energy level of a Cite as 313 Or App 176 (2021) 203 consumer, absent caffeine, during the five hours following consumption.” The court recognized that defendants’ represen- tations “may carry some false implications as to the effect of the specific NCI in a bottle of Decaf 5HE.” (Emphasis in original.) In response to precisely the same point that the state now makes on appeal—that the court should have entered judgment for the state because it had found all | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Migis v. Autozone, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018App. 774 , 782, 387 P.3d 381 (2016). *87 At its core, BP's combined argument asks us to resolve a legal question-whether plaintiff's specific UTPA claim requires proof of reliance. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Caldwell v. Pop's Homes, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015There, the buyer of a mobile home brought a UTPA claim against the seller, Pop’s Homes, alleging that it had misrepresented the status of the mobile home’s location in a trailer park when the defendant seller had known of, but not disclosed, a risk that the mobile home could not remain there. 54 Or App at 106 . 2015There, the buyer of a mobile home brought a UTPA claim against the seller, Pop’s Homes, alleging that it had misrepresented the status of the mobile home’s location in a trailer park when the defendant seller had known of, but not disclosed, a risk that the mobile home could not remain there. 54 Or App at 106 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rathgeber v. James Hemenway, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015Unlike a private litigant, who “may bring a UTPA claim only if it has suffered an ‘ascertainable loss of money or property’ as a result of a ‘willful’ violation of the statute, [those] requirements do not apply when the state brings a UTPA claim.” Rathgeber v. James Hemenway, Inc., 335 Or 404 , 413 n 5, 69 P3d 710 (2003); see ORS 646.618 (authorizing investigations); ORS 646.632 (describing state UTPA enforcement processes); ORS 646.638(1) (setting out “ascertainable loss” requirement for private actions); ORS 646.642 (authorizing enforcement of injunctions and compliance agreements and civil 2015Unlike a private litigant, who “may bring a UTPA claim only if it has suffered an ‘ascertainable loss of money or property’ as a result of a ‘willful’ violation of the statute, [those] requirements do not apply when the state brings a UTPA claim.” Rathgeber v. James Hemenway, Inc., 335 Or 404 , 413 n 5, 69 P3d 710 (2003); see ORS 646.618 (authorizing investigations); ORS 646.632 (describing state UTPA enforcement processes); ORS 646.638(1) (setting out “ascertainable loss” requirement for private actions); ORS 646.642 (authorizing enforcement of injunctions and compliance agreements and civil | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Tri-West Construction Co. v. Hernandez
green
2 sentences2013That is not the law in Oregon, where the Supreme Court has held that whether proof of reliance is required for a UTPA claim depends on the unlawful trade practice alleged, Sanders, 277 Or at 598-99 , and we have held that, in a case where a plaintiff claims to have acted on an express representation, proof of reliance is essential, Feitler, 170 Or App at 708 . 14 Plaintiffs also contend that “no proof [of reliance] is necessary where the defendant is under an independent duty to speak the truth.” They cite Tri-West Const. v. Hernandez, 43 Or App 961, 971-72 , 607 P2d 1375 (1979), rev den, 288 2013That is not the law in Oregon, where the Supreme Court has held that whether proof of reliance is required for a UTPA claim depends on the unlawful trade practice alleged, Sanders, 277 Or at 598-99 , and we have held that, in a case where a plaintiff claims to have acted on an express representation, proof of reliance is essential, Feitler, 170 Or App at 708 . 14 Plaintiffs also contend that “no proof [of reliance] is necessary where the defendant is under an independent duty to speak the truth.” They cite Tri-West Const. v. Hernandez, 43 Or App 961, 971-72 , 607 P2d 1375 (1979), rev den, 288 | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Feitler v. the Animation Celection, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013That is not the law in Oregon, where the Supreme Court has held that whether proof of reliance is required for a UTPA claim depends on the unlawful trade practice alleged, Sanders, 277 Or at 598-99 , and we have held that, in a case where a plaintiff claims to have acted on an express representation, proof of reliance is essential, Feitler, 170 Or App at 708 . 14 Plaintiffs also contend that “no proof [of reliance] is necessary where the defendant is under an independent duty to speak the truth.” They cite Tri-West Const. v. Hernandez, 43 Or App 961, 971-72 , 607 P2d 1375 (1979), rev den, 288 2013That is not the law in Oregon, where the Supreme Court has held that whether proof of reliance is required for a UTPA claim depends on the unlawful trade practice alleged, Sanders, 277 Or at 598-99 , and we have held that, in a case where a plaintiff claims to have acted on an express representation, proof of reliance is essential, Feitler, 170 Or App at 708 . 14 Plaintiffs also contend that “no proof [of reliance] is necessary where the defendant is under an independent duty to speak the truth.” They cite Tri-West Const. v. Hernandez, 43 Or App 961, 971-72 , 607 P2d 1375 (1979), rev den, 288 | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Krause v. Eugene Dodge, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013That is not the law in Oregon, where the Supreme Court has held that whether proof of reliance is required for a UTPA claim depends on the unlawful trade practice alleged, Sanders, 277 Or at 598-99 , and we have held that, in a case where a plaintiff claims to have acted on an express representation, proof of reliance is essential, Feitler, 170 Or App at 708 . 14 Plaintiffs also contend that “no proof [of reliance] is necessary where the defendant is under an independent duty to speak the truth.” They cite Tri-West Const. v. Hernandez, 43 Or App 961, 971-72 , 607 P2d 1375 (1979), rev den, 288 2013That is not the law in Oregon, where the Supreme Court has held that whether proof of reliance is required for a UTPA claim depends on the unlawful trade practice alleged, Sanders, 277 Or at 598-99 , and we have held that, in a case where a plaintiff claims to have acted on an express representation, proof of reliance is essential, Feitler, 170 Or App at 708 . 14 Plaintiffs also contend that “no proof [of reliance] is necessary where the defendant is under an independent duty to speak the truth.” They cite Tri-West Const. v. Hernandez, 43 Or App 961, 971-72 , 607 P2d 1375 (1979), rev den, 288 | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Wolverton v. Stanwood
green
2 sentences2013As the Supreme Court has explained, the elements of a UTPA claim are “distinct and separate “ from the elements of common-law fraud, and a violation of the UTPA is “much more easily shown.” Wolverton v. Stanwood, 278 Or 709, 713 , 565 P2d 755 (1977); Raudebaugh v. Action Pest Control, Inc., 59 Or App 166, 171 , 650 P2d 1006 (1982) (“Had the legislature intended that a consumer prove all the elements of eommon[-]law fraud in order to recover damages, it would have been unnecessary to create a cause of action by statute.”). 2013As the Supreme Court has explained, the elements of a UTPA claim are “distinct and separate “ from the elements of common-law fraud, and a violation of the UTPA is “much more easily shown.” Wolverton v. Stanwood, 278 Or 709, 713 , 565 P2d 755 (1977); Raudebaugh v. Action Pest Control, Inc., 59 Or App 166, 171 , 650 P2d 1006 (1982) (“Had the legislature intended that a consumer prove all the elements of eommon[-]law fraud in order to recover damages, it would have been unnecessary to create a cause of action by statute.”). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Stocker v. Keith
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 546 ..The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on two ORLTA claims and one UTPA claim. 2005Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Oberg v. Honda Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2001Oberg (state), 320 Or at 552-56 . 2001Oberg (state), 320 Or at 552-56 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Blume v. Fred Meyer, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Defendant challenged the jury’s award of punitive damages on several grounds, including excessiveness under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 7 The trial court noted that the record supported what was “an extraordinarily egregious violation” of the UTPA, but, on defendant’s motion for elimination or reduction of the punitive damages award, lowered plaintiffs punitive damages award to $50,000, finding that $50,000 “is the number which is the top of the range which * * * a rational factfinder could award on this * * * record.” On appeal, the Court of Appeals followed Bl 2001Defendant challenged the jury’s award of punitive damages on several grounds, including excessiveness under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 7 The trial court noted that the record supported what was “an extraordinarily egregious violation” of the UTPA, but, on defendant’s motion for elimination or reduction of the punitive damages award, lowered plaintiffs punitive damages award to $50,000, finding that $50,000 “is the number which is the top of the range which * * * a rational factfinder could award on this * * * record.” On appeal, the Court of Appeals followed Bl | 1 | 2001–2001 |
GPL Treatment, Ltd. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.
green
2 sentences2001We review for errors of law, GPL Treatment, Ltd. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 323 Or 116, 118 , 914 P2d 682 (1996), and reverse and remand. 2001We review for errors of law, GPL Treatment, Ltd. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 323 Or 116, 118 , 914 P2d 682 (1996), and reverse and remand. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Haeger v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1996The trial court, citing Haeger v. Johnson, 25 Or App 131 , 548 P2d 532 (1976), and Lamm v. Amfac Mortgage Corp., 44 Or App 203 , *123 605 P2d 730 (1980), concluded that “mortgage brokers are exempt from UTPA applications” (emphasis in original) and dismissed the UTPA claim. 1 In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, ORCP 21 A(8), we assume the truth of plaintiffs’ pleadings, including particularly plaintiffs’ allegation that “Defendant did not loan money or extend credit to Plaintiffs.” Glubka v. Long, 115 Or App 236, 238 , 837 P2d 553 (1992). 1996The trial court, citing Haeger v. Johnson, 25 Or App 131 , 548 P2d 532 (1976), and Lamm v. Amfac Mortgage Corp., 44 Or App 203 , *123 605 P2d 730 (1980), concluded that “mortgage brokers are exempt from UTPA applications” (emphasis in original) and dismissed the UTPA claim. 1 In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, ORCP 21 A(8), we assume the truth of plaintiffs’ pleadings, including particularly plaintiffs’ allegation that “Defendant did not loan money or extend credit to Plaintiffs.” Glubka v. Long, 115 Or App 236, 238 , 837 P2d 553 (1992). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lamm v. Amfac Mortgage Corp.
green
2 sentences1996The trial court, citing Haeger v. Johnson, 25 Or App 131 , 548 P2d 532 (1976), and Lamm v. Amfac Mortgage Corp., 44 Or App 203 , *123 605 P2d 730 (1980), concluded that “mortgage brokers are exempt from UTPA applications” (emphasis in original) and dismissed the UTPA claim. 1 In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, ORCP 21 A(8), we assume the truth of plaintiffs’ pleadings, including particularly plaintiffs’ allegation that “Defendant did not loan money or extend credit to Plaintiffs.” Glubka v. Long, 115 Or App 236, 238 , 837 P2d 553 (1992). 1996The trial court, citing Haeger v. Johnson, 25 Or App 131 , 548 P2d 532 (1976), and Lamm v. Amfac Mortgage Corp., 44 Or App 203 , *123 605 P2d 730 (1980), concluded that “mortgage brokers are exempt from UTPA applications” (emphasis in original) and dismissed the UTPA claim. 1 In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, ORCP 21 A(8), we assume the truth of plaintiffs’ pleadings, including particularly plaintiffs’ allegation that “Defendant did not loan money or extend credit to Plaintiffs.” Glubka v. Long, 115 Or App 236, 238 , 837 P2d 553 (1992). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Glubka v. Long
neutral
2 sentences1996The trial court, citing Haeger v. Johnson, 25 Or App 131 , 548 P2d 532 (1976), and Lamm v. Amfac Mortgage Corp., 44 Or App 203 , *123 605 P2d 730 (1980), concluded that “mortgage brokers are exempt from UTPA applications” (emphasis in original) and dismissed the UTPA claim. 1 In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, ORCP 21 A(8), we assume the truth of plaintiffs’ pleadings, including particularly plaintiffs’ allegation that “Defendant did not loan money or extend credit to Plaintiffs.” Glubka v. Long, 115 Or App 236, 238 , 837 P2d 553 (1992). 1996The trial court, citing Haeger v. Johnson, 25 Or App 131 , 548 P2d 532 (1976), and Lamm v. Amfac Mortgage Corp., 44 Or App 203 , *123 605 P2d 730 (1980), concluded that “mortgage brokers are exempt from UTPA applications” (emphasis in original) and dismissed the UTPA claim. 1 In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, ORCP 21 A(8), we assume the truth of plaintiffs’ pleadings, including particularly plaintiffs’ allegation that “Defendant did not loan money or extend credit to Plaintiffs.” Glubka v. Long, 115 Or App 236, 238 , 837 P2d 553 (1992). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Eldridge v. Eastmoreland General Hospital green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Eldridge v. Eastmoreland General Hospital
green
2 sentences1992To avoid the bar of a limitation, plaintiffs “must plead facts sufficient to show that the delay is excused.” Eldridge v. Eastmoreland General Hospital, 88 Or App 547, 550 , 746 P2d 735 (1987), aff’d 307 Or 500 , 769 P2d 775 (1989). 1992To avoid the bar of a limitation, plaintiffs “must plead facts sufficient to show that the delay is excused.” Eldridge v. Eastmoreland General Hospital, 88 Or App 547, 550 , 746 P2d 735 (1987), aff’d 307 Or 500 , 769 P2d 775 (1989). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.