utpa claim in South Carolina

2008See Jefferies v. Phillips , 316 S.C. 523, 527 , 451 S.E.2d 21, 23 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating conduct that only affects the parties to the transaction provides no basis for a UTPA claim).

2008See Jefferies v. Phillips , 316 S.C. 523, 527 , 451 S.E.2d 21, 23 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating conduct that only affects the parties to the transaction provides no basis for a UTPA claim).

1994See Key Co. v. Fameco Distribs., 292 S.C. 524, 528 , 357 S.E.2d 476, 478 (Ct.App.1987) (no UTPA violation held shown where the dispute "involved nothing more than a breach of contract that affected no one but the parties to the contract").

1994See Key Co. v. Fameco Distribs., 292 S.C. 524, 528 , 357 S.E.2d 476, 478 (Ct.App.1987) (no UTPA violation held shown where the dispute "involved nothing more than a breach of contract that affected no one but the parties to the contract").

2025Corp., 332 S.C. at 159 , 503 S.E.2d at 488). as to the public interest element of a UTPA claim.

2025Corp., 332 S.C. at 159 , 503 S.E.2d at 488). as to the public interest element of a UTPA claim.

2008The supreme court addressed a similar UTPA claim between a business and a former employee, turned competitor, in the case of Florence Paper Co. v. Orphan , 298 S.C. 210 , 379 S.E.2d 289 (1989).

2008The supreme court addressed a similar UTPA claim between a business and a former employee, turned competitor, in the case of Florence Paper Co. v. Orphan , 298 S.C. 210 , 379 S.E.2d 289 (1989).

2025See Richland County v. Kaiser, 351 S.C. 89, 97 , 567 S.E.2d 260, 264 (Ct. App. 2002) (reversing the award of attorney's fees because based on this court's reversal of the trial court's findings, the respondents were no longer the prevailing parties).

2025See Richland County v. Kaiser, 351 S.C. 89, 97 , 567 S.E.2d 260, 264 (Ct. App. 2002) (reversing the award of attorney's fees because based on this court's reversal of the trial court's findings, the respondents were no longer the prevailing parties).

2017Cf. BADD, 414 S.C. at 296 , 778 S.E.2d at 109 (holding a counterclaim was permissive when its allegations, if true, would not have rendered the guaranty agreements unenforceable).

2017Cf. BADD, 414 S.C. at 296 , 778 S.E.2d at 109 (holding a counterclaim was permissive when its allegations, if true, would not have rendered the guaranty agreements unenforceable).

2016Cf. Simpson, 373 S.C. at 29-30 , 644 S.E.2d at 671 (finding an arbitration agreement unconscionable when it purported to restrict a consumer from receiving the statutorily-mandated treble damages to which she might otherwise have been entitled in her underlying UTPA claim, because courts “will not enforce a contract which is violative of public policy, statutory law, or provisions of the Constitution” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

2016Cf. Simpson, 373 S.C. at 29-30 , 644 S.E.2d at 671 (finding an arbitration agreement unconscionable when it purported to restrict a consumer from receiving the statutorily-mandated treble damages to which she might otherwise have been entitled in her underlying UTPA claim, because courts “will not enforce a contract which is violative of public policy, statutory law, or provisions of the Constitution” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

2015When this Court answered certified questions in Johnson in 2002, it reiterated the goal of limiting excessive gambling and protecting gamblers and then-families from allowing the gambler’s vice to overcome his ability to pay. 349 S.C. at 635 , 564 S.E.2d at 664-65 (citation omitted). 17 For these reasons, I would allow Proctor to pursue her UTPA claim in full against Defendants, who engaged in deliberate conduct that fed Proctor’s gambling addiction.

2015When this Court answered certified questions in Johnson in 2002, it reiterated the goal of limiting excessive gambling and protecting gamblers and then-families from allowing the gambler’s vice to overcome his ability to pay. 349 S.C. at 635 , 564 S.E.2d at 664-65 (citation omitted). 17 For these reasons, I would allow Proctor to pursue her UTPA claim in full against Defendants, who engaged in deliberate conduct that fed Proctor’s gambling addiction.

2012See Parrish v. Allison , 376 S.C. 308, 319 , 656 S.E.2d 382, 388 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[I]f the evidence as a whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and the motion should be denied."); The Huffines Co., LLC v. Lockhart , 365 S.C. 178, 187 , 617 S.E.2d 125, 129 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that in ruling on motions for a directed verdict or JNOV, the trial court is required to view the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions).

2012See Parrish v. Allison , 376 S.C. 308, 319 , 656 S.E.2d 382, 388 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[I]f the evidence as a whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and the motion should be denied."); The Huffines Co., LLC v. Lockhart , 365 S.C. 178, 187 , 617 S.E.2d 125, 129 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that in ruling on motions for a directed verdict or JNOV, the trial court is required to view the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions).

2012See S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-10(b) (1985) (defining “trade” and “commerce” in the UTPA as including the “sale or distribution of any services”); Taylor, 324 S.C. at 217 , 479 S.E.2d at 44 (citing the statutory definitions in section 39-5-10(b) and holding “[t]he provision of any service constitutes commerce within the meaning of the UTPA”; the Court observed that “[t]he statute does not exclude professional services from its definition”); Camp v. Springs Mortgage Corp., 307 S.C. 283, 285 , 414 S.E.2d 784, 786 (Ct.App.1991) (“There is no question but what legal services come within the definition o

2012See S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-10(b) (1985) (defining “trade” and “commerce” in the UTPA as including the “sale or distribution of any services”); Taylor, 324 S.C. at 217 , 479 S.E.2d at 44 (citing the statutory definitions in section 39-5-10(b) and holding “[t]he provision of any service constitutes commerce within the meaning of the UTPA”; the Court observed that “[t]he statute does not exclude professional services from its definition”); Camp v. Springs Mortgage Corp., 307 S.C. 283, 285 , 414 S.E.2d 784, 786 (Ct.App.1991) (“There is no question but what legal services come within the definition o

2012Creel & Sons, Inc. , 320 S.C. 274 , 465 S.E.2d 84 (1995) (holding the trial court did not err in finding the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act and in granting a directed verdict to the defendant on the plaintiff's UTPA claim); LaMotte v. Punch Line of Columbia, Inc. , 296 S.C. 66 , 370 S.E.2d 711 (1988) (upholding the trial court's grant of summary judgment on a claim for violation of the UTPA where there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants engaged in unfair acts that affected a public interest); see

2012Creel & Sons, Inc. , 320 S.C. 274 , 465 S.E.2d 84 (1995) (holding the trial court did not err in finding the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act and in granting a directed verdict to the defendant on the plaintiff's UTPA claim); LaMotte v. Punch Line of Columbia, Inc. , 296 S.C. 66 , 370 S.E.2d 711 (1988) (upholding the trial court's grant of summary judgment on a claim for violation of the UTPA where there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants engaged in unfair acts that affected a public interest); see

2012See Parrish v. Allison , 376 S.C. 308, 319 , 656 S.E.2d 382, 388 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[I]f the evidence as a whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and the motion should be denied."); The Huffines Co., LLC v. Lockhart , 365 S.C. 178, 187 , 617 S.E.2d 125, 129 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that in ruling on motions for a directed verdict or JNOV, the trial court is required to view the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions).

2012See Parrish v. Allison , 376 S.C. 308, 319 , 656 S.E.2d 382, 388 (Ct. App. 2007) ("[I]f the evidence as a whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and the motion should be denied."); The Huffines Co., LLC v. Lockhart , 365 S.C. 178, 187 , 617 S.E.2d 125, 129 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that in ruling on motions for a directed verdict or JNOV, the trial court is required to view the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motions).

2012See S.C.Code Ann. § 39-5-10(b) (1985) (defining “trade” and “commerce” in the UTPA as including the “sale or distribution of any services”); Taylor, 324 S.C. at 217 , 479 S.E.2d at 44 (citing the statutory definitions in section 39-5-10(b) and holding “[t]he provision of any service constitutes commerce within the meaning of the UTPA”; the Court observed that “[t]he statute does not exclude professional services from its definition”); Camp v. Springs Mortgage Corp., 307 S.C. 283, 285 , 414 S.E.2d 784, 786 (Ct.App.1991) (“There is no question but what legal services come within the definition o

2006In Ward v. Dick Dyer and Assocs., Inc., plaintiffs initiated an action against a dealer whose employee failed to inform them the vehicle they purchased had been wrecked and repaired. 304 S.C. 152, 158 , 403 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1991).

2006In Ward v. Dick Dyer and Assocs., Inc., plaintiffs initiated an action against a dealer whose employee failed to inform them the vehicle they purchased had been wrecked and repaired. 304 S.C. 152, 158 , 403 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1991).

2006We disagree. “[T]o recover pursuant to the UTPA one must prove each of the following three elements by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence: 1) a violation of the Act, 2) proximate cause, and 3) damages.” Charleston Lumber Co. v. Miller Housing Corp. , 318 S.C. 471, 482 , 458 S.E.2d 431, 438 (Ct. App. 1995).

2006We disagree. “[T]o recover pursuant to the UTPA one must prove each of the following three elements by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence: 1) a violation of the Act, 2) proximate cause, and 3) damages.” Charleston Lumber Co. v. Miller Housing Corp. , 318 S.C. 471, 482 , 458 S.E.2d 431, 438 (Ct. App. 1995).

1999DISCUSSION Initially, we note that in deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the trial court should consider only the allegations set forth on the face of the plaintiffs complaint and a 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted if “facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom would entitle the plaintiff to any relief on any theory of the case.” Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 300 , 457 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1995). 2 The question is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim f

1999DISCUSSION Initially, we note that in deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the trial court should consider only the allegations set forth on the face of the plaintiffs complaint and a 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted if “facts alleged and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom would entitle the plaintiff to any relief on any theory of the case.” Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 300 , 457 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1995). 2 The question is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim f