authentication requirement in Pennsylvania

2025Commonwealth v. McKellick, 24 A.3d 982, 988 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1).

2025Commonwealth v. McKellick, 24 A.3d 982, 988 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1).

2025See Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 480 (Pa. Super. 2018) (recognizing that a document must first satisfy requirements of authentication prior to ruling on its admissibility under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Commonwealth v. Koch, 106 A.3d 705, 711 (Pa. 2014) - 18 - J-A18043-25 (plurality) (Opinion in Support of Affirmance) (“[I]f proffered evidence fails an authentication challenge, meaning that its proponent cannot prove that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be, the evidence cannot be admitted, regardless of its potential rele

2019AUTHENTICATION “The authentication inquiry will, by necessity, be fact-bound and case- by-case.” Koch, 106 A.3d at 714 .

2025See Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 480 (Pa. Super. 2018) (recognizing that a document must first satisfy requirements of authentication prior to ruling on its admissibility under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay); see also Commonwealth v. Koch, 106 A.3d 705, 711 (Pa. 2014) - 18 - J-A18043-25 (plurality) (Opinion in Support of Affirmance) (“[I]f proffered evidence fails an authentication challenge, meaning that its proponent cannot prove that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be, the evidence cannot be admitted, regardless of its potential rele

2023Rule 901 and our caselaw interpreting the rule do not require that the author of a document personally testify as to the genuineness of a document for it to be authenticated.4 ____________________________________________ 4 See, e.g., Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1) (requiring only testimony of a witness with knowledge for authentication); Gregury, 196 A.3d at 634 (trial court abused (Footnote Continued Next Page) -8- J-S20032-23 Furthermore, the fact that Foster Mother could not self-authenticate the evaluation, as the trial court stated at the hearing, N.T., 10/25/22, at 87, does not end the authentication

2021Despite the deferential nature of our review, I believe that both the trial court and the Majority have taken too exacting of a J-A25017-20 view of the authentication standard under Pa.R.E. 901(a), which, in pertinent part, provides as follows: “[T]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Under our rules, “[e]vidence that cannot be authenticated by a knowledgeable person, pursuant to [Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1)], may be authenticated by other part

2016The authentication inquiry will, by ____________________________________________ 6 We note that the “rules of evidence govern proceedings in all courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s unified judicial system, except as otherwise provided by law.” See Pa.R.E. 101 (Scope of Rules of Evidence); see also Ferko-Fox, supra (applying Pa.R.E. 402 and 403 in court’s assessment of relevancy of testimony at PFA hearing). -6- J-S80011-16 necessity, be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as with any other document to determine whether there has been an adequate foundational showing of its relevance and

2016Id.

2015Preliminarily, we note that this current question does not trigger an authentication analysis under the standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Mosley, 114 A.3d 1072 (Pa. Super. 2015), and Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996 (Pa. Super. 2011), affirmed by an equally divided court, 106 A.3d 705 (Pa. 2014) because here, the content of the text messages was not admitted into evidence.

2015See Koch, supra at 1005 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting text messages because there was no evidence that tended to substantiate that the appellant wrote the drug related texts); Mosley, supra at 1081-84 (concluding that the trial court erred in admitting the transcript of text messages into evidence where there was no evidence proving the appellant had authored the text messages).

2014Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368 , 423 S.W.3d 569, 578-79 (2012) (recipient testimony and corresponding specific facts in message contents sufficient to authenticate text messages as written by defendant); Holloman v. State, 293 Ga. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (2013) (recipient, the infant murder victim's mother, authenticated messages through testimony that she knew defendant and recognized text messages she received on her phone as from him); State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89 , 334 P.3d 280, 288 (2014) ("[E]stablishing the identity of the author of a text message or e-mail through the use of corrobor

2014Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368 , 423 S.W.3d 569, 578-79 (2012) (recipient testimony and corresponding specific facts in message contents sufficient to authenticate text messages as written by defendant); Holloman v. State, 293 Ga. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (2013) (recipient, the infant murder victim's mother, authenticated messages through testimony that she knew defendant and recognized text messages she received on her phone as from him); State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89 , 334 P.3d 280, 288 (2014) ("[E]stablishing the identity of the author of a text message or e-mail through the use of corrobor

2014Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368 , 423 S.W.3d 569, 578-79 (2012) (recipient testimony and corresponding specific facts in message contents sufficient to authenticate text messages as written by defendant); Holloman v. State, 293 Ga. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (2013) (recipient, the infant murder victim's mother, authenticated messages through testimony that she knew defendant and recognized text messages she received on her phone as from him); State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89 , 334 P.3d 280, 288 (2014) ("[E]stablishing the identity of the author of a text message or e-mail through the use of corrobor

2014Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368 , 423 S.W.3d 569, 578-79 (2012) (recipient testimony and corresponding specific facts in message contents sufficient to authenticate text messages as written by defendant); Holloman v. State, 293 Ga. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (2013) (recipient, the infant murder victim's mother, authenticated messages through testimony that she knew defendant and recognized text messages she received on her phone as from him); State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89 , 334 P.3d 280, 288 (2014) ("[E]stablishing the identity of the author of a text message or e-mail through the use of corrobor

2014Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368 , 423 S.W.3d 569, 578-79 (2012) (recipient testimony and corresponding specific facts in message contents sufficient to authenticate text messages as written by defendant); Holloman v. State, 293 Ga. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (2013) (recipient, the infant murder victim's mother, authenticated messages through testimony that she knew defendant and recognized text messages she received on her phone as from him); State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89 , 334 P.3d 280, 288 (2014) ("[E]stablishing the identity of the author of a text message or e-mail through the use of corrobor

2014Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368 , 423 S.W.3d 569, 578-79 (2012) (recipient testimony and corresponding specific facts in message contents sufficient to authenticate text messages as written by defendant); Holloman v. State, 293 Ga. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (2013) (recipient, the infant murder victim's mother, authenticated messages through testimony that she knew defendant and recognized text messages she received on her phone as from him); State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89 , 334 P.3d 280, 288 (2014) ("[E]stablishing the identity of the author of a text message or e-mail through the use of corrobor

2014Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368 , 423 S.W.3d 569, 578-79 (2012) (recipient testimony and corresponding specific facts in message contents sufficient to authenticate text messages as written by defendant); Holloman v. State, 293 Ga. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (2013) (recipient, the infant murder victim's mother, authenticated messages through testimony that she knew defendant and recognized text messages she received on her phone as from him); State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89 , 334 P.3d 280, 288 (2014) ("[E]stablishing the identity of the author of a text message or e-mail through the use of corrobor

2014Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368 , 423 S.W.3d 569, 578-79 (2012) (recipient testimony and corresponding specific facts in message contents sufficient to authenticate text messages as written by defendant); Holloman v. State, 293 Ga. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (2013) (recipient, the infant murder victim's mother, authenticated messages through testimony that she knew defendant and recognized text messages she received on her phone as from him); State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89 , 334 P.3d 280, 288 (2014) ("[E]stablishing the identity of the author of a text message or e-mail through the use of corrobor

2014Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368 , 423 S.W.3d 569, 578-79 (2012) (recipient testimony and corresponding specific facts in message contents sufficient to authenticate text messages as written by defendant); Holloman v. State, 293 Ga. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (2013) (recipient, the infant murder victim's mother, authenticated messages through testimony that she knew defendant and recognized text messages she received on her phone as from him); State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89 , 334 P.3d 280, 288 (2014) ("[E]stablishing the identity of the author of a text message or e-mail through the use of corrobor

2014Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368 , 423 S.W.3d 569, 578-79 (2012) (recipient testimony and corresponding specific facts in message contents sufficient to authenticate text messages as written by defendant); Holloman v. State, 293 Ga. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (2013) (recipient, the infant murder victim's mother, authenticated messages through testimony that she knew defendant and recognized text messages she received on her phone as from him); State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89 , 334 P.3d 280, 288 (2014) ("[E]stablishing the identity of the author of a text message or e-mail through the use of corrobor

2014Gulley v. State, 2012 Ark. 368 , 423 S.W.3d 569, 578-79 (2012) (recipient testimony and corresponding specific facts in message contents sufficient to authenticate text messages as written by defendant); Holloman v. State, 293 Ga. 151 , 744 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (2013) (recipient, the infant murder victim's mother, authenticated messages through testimony that she knew defendant and recognized text messages she received on her phone as from him); State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89 , 334 P.3d 280, 288 (2014) ("[E]stablishing the identity of the author of a text message or e-mail through the use of corrobor