113 Tennessee opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kimmelman v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2011The performance prong of the Strickland test requires a petitioner raising a claim of ineffectiveness to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or was “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386 (1986). 2011The performance prong of the Strickland test requires a petitioner raising a claim of ineffectiveness to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or “outside the range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386 (1986). | 13 | 13 |
Baxter v. Rosegreen2 sentences2014In Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), our supreme court decided that attorneys should be held to the general standard of whether the services rendered were within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. 2014In Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975), our supreme court decided that attorneys should be held to the general standard of whether the services rendered were within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. | 9 | 9 |
Hill v. Lockhartgreen2 sentences2011In the context of a guilty plea, the prejudice prong requires a petitioner to demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 2011In the context of a guilty plea, in order to prove prejudice, a petitioner “‘must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 516 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). | 2 | 2 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2015The performance prong requires a petitioner raising a claim of ineffectiveness to show that counsel‟s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or was “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 . 2014The performance prong requires a petitioner raising a claim of ineffectiveness to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 . | 1 | 112 |
House v. Stategreen1 sentence2011In the context of a guilty plea, in order to prove prejudice, a petitioner “‘must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” House v. State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 516 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Melsongreen1 sentence2005See State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417 , 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989). 27 The performance prong of the Strickland test requires a petitioner raising a claim of ineffectiveness to show that the counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S. Ct. at 2066 ; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386 , 106 S. Ct. 2574 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ronald Dean Combs v. Ralph Coyle
green
2 sentences2011“Judicial scrutiny of performance is highly deferential, and ‘[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Combs, 205 F.3d at 278 . 2011“Judicial scrutiny of performance is highly deferential, and ‘[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Combs, 205 F.3d at 278 . | 12 | 1994–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.