petitioner raising challenge in New York

2022"A petitioner raising a challenge under Election Law § 16-102 must commence the proceeding and complete service on all the necessary parties within the period prescribed by Election Law § 16-102(2)" ( Matter of Wilson v Garfinkle , 5 AD3d 409, 410 ; see Matter of Yellico v Ringer , 185 AD2d 965 ).

2018The last day to institute a proceeding with regard to a petition is "fourteen days after the last day to file the petition, or within three business days after the officer or board with whom or which such petition was filed, makes a determination of invalidity with respect to such petition, whichever is later" (Election Law § 16-102[2]). " A petitioner raising a challenge under Election Law § 16-102 must commence the proceeding and complete service on all the necessary parties within the period prescribed by Election Law § 16-102(2)'" ( Matter of Nunziato v Messano , 87 AD3d 647, 648 , quoting

2017“A proceeding with respect to a petition shall be instituted within fourteen days after the last day to file the petition, or within three business days after the officer or board with whom or which such petition was filed, makes a determination of invalidity with respect to such petition, whichever is later” (Election Law § 16-102 [2]). “ ‘A petitioner raising a challenge under Election Law § 16-102 must commence the proceeding and complete service on all the necessary parties within the period prescribed by Election Law § 16-102 (2)’ ” (Matter of Nunziato v Messano, 87 AD3d 647, 648 [2011],

2014The court concluded that, although the three-day statute of limitations set forth in Election Law § 16-102 (2) was applicable (see Health v Town of Islip, 169 Misc 2d 382, 386 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1996]), and that a petitioner raising a challenge under this section must file and complete service on all necessary parties within the prescribed time period in order to timely institute the proceeding (see Matter of Goodman v Nassau County Bd. of Elections, 87 AD3d 668, 668 [2011]; Matter of McDonough v Scannapieco, 65 AD3d 647, 648 [2009]; Matter of Wilson v Garfinkle, 5 AD3d 409, 410 [2004]; M

2020In order to properly complete service, actual delivery must occur no later than the last day upon which the proceeding may be commenced ( see Matter of Angletti v Morreale , 25 NY3d 794, 797 [2015]; Matter of DeStefano v Borkowski , 153 AD3d at 818 ; Matter of Wilson v Bowman , 121 AD3d 1402, 1404 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1000 [2014]) — here, April 3, 2020.

2017“A proceeding with respect to a petition shall be instituted within fourteen days after the last day to file the petition, or within three business days after the officer or board with whom or which such petition was filed, makes a determination of invalidity with respect to such petition, whichever is later” (Election Law § 16-102 [2]). “ ‘A petitioner raising a challenge under Election Law § 16-102 must commence the proceeding and complete service on all the necessary parties within the period prescribed by Election Law § 16-102 (2)’ ” (Matter of Nunziato v Messano, 87 AD3d 647, 648 [2011],

2014The court concluded that, although the three-day statute of limitations set forth in Election Law § 16-102 (2) was applicable (see Health v Town of Islip, 169 Misc 2d 382, 386 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1996]), and that a petitioner raising a challenge under this section must file and complete service on all necessary parties within the prescribed time period in order to timely institute the proceeding (see Matter of Goodman v Nassau County Bd. of Elections, 87 AD3d 668, 668 [2011]; Matter of McDonough v Scannapieco, 65 AD3d 647, 648 [2009]; Matter of Wilson v Garfinkle, 5 AD3d 409, 410 [2004]; M

2014The court concluded that, although the three-day statute of limitations set forth in Election Law § 16-102 (2) was applicable (see Health v Town of Islip, 169 Misc 2d 382, 386 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1996]), and that a petitioner raising a challenge under this section must file and complete service on all necessary parties within the prescribed time period in order to timely institute the proceeding (see Matter of Goodman v Nassau County Bd. of Elections, 87 AD3d 668, 668 [2011]; Matter of McDonough v Scannapieco, 65 AD3d 647, 648 [2009]; Matter of Wilson v Garfinkle, 5 AD3d 409, 410 [2004]; M

2014The court concluded that, although the three-day statute of limitations set forth in Election Law § 16-102 (2) was applicable (see Health v Town of Islip, 169 Misc 2d 382, 386 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1996]), and that a petitioner raising a challenge under this section must file and complete service on all necessary parties within the prescribed time period in order to timely institute the proceeding (see Matter of Goodman v Nassau County Bd. of Elections, 87 AD3d 668, 668 [2011]; Matter of McDonough v Scannapieco, 65 AD3d 647, 648 [2009]; Matter of Wilson v Garfinkle, 5 AD3d 409, 410 [2004]; M

2014The court concluded that, although the three-day statute of limitations set forth in Election Law § 16-102 (2) was applicable (see Health v Town of Islip, 169 Misc 2d 382, 386 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1996]), and that a petitioner raising a challenge under this section must file and complete service on all necessary parties within the prescribed time period in order to timely institute the proceeding (see Matter of Goodman v Nassau County Bd. of Elections, 87 AD3d 668, 668 [2011]; Matter of McDonough v Scannapieco, 65 AD3d 647, 648 [2009]; Matter of Wilson v Garfinkle, 5 AD3d 409, 410 [2004]; M

2014The court concluded that, although the three-day statute of limitations set forth in Election Law § 16-102 (2) was applicable (see Health v Town of Islip, 169 Misc 2d 382, 386 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1996]), and that a petitioner raising a challenge under this section must file and complete service on all necessary parties within the prescribed time period in order to timely institute the proceeding (see Matter of Goodman v Nassau County Bd. of Elections, 87 AD3d 668, 668 [2011]; Matter of McDonough v Scannapieco, 65 AD3d 647, 648 [2009]; Matter of Wilson v Garfinkle, 5 AD3d 409, 410 [2004]; M

2014The court concluded that, although the three-day statute of limitations set forth in Election Law § 16-102 (2) was applicable (see Health v Town of Islip, 169 Misc 2d 382, 386 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 1996]), and that a petitioner raising a challenge under this section must file and complete service on all necessary parties within the prescribed time period in order to timely institute the proceeding (see Matter of Goodman v Nassau County Bd. of Elections, 87 AD3d 668, 668 [2011]; Matter of McDonough v Scannapieco, 65 AD3d 647, 648 [2009]; Matter of Wilson v Garfinkle, 5 AD3d 409, 410 [2004]; M

2018The last day to institute a proceeding with regard to a petition is "fourteen days after the last day to file the petition, or within three business days after the officer or board with whom or which such petition was filed, makes a determination of invalidity with respect to such petition, whichever is later" (Election Law § 16-102[2]). " A petitioner raising a challenge under Election Law § 16-102 must commence the proceeding and complete service on all the necessary parties within the period prescribed by Election Law § 16-102(2)'" ( Matter of Nunziato v Messano , 87 AD3d 647, 648 , quoting

2017“A proceeding with respect to a petition shall be instituted within fourteen days after the last day to file the petition, or within three business days after the officer or board with whom or which such petition was filed, makes a determination of invalidity with respect to such petition, whichever is later” (Election Law § 16-102 [2]). “ ‘A petitioner raising a challenge under Election Law § 16-102 must commence the proceeding and complete service on all the necessary parties within the period prescribed by Election Law § 16-102 (2)’ ” (Matter of Nunziato v Messano, 87 AD3d 647, 648 [2011],

2022"A petitioner raising a challenge under Election Law § 16-102 must commence the proceeding and complete service on all the necessary parties within the period prescribed by Election Law § 16-102(2)" ( Matter of Wilson v Garfinkle , 5 AD3d 409, 410 ; see Matter of Yellico v Ringer , 185 AD2d 965 ).

2020"A petitioner raising a challenge under Election Law § 16-102 must commence the proceeding and complete service on all the necessary parties within the period prescribed by Election Law § 16-102 (2)" ( Matter of DeStefano v Borkowski , 153 AD3d 817, 818 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 29 NY3d 915 [2017]; accord Matter of Mandell v Board of Elections of the City of N.Y. , 164 AD3d 719 , 720 [2018]; Matter of Malaga v Suffolk County Bd. of Elections , 66 AD3d 902, 903 [2009]).

2020In order to properly complete service, actual delivery must occur no later than the last day upon which the proceeding may be commenced ( see Matter of Angletti v Morreale , 25 NY3d 794, 797 [2015]; Matter of DeStefano v Borkowski , 153 AD3d at 818 ; Matter of Wilson v Bowman , 121 AD3d 1402, 1404 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1000 [2014]) — here, April 3, 2020.

2020"A petitioner raising a challenge under Election Law § 16-102 must commence the proceeding and complete service on all the necessary parties within the period prescribed by Election Law § 16-102 (2)" ( Matter of DeStefano v Borkowski , 153 AD3d 817, 818 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 29 NY3d 915 [2017]; accord Matter of Mandell v Board of Elections of the City of N.Y. , 164 AD3d 719 , 720 [2018]; Matter of Malaga v Suffolk County Bd. of Elections , 66 AD3d 902, 903 [2009]).

2020In order to properly complete service, actual delivery must occur no later than the last day upon which the proceeding may be commenced ( see Matter of Angletti v Morreale , 25 NY3d 794, 797 [2015]; Matter of DeStefano v Borkowski , 153 AD3d at 818 ; Matter of Wilson v Bowman , 121 AD3d 1402, 1404 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1000 [2014]) — here, April 3, 2020.

2013“In order to acquire personal jurisdiction, the method of service directed in the order to show cause must be reasonably calculated to give notice to the necessary parties within the statutory time period” (Matter of Henry v Trotto, 54 AD3d 424, 425 [2d Dept 2008]).