complained error in Texas

2025In deciding whether substantial rights were affected, “we consider: (1) the character of the alleged error and how it might be 5 considered in connection with other evidence; (2) the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict; (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt; and (4) whether the State emphasized the complained of error.” Id.

2025“In making this determination, we consider: (1) the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence; (2) the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict; (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt; and (4) whether the State emphasized the complained of error.” Id.

2023Id. (citing Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim.

2020“In making this determination, we consider: (1) the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence; (2) the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict; (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt; and (4) whether the 9 State emphasized the complained of error.” Id. (citing Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 356-58 (Tex. Crim.

2024The Entire Jury Charge “As to this factor, we consider the entire jury charge to determine if ‘anything in the 14 balance of the jury charge either exacerbated or ameliorated’ the complained of error.” State v. Lausch, 651 S.W.3d 546 , 556 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d) (quoting French v. State, 563 S.W.3d 228, 236 (Tex. Crim.

2024Entire Jury Charge “As to this factor, we consider the entire jury charge to determine if ‘anything in the balance of the jury charge either exacerbated or ameliorated’ the complained of error.” State v. Lausch, 651 S.W.3d 546 , 556 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d) (quoting French v. State, 563 S.W.3d 228, 236 (Tex. Crim.

2015Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 (holding that reversal is required if the complained of error was “calculated to injure the rights of the defendant”).

2013If error is found, the degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objecting to the complained of instruction. *742 Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); see also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on reh’g); Lovings, 376 S.W.3d at 337 .

2012LEXIS 65, at *7 (Tex.App.-Dallas Jan. 8, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Gardner v. Baker & Botts, L.L.P., 6 S.W.3d 295, 296 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied)); see CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz, 991 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (identifying that, while the statement of points need not be exact, it should describe the nature of the complained of error with reasonable particularity).

2012LEXIS 65, at *7 (Tex.App. -- Dallas Jan. 8, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Gardner v. Baker & Botts, L.L.P., 6 S.W.3d 295, 296 (Tex.App. -- Houston [1[st] Dist.] 1999, pet. denied)); see CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz, 991 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex.App. -- Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (identifying that, while the statement of points need not be exact, it should describe the nature of the complained of error with reasonable particularity).

2025App. 1998)); see also Tolbert v. State, 306 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tex. Crim.

2024Id. at 779, 782; see also Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 461 (“when the complained- of error is the lack of a defensive instruction, the Almanza framework does not apply.”).

2016Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); see also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on reh’g).

2013If error is found, the degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objecting to the complained of instruction. *742 Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); see also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on reh’g); Lovings, 376 S.W.3d at 337 .

2012LEXIS 65, at *7 (Tex.App.-Dallas Jan. 8, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Gardner v. Baker & Botts, L.L.P., 6 S.W.3d 295, 296 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied)); see CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz, 991 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (identifying that, while the statement of points need not be exact, it should describe the nature of the complained of error with reasonable particularity).

2012LEXIS 65, at *7 (Tex.App. -- Dallas Jan. 8, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Gardner v. Baker & Botts, L.L.P., 6 S.W.3d 295, 296 (Tex.App. -- Houston [1[st] Dist.] 1999, pet. denied)); see CMM Grain Co. v. Ozgunduz, 991 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex.App. -- Fort Worth 1999, no pet.) (identifying that, while the statement of points need not be exact, it should describe the nature of the complained of error with reasonable particularity).

2009See Pool , 715 S.W.2d at 633 (remanding for consideration of factual-sufficiency challenge where appellate court failed to consider argument in form that was “readily apparent from the argument briefed”).

1992Appellant claims, however, that he has directly attacked findings one and two, at least in argument, citing Pool v. Ford Motor Co. , 715 S.W.2d 629, 632-33 (Tex. 1986) (points of error are to be liberally construed and error is preserved when the complained of error is readily apparent from the argument briefed).

2009See Campbell, 227 S.W.3d at 328 .

2009See Campbell, 227 S.W.3d at 328 .

2009See Perez v. State , 129 S.W.3d 282, 288 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.).

2009See Perez v. State, 129 S.W.3d 282, 288 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.).

2001See McFarland v. State , 845 S.W.2d 824, 838 (Tex. Crim.

2001See McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 838 (Tex. Crim.

1998Cook v. State , 611 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981).

1995Cook v. State, 611 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981).

1995First, its requirement of a timely objection allows the trial court to "correct the complained of error at that time and to then proceed with the trial." Janecka v. State, 823 S.W.2d 232, 244 (Tex. Crim.App.1990) (on rehearing).

1995First, its requirement of a timely objection allows the trial court to “correct the complained of error at that time and to then proceed with the trial.” Janecka v. State, 823 S.W.2d 232, 244 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (on rehearing).

2019Id.

2019Bagheri v. State, 119 S.W.3d 755, 762-63 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).

2001Reyes v. State, 994 S.W.2d at 153 .

1999See Reyes, 994 S.W.2d at 153 .

2025When lack of a defensive instruction is the complained of error, the Almanza framework does not apply, and “unrequested defensive instructions are still subject to ordinary rules of procedural default.” Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 461 (citing Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. Crim.

2023See Few, 230 S.W.3d at 188–190; Pena v. State, 323 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, no pet.) (“Dismissal for an incorrect cause number, unlike a defective certification where there is no underlying right of appeal, bars an appeal based on a purely procedural error, rather than a substantive restriction.”); see also Ex parte Espinoza, No. 02-15- 00074-CR, 2015 WL 1967230 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 30, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (assigning sua sponte a criminal cause number on appeal where the trial court clerk had mistakenly assi

2023See Few, 230 S.W.3d at 188–190; Pena v. State, 323 S.W.3d 522, 526 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, no pet.) (“Dismissal for an incorrect cause number, unlike a defective certification where there is no underlying right of appeal, bars an appeal based on a purely procedural error, rather than a substantive restriction.”); see also Ex parte Espinoza, No. 02-15- 00074-CR, 2015 WL 1967230 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 30, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (assigning sua sponte a criminal cause number on appeal where the trial court clerk had mistakenly assi

2021App. 2009) (recognizing that court’s prior decision in Phillips v. State, 72 S.W.3d 719, 720 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.), which determined that inclusion 8 See, e.g., Castillo v. State, No. 05-17-00524-CR, 2018 WL 3583577 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 26, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting defendant’s complaint that he suffered egregious harm from inclusion of paragraph [3] of Geesa reasonable-doubt instruction because “the complained of instruction here is identical to the instruction in Woods, and was not among those parts of the Geesa charge [that] P

2021App. 2009) (recognizing that court’s prior decision in Phillips v. State, 72 S.W.3d 719, 720 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.), which determined that inclusion 8 See, e.g., Castillo v. State, No. 05-17-00524-CR, 2018 WL 3583577 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 26, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting defendant’s complaint that he suffered egregious harm from inclusion of paragraph [3] of Geesa reasonable-doubt instruction because “the complained of instruction here is identical to the instruction in Woods, and was not among those parts of the Geesa charge [that] P

2021App. 2009) (recognizing that court’s prior decision in Phillips v. State, 72 S.W.3d 719, 720 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.), which determined that inclusion 8 See, e.g., Castillo v. State, No. 05-17-00524-CR, 2018 WL 3583577 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 26, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting defendant’s complaint that he suffered egregious harm from inclusion of paragraph [3] of Geesa reasonable-doubt instruction because “the complained of instruction here is identical to the instruction in Woods, and was not among those parts of the Geesa charge [that] P

2021App. 2009) (recognizing that court’s prior decision in Phillips v. State, 72 S.W.3d 719, 720 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.), which determined that inclusion 8 See, e.g., Castillo v. State, No. 05-17-00524-CR, 2018 WL 3583577 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 26, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting defendant’s complaint that he suffered egregious harm from inclusion of paragraph [3] of Geesa reasonable-doubt instruction because “the complained of instruction here is identical to the instruction in Woods, and was not among those parts of the Geesa charge [that] P

2020See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (“A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties at any stage of the legal proceedings....”); State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (stating that, for a controversy to be justiciable, there must be a real controversy between the parties that will be actually resolved by the judicial relief sought).

2020See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (“A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties at any stage of the legal proceedings....”); State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (stating that, for a controversy to be justiciable, there must be a real controversy between the parties that will be actually resolved by the judicial relief sought).