hhsc plea in Texas

2015While sovereign immunity bars actions against the state absent a legislative waiver, Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004), requests for declaratory relief that do not attempt to control state action do not implicate governmental immunity at all, see Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 .

2013While sovereign immunity bars actions against the state absent a legislative waiver, Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex.2004), requests for declaratory relief that do not attempt to control state action do not implicate governmental immunity at all, see Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 (Tex.2009).

2015While sovereign immunity bars actions against the state absent a legislative waiver, Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004), requests for declaratory relief that do not attempt to control state action do not implicate governmental immunity at all, see Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 .

2013While sovereign immunity bars actions against the state absent a legislative waiver, Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex.2004), requests for declaratory relief that do not attempt to control state action do not implicate governmental immunity at all, see Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 (Tex.2009).

2025When an agency official “cancels an item of . . . direct spending” or redirects it, “he is rejecting the policy judgment made by [the Legislature] and relying on his own policy judgment.” Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 444 (1998).

2025Code § 391.305 (c); see also, e.g., Labatt Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed.

2025See Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d at 917 ; Resendiz, 642 S.W.3d at 173; Flores, 612 S.W.3d at 312. 5 Because we have sustained HHSC’s first issue, we decline to address HHSC’s remaining sub- issue.

2019See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28 (noting that standard for reviewing plea to jurisdiction mirrors that of summary judgment and, when jurisdictional challenge implicates merits of cause of action, court may make determination on 7 merits in absence of any fact issues); Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1986) (“[T]he decision whether an error in a judgment is judicial or clerical is a question of law.”).

2019See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28 (noting that standard for reviewing plea to jurisdiction mirrors that of summary judgment and, when jurisdictional challenge implicates merits of cause of action, court may make determination on 7 merits in absence of any fact issues); Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1986) (“[T]he decision whether an error in a judgment is judicial or clerical is a question of law.”).

2018Sch. at Hous. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995), and the Providers have pleaded no such interest here, see McAllen Hosps., L.P. v. Suehs, 426 S.W.3d 304 , 312–13 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014, no pet.) (holding that hospitals’ receipt of Medicaid reimbursements from HHSC was not vested property interest because HHSC retained authority to adjust or recoup them under applicable rules’ utilization-review procedures and, thus, trial court properly granted HHSC’s plea to jurisdiction); see also Combs v. City of Webster, 311 S.W.3d 85 , 92–93 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, pet. denied) (affirming comptro

2018Sch. at Hous. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995), and the Providers have pleaded no such interest here, see McAllen Hosps., L.P. v. Suehs, 426 S.W.3d 304 , 312–13 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014, no pet.) (holding that hospitals’ receipt of Medicaid reimbursements from HHSC was not vested property interest because HHSC retained authority to adjust or recoup them under applicable rules’ utilization-review procedures and, thus, trial court properly granted HHSC’s plea to jurisdiction); see also Combs v. City of Webster, 311 S.W.3d 85 , 92–93 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, pet. denied) (affirming comptro

2018See id. 7 We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying HHSC’s plea to the jurisdiction.

2015See TGS–NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex. 2011) (citation omitted). 2 In fact, this provision derives from an internal exceptions process established by the Texas Medicaid and Healthcare Partnership (TMHP) in October 2012.5 As part of this process, DME suppliers are informed they must submit: a minimum of two articles from evidence-based medical peer-reviewed literature that demonstrate validated, uncontested data for use of the requested equipment to treat the recipient’s specific medical condition, and that the requested equipment has been found to be safe and effecti

2015See IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 858 (agency’s executive director had authority to enter contract but did not have authority to, and thus did not, waive agency’s immunity from suit).

2015See Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Amusement & Music Operators of Tex., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 651, 658 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (finding statements in agency memoranda were rules because they imposed binding instructions affecting private rights of all similarly situated persons.) As HHSC’s decision demonstrates, this policy exclusion dictates a specific result - a finding of non-coverage of the standing feature - without regard to the required test for Medicaid DME coverage. 41 Both HHSC’s hearing officer and reviewing attorney regarded this policy as binding on their decisi

2015Co., 997 S.W.2d 248, 255 (Tex. 1999) (stating an agency’s action will be reversed as arbitrary and capricious when the agency fails to follow “the clear, unambiguous language of its own regulation.”) HHSC’s claim that Linda failed to satisfy the necessary prerequisites for prior authorization of DME is wholly unsupported by the administrative record.