comparative equitable indemnity doctrine in California

2009Although the trial court retains the authority to postpone the trial of the indemnity question if it believes such action is appropriate to avoid unduly complicating the plaintiff’s suit, the court may not preclude the filing of such a cross-complaint altogether.” (American Motorcycle, supra, at p. 584, italics added; see also Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1197-1198 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] [under the principles articulated in American Motorcycle, a defendant may pursue a comparative equitable indemnity claim against another tortfeasor “by filing a cross-comp

1993In this case we are asked to consider whether the comparative equitable indemnity doctrine, set forth by our Supreme Court in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 182 , 578 P.2d 899 ], permits an intentional tortfeasor to obtain indemnity from a concurrent intentional tortfeasor.

2007(See Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1197 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] [plaintiffs “no longer have the unilateral right to determine which defendant or defendants should be included in an action” under doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity]; GEM Developers v. Hallcraft Homes of San Diego, Inc. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 419, 428 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 626 ] [“[a]s part of the comparative equitable indemnity doctrine, a defendant who is sued has a right to bring in other tortfeasors who are allegedly responsible for plaintiff’s action through a cross-complaint or by a sep

2007(See Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1197 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] [plaintiffs “no longer have the unilateral right to determine which defendant or defendants should be included in an action” under doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity]; GEM Developers v. Hallcraft Homes of San Diego, Inc. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 419, 428 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 626 ] [“[a]s part of the comparative equitable indemnity doctrine, a defendant who is sued has a right to bring in other tortfeasors who are allegedly responsible for plaintiff’s action through a cross-complaint or by a sep

2009Although the trial court retains the authority to postpone the trial of the indemnity question if it believes such action is appropriate to avoid unduly complicating the plaintiff’s suit, the court may not preclude the filing of such a cross-complaint altogether.” (American Motorcycle, supra, at p. 584, italics added; see also Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1197-1198 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] [under the principles articulated in American Motorcycle, a defendant may pursue a comparative equitable indemnity claim against another tortfeasor “by filing a cross-comp

2009Although the trial court retains the authority to postpone the trial of the indemnity question if it believes such action is appropriate to avoid unduly complicating the plaintiff’s suit, the court may not preclude the filing of such a cross-complaint altogether.” (American Motorcycle, supra, at p. 584, italics added; see also Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1197-1198 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] [under the principles articulated in American Motorcycle, a defendant may pursue a comparative equitable indemnity claim against another tortfeasor “by filing a cross-comp

2007The Supreme Court has applied equitable indemnity not only to cover defendants whose negligence caused the plaintiff’s loss (see, e.g., American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 182 , 578 P.2d 899 ] (American Motorcycle), but to allow apportionment of loss between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent plaintiff (Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 380 , 575 P.2d 1162 ]), and between a defendant liable in strict liability and negligence and another defendant strictly liable (Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart (1978) 21 Ca

2007The Supreme Court has applied equitable indemnity not only to cover defendants whose negligence caused the plaintiff’s loss (see, e.g., American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 182 , 578 P.2d 899 ] (American Motorcycle), but to allow apportionment of loss between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent plaintiff (Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 380 , 575 P.2d 1162 ]), and between a defendant liable in strict liability and negligence and another defendant strictly liable (Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart (1978) 21 Ca

1986(See American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 591-599 [reviewing the origins and development of the common law equitable indemnity doctrine]; see also 7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Equity, §§ 122-123, pp. 5341-5342.) Before the Supreme Court adopted comparative negligence as the law of California in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ], the Legislature had statutorily provided for a limited right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. (§ 875, enacted in Stats. 1957, ch. 1700, § 1, pp. 3076

1986(See American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 591-599 [reviewing the origins and development of the common law equitable indemnity doctrine]; see also 7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Equity, §§ 122-123, pp. 5341-5342.) Before the Supreme Court adopted comparative negligence as the law of California in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ], the Legislature had statutorily provided for a limited right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. (§ 875, enacted in Stats. 1957, ch. 1700, § 1, pp. 3076

2007(See Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1197 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] [plaintiffs “no longer have the unilateral right to determine which defendant or defendants should be included in an action” under doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity]; GEM Developers v. Hallcraft Homes of San Diego, Inc. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 419, 428 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 626 ] [“[a]s part of the comparative equitable indemnity doctrine, a defendant who is sued has a right to bring in other tortfeasors who are allegedly responsible for plaintiff’s action through a cross-complaint or by a sep

2007(See Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1197 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] [plaintiffs “no longer have the unilateral right to determine which defendant or defendants should be included in an action” under doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity]; GEM Developers v. Hallcraft Homes of San Diego, Inc. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 419, 428 [ 261 Cal.Rptr. 626 ] [“[a]s part of the comparative equitable indemnity doctrine, a defendant who is sued has a right to bring in other tortfeasors who are allegedly responsible for plaintiff’s action through a cross-complaint or by a sep

2009Although the trial court retains the authority to postpone the trial of the indemnity question if it believes such action is appropriate to avoid unduly complicating the plaintiff’s suit, the court may not preclude the filing of such a cross-complaint altogether.” (American Motorcycle, supra, at p. 584, italics added; see also Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1197-1198 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] [under the principles articulated in American Motorcycle, a defendant may pursue a comparative equitable indemnity claim against another tortfeasor “by filing a cross-comp

2009Although the trial court retains the authority to postpone the trial of the indemnity question if it believes such action is appropriate to avoid unduly complicating the plaintiff’s suit, the court may not preclude the filing of such a cross-complaint altogether.” (American Motorcycle, supra, at p. 584, italics added; see also Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1197-1198 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 629 , 753 P.2d 585 ] [under the principles articulated in American Motorcycle, a defendant may pursue a comparative equitable indemnity claim against another tortfeasor “by filing a cross-comp

2008Nor did [American Motorcycle] overrule Ash , either explicitly or impliedly.” (Id. at p. 1201.) In addition, the Blecker court explained, although American Motorcycle referred to “ ‘concurrent tortfeasors,’ ” for purposes of the doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity, the term properly refers to both concurrent and successive tortfeasors: “[ijt matters not whether the tortfeasors acted in concert to create a single injury, or successively, in creating distinct and divisible injury.” (Id. at pp. 1200, fn. 2, 1203; 7 see BFGC Architects Planners, Inc. v. Forcum/Mackey Construction, Inc. (20

2008Nor did [American Motorcycle] overrule Ash , either explicitly or impliedly.” (Id. at p. 1201.) In addition, the Blecker court explained, although American Motorcycle referred to “ ‘concurrent tortfeasors,’ ” for purposes of the doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity, the term properly refers to both concurrent and successive tortfeasors: “[ijt matters not whether the tortfeasors acted in concert to create a single injury, or successively, in creating distinct and divisible injury.” (Id. at pp. 1200, fn. 2, 1203; 7 see BFGC Architects Planners, Inc. v. Forcum/Mackey Construction, Inc. (20

2008Nor did [American Motorcycle] overrule Ash , either explicitly or impliedly.” (Id. at p. 1201.) In addition, the Blecker court explained, although American Motorcycle referred to “ ‘concurrent tortfeasors,’ ” for purposes of the doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity, the term properly refers to both concurrent and successive tortfeasors: “[ijt matters not whether the tortfeasors acted in concert to create a single injury, or successively, in creating distinct and divisible injury.” (Id. at pp. 1200, fn. 2, 1203; 7 see BFGC Architects Planners, Inc. v. Forcum/Mackey Construction, Inc. (20

2008Nor did [American Motorcycle] overrule Ash , either explicitly or impliedly.” (Id. at p. 1201.) In addition, the Blecker court explained, although American Motorcycle referred to “ ‘concurrent tortfeasors,’ ” for purposes of the doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity, the term properly refers to both concurrent and successive tortfeasors: “[ijt matters not whether the tortfeasors acted in concert to create a single injury, or successively, in creating distinct and divisible injury.” (Id. at pp. 1200, fn. 2, 1203; 7 see BFGC Architects Planners, Inc. v. Forcum/Mackey Construction, Inc. (20

2008(See Great Western Drywall, Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1041 [noting that the doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity allows for a full spectrum of apportionment of loss between defendants varying from no right to any indemnity to a right of complete indemnity].) 17 Section 910 specifies that prior to filing an action for a violation of the Act’s standards, “the claimant,” shall provide the “builder” a particular form of notice.

1991White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, supra, 21 Cal.3d 497, 507 , fn. omitted.) “[E]quitable indemnification is a matter of fairness.” (Jaffe v. Huxley Architecture (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1188, 1191 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 432 ] [examining comparative equitable indemnification among joint tortfeasors].) The doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity is applied to multiple tortfeasors and is designed to apportion loss among tortfeasors in proportion to their relative culpability so there will be an equitable sharing of the loss among multiple tortfeasors.

1991White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, supra, 21 Cal.3d 497, 507 , fn. omitted.) “[E]quitable indemnification is a matter of fairness.” (Jaffe v. Huxley Architecture (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1188, 1191 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 432 ] [examining comparative equitable indemnification among joint tortfeasors].) The doctrine of comparative equitable indemnity is applied to multiple tortfeasors and is designed to apportion loss among tortfeasors in proportion to their relative culpability so there will be an equitable sharing of the loss among multiple tortfeasors.

1989(Ibid.; Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 604, 612 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 659 P.2d 1160 ]; People ex rel.

1989(Ibid.; Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 604, 612 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 871 , 659 P.2d 1160 ]; People ex rel.

1988(See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 492, 496 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 262 ]; American Bankers Ins.

1988(See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 492, 496 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 262 ]; American Bankers Ins.

1986(Compare Angelus Associates Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc., supra, 167 Cal.App.3d 532, 542 ; Huizar v. Abex Corp., supra, 156 Cal.App.3d 534, 542 ; see also dissent in City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Investment Co., supra, 115 Cal.App.3d 869, 878 .) As the Supreme Court explained in Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725, 742 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 380 , 575 P.2d 1162 ], the court adopted the term “comparative fault,” although the process could more accurately be described as “equitable apportionment of loss” because the term “comparative fault” had gained wide acceptance.

1978In American Motorcycle, the indemnity issue arose in a pretrial mandamus context, and the opinion consequently did not address the question of whether our modification of *333 the traditional indemnity doctrine should be applied to any cases tried prior to the finality of that decision. (3) As we noted in Li, "[i]t is the rule in this state that determinations [as to the retroactive or prospective effect of judicial decisions in civil cases] turn upon considerations of fairness and public policy. [Citation.]" ( 13 Cal.3d at p. 829 .) In Li itself we determined that in light of "the very substa

1978In American Motorcycle, the indemnity issue arose in a pretrial mandamus context, and the opinion consequently did not address the question of whether our modification of *333 the traditional indemnity doctrine should be applied to any cases tried prior to the finality of that decision. (3) As we noted in Li, "[i]t is the rule in this state that determinations [as to the retroactive or prospective effect of judicial decisions in civil cases] turn upon considerations of fairness and public policy. [Citation.]" ( 13 Cal.3d at p. 829 .) In Li itself we determined that in light of "the very substa