16 California opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
E. L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beachgreen2 sentences2022White, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 508 ; Rossmoor, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 628 [where the parties have expressly contracted with respect to the duty to indemnify, the extent of that duty must be determined from the contract].) “In an express indemnity agreement, the parties may agree to results which would not occur in the absence of an express agreement for reasons other than equally or ‘fairly’ apportioning loss.” (Smoketree-Lake Murray, Ltd. v. Mills Concrete Construction Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1724, 1737 , fn. 8 omitted (Smoketree).) Further, “an express indemnity clause is accorded a certain 2016White, Inc. v. Huntington Beach (1978) 21 Cal.3d 497, 508 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 614 , 579 P.2d 505 ], italics omitted; see also 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 123, p. 225 [“An express indemnity clause, *193 rather than the equitable principles behind comparative indemnity, governs the scope of any duty to indemnify.”].) We hold that under the indemnity clause in this case, the injury to a third party that occurred outside the dental suite, in a common area over which the landlords have exclusive control, did not arise out of the tenant’s use of the dental suite. | 2 | 3 |
Oasis West Realty v. Goldmangreen2 sentences2014FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Retirement Housing’s Fourth Amended Complaint In its fourth amended complaint, Retirement Housing Group Foundation and related entities (Retirement Housing) alleged three breach of contract claims against Cain Brothers & Company, LLC (Cain Brothers) based on an alleged “Financial Advisory Agreement,” which, according to Retirement Housing, was comprised of Exhibits A through C attached to its pleading.2 Cain Brothers filed a demurrer to these causes of action, and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, noting in its ruling that Retirement 2013FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Retirement Housing’s Fourth Amended Complaint In its fourth amended complaint, Retirement Housing Group Foundation and related entities (Retirement Housing) alleged three breach of contract claims against Cain Brothers & Company, LLC (Cain Brothers) based on an alleged “Financial Advisory Agreement,” which, according to Retirement Housing, was comprised of Exhibits A through C attached to its pleading.2 Cain Brothers filed a demurrer to these causes of action, and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, noting in its ruling that Retirement | 2 | 2 |
Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc.green2 sentences2022White, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 508 ; Rossmoor, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 628 [where the parties have expressly contracted with respect to the duty to indemnify, the extent of that duty must be determined from the contract].) “In an express indemnity agreement, the parties may agree to results which would not occur in the absence of an express agreement for reasons other than equally or ‘fairly’ apportioning loss.” (Smoketree-Lake Murray, Ltd. v. Mills Concrete Construction Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1724, 1737 , fn. 8 omitted (Smoketree).) Further, “an express indemnity clause is accorded a certain 2022White, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 508 ; Rossmoor, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 628 [where the parties have expressly contracted with respect to the duty to indemnify, the extent of that duty must be determined from the contract].) “In an express indemnity agreement, the parties may agree to results which would not occur in the absence of an express agreement for reasons other than equally or ‘fairly’ apportioning loss.” (Smoketree-Lake Murray, Ltd. v. Mills Concrete Construction Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1724, 1737 , fn. 8 omitted (Smoketree).) Further, “an express indemnity clause is accorded a certain | 1 | 4 |
Martin v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2024(See, e.g., Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 [“where, as here, no valid 23 TRICOAST BUILDERS, INC. v. FONNEGRA Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. waiver has occurred and a trial court has ‘denied [a party] its constitutional right to [jury] trial in the first instance,’ the error is structural, reversible per se” (quoting Martin v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 688, 698 )]; accord, Valley Crest Landscape Development, Inc. v. Mission Pools of Escondido, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 468, 493 [holding that it was reversible error per se to 2015(Martin v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 688, 694 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 303 ].) “ ‘Actions at law *492 usually seek a money judgment for damages, while equitable actions seek some form of specific relief and equity decrees are usually in personam.’ ” (Id. at pp. 695-696.) In the express indemnity claim, Valley Crest alleged Mission Pools breached the terms of the indemnity provision of the Subcontract. | 1 | 3 |
Weaver v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2024(Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017) 582 U.S. 286, 295 ; see id. at pp. 294–296 [discussing structural error in the criminal context]; accord, In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063 , 1077.) The right of trial by jury is a cornerstone of our legal system, and the prejudice that results from the deprivation of the right is of the sort that cannot be measured by conventional inquiry into the likely effect of the deprivation on trial outcomes. 2024(Weaver v. Massachusetts (2017) 582 U.S. 286, 295 ; see id. at pp. 294–296 [discussing structural error in the criminal context]; accord, In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063 , 1077.) The right of trial by jury is a cornerstone of our legal system, and the prejudice that results from the deprivation of the right is of the sort that cannot be measured by conventional inquiry into the likely effect of the deprivation on trial outcomes. | 1 | 1 |
Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc.green1 sentence2024(See, e.g., Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 [“where, as here, no valid 23 TRICOAST BUILDERS, INC. v. FONNEGRA Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. waiver has occurred and a trial court has ‘denied [a party] its constitutional right to [jury] trial in the first instance,’ the error is structural, reversible per se” (quoting Martin v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 688, 698 )]; accord, Valley Crest Landscape Development, Inc. v. Mission Pools of Escondido, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 468, 493 [holding that it was reversible error per se to | 1 | 1 |
Valley Crest Landscape Development, Inc. v. Mission Pools of Escondido, Inc.green1 sentence2024(See, e.g., Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1, 19 [“where, as here, no valid 23 TRICOAST BUILDERS, INC. v. FONNEGRA Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. waiver has occurred and a trial court has ‘denied [a party] its constitutional right to [jury] trial in the first instance,’ the error is structural, reversible per se” (quoting Martin v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 688, 698 )]; accord, Valley Crest Landscape Development, Inc. v. Mission Pools of Escondido, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 468, 493 [holding that it was reversible error per se to | 1 | 1 |
Regional Steel Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence1995(Regional Steel Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.) We explained “[b]y contract, [the contractor] bargained away its right to pursue [the subcontractor] on equitable indemnity grounds. | 1 | 1 |
C. L. Peck Contractors v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1995Peck Contractors v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 828, 834 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 754 ].) Applying these principles, we recently held a general contractor was precluded from bringing an equitable indemnity claim against a subcontractor because the subcontract contained an express indemnity clause requiring the subcontractor to indemnify the contractor where the loss or damage was “ ‘caused in whole’ ” by the subcontractor. 1995Peck Contractors v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 828, 834 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 754 ].) Applying these principles, we recently held a general contractor was precluded from bringing an equitable indemnity claim against a subcontractor because the subcontract contained an express indemnity clause requiring the subcontractor to indemnify the contractor where the loss or damage was “ ‘caused in whole’ ” by the subcontractor. | 1 | 1 |
C. I. Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. Johnson & Turner Painting Co.green2 sentences1990Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. Johnson & Turner Painting Co. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1018 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 824 ].) Our analysis is not based on the mechanical application of some formula. 1990Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. Johnson & Turner Painting Co. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1018 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 824 ].) Our analysis is not based on the mechanical application of some formula. | 1 | 1 |
Hollywood Turf Club v. Montgomery Elevator Co.green2 sentences1978(See Hollywood Turf Club v. Montgomery Elevator Co. (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 580, 586-587 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 81 ].) Within the limitations of the language used, however, an express indemnity clause is accorded a certain preemptive effect, displacing any *508 implied rights which might otherwise arise within the scope of its operation. 1978(See Hollywood Turf Club v. Montgomery Elevator Co. (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 580, 586-587 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 81 ].) Within the limitations of the language used, however, an express indemnity clause is accorded a certain preemptive effect, displacing any *508 implied rights which might otherwise arise within the scope of its operation. | 1 | 1 |
City of Los Angeles v. Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd.green2 sentences1978Thus, as we stated in Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Cal.2d 951 , at page 961, [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 429 P.2d 129 ], when parties by express contractual provision establish a duty in one party to indemnify another, “the extent of that duty must be determined from the contract and not from the independent doctrine of equitable indemnity.” (Italics added.) (See also City of Los Angeles v. Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 416, 428 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 69 ]; Davidson v. Welch, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d 220, 232 . 7 ) When, however, the duty established by contract is by the terms and conditions o 1978Thus, as we stated in Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Cal.2d 951 , at page 961, [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 429 P.2d 129 ], when parties by express contractual provision establish a duty in one party to indemnify another, “the extent of that duty must be determined from the contract and not from the independent doctrine of equitable indemnity.” (Italics added.) (See also City of Los Angeles v. Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 416, 428 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 69 ]; Davidson v. Welch, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d 220, 232 . 7 ) When, however, the duty established by contract is by the terms and conditions o | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Farm General Insurance v. Wells Fargo Bank
green
2 sentences2015Balancing the Equities: The Interstate Fire Opinion Though easily stated in general terms, the element of balancing the equities lacks specificity in details. “‘[T]here is no facile formula for determining superiority of equities, for there is no formula by which to determine the existence or nonexistence of an equity except to the extent that certain familiar fact combinations have been repeatedly adjudged to create an equity in the surety or the third party. . . . ’” (State Farm, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1112 .) Nonetheless, Interstate Fire, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 23 , provides a valuabl 2015Balancing the Equities: The Interstate Fire Opinion Though easily stated in general terms, the element of balancing the equities lacks specificity in details. “ ‘[T]here is no facile formula for determining superiority of equities, for there is no formula by which to determine the existence or nonexistence of an equity except to the extent that certain familiar fact combinations have been repeatedly adjudged to create an equity in the surety or the third party. . . ” (State Farm, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1112 .) Nonetheless, Interstate Fire, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 23 , provides a valuable | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Interstate Fire & Casualty Insurance v. Cleveland Wrecking Co.
green
2 sentences2015Balancing the Equities: The Interstate Fire Opinion Though easily stated in general terms, the element of balancing the equities lacks specificity in details. “‘[T]here is no facile formula for determining superiority of equities, for there is no formula by which to determine the existence or nonexistence of an equity except to the extent that certain familiar fact combinations have been repeatedly adjudged to create an equity in the surety or the third party. . . . ’” (State Farm, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1112 .) Nonetheless, Interstate Fire, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 23 , provides a valuabl 2015Balancing the Equities: The Interstate Fire Opinion Though easily stated in general terms, the element of balancing the equities lacks specificity in details. “ ‘[T]here is no facile formula for determining superiority of equities, for there is no formula by which to determine the existence or nonexistence of an equity except to the extent that certain familiar fact combinations have been repeatedly adjudged to create an equity in the surety or the third party. . . ” (State Farm, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1112 .) Nonetheless, Interstate Fire, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 23 , provides a valuable | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Markley v. Beagle
green
2 sentences1984Thus, as we stated in Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Cal.2d 951 at page 971, [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 429 P.2d 129 ], when parties by express contractual provision establish a duty in one party to indemnify another, ‘the extent of that duty must be determined from the contract and not from the independent doctrine of equitable indemnity.’ (Italics added.) [Citations.] When, however, the duty established by contract is by the terms and conditions of its creation inapplicable to the particular factual setting before the court, the equitable principles of implied indemnity may indeed come into play.” (E 1984Thus, as we stated in Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Cal.2d 951 at page 971, [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 429 P.2d 129 ], when parties by express contractual provision establish a duty in one party to indemnify another, ‘the extent of that duty must be determined from the contract and not from the independent doctrine of equitable indemnity.’ (Italics added.) [Citations.] When, however, the duty established by contract is by the terms and conditions of its creation inapplicable to the particular factual setting before the court, the equitable principles of implied indemnity may indeed come into play.” (E | 2 | 1978–1984 |
Smoketree-Lake Murray, Ltd. v. Mills Concrete Construction Co.
green
1 sentence2022White, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 508 ; Rossmoor, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 628 [where the parties have expressly contracted with respect to the duty to indemnify, the extent of that duty must be determined from the contract].) “In an express indemnity agreement, the parties may agree to results which would not occur in the absence of an express agreement for reasons other than equally or ‘fairly’ apportioning loss.” (Smoketree-Lake Murray, Ltd. v. Mills Concrete Construction Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1724, 1737 , fn. 8 omitted (Smoketree).) Further, “an express indemnity clause is accorded a certain | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Because Melissa Young had agreed “‘to indemnify Lennar for costs incurred in defending a meritless suit by a third party (here Mr. Young),’” Lennar unsuccessfully attempted to characterize its claim against Melissa Young as a “‘straightforward third-party indemnity claim.’” (Lennar Homes, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 .) 20 supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 684-685.) The Lennar Homes court, which decided the case several years before the Supreme Court’s clarification of proper section 425.16 analysis in Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th 871 and Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1057 , did not consider whether the 2019Because Melissa Young had agreed “‘to indemnify Lennar for costs incurred in defending a meritless suit by a third party (here Mr. Young),’” Lennar unsuccessfully attempted to characterize its claim against Melissa Young as a “‘straightforward third-party indemnity claim.’” (Lennar Homes, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 .) 20 supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 684-685.) The Lennar Homes court, which decided the case several years before the Supreme Court’s clarification of proper section 425.16 analysis in Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th 871 and Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1057 , did not consider whether the | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Park v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ.
green
2 sentences2019Because Melissa Young had agreed “‘to indemnify Lennar for costs incurred in defending a meritless suit by a third party (here Mr. Young),’” Lennar unsuccessfully attempted to characterize its claim against Melissa Young as a “‘straightforward third-party indemnity claim.’” (Lennar Homes, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 .) 20 supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 684-685.) The Lennar Homes court, which decided the case several years before the Supreme Court’s clarification of proper section 425.16 analysis in Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th 871 and Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1057 , did not consider whether the 2019Because Melissa Young had agreed “‘to indemnify Lennar for costs incurred in defending a meritless suit by a third party (here Mr. Young),’” Lennar unsuccessfully attempted to characterize its claim against Melissa Young as a “‘straightforward third-party indemnity claim.’” (Lennar Homes, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 .) 20 supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 684-685.) The Lennar Homes court, which decided the case several years before the Supreme Court’s clarification of proper section 425.16 analysis in Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th 871 and Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1057 , did not consider whether the | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Lennar Homes of California, Inc. v. Stephens
green
1 sentence2019Because Melissa Young had agreed “‘to indemnify Lennar for costs incurred in defending a meritless suit by a third party (here Mr. Young),’” Lennar unsuccessfully attempted to characterize its claim against Melissa Young as a “‘straightforward third-party indemnity claim.’” (Lennar Homes, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 684 .) 20 supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 684-685.) The Lennar Homes court, which decided the case several years before the Supreme Court’s clarification of proper section 425.16 analysis in Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th 871 and Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th 1057 , did not consider whether the | 1 | 2019–2019 |
MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co.
green
1 sentence1995(See MacDonald & Kruse, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 420 .) By contrast, a Type II provision permits recovery for concurrent negligence, if the indemnitee was not actively negligent. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Herman Christensen & Sons, Inc. v. Paris Plastering Co.
green
1 sentence1978On the contrary, in the case of Herman Christensen & Sons, Inc. v. Paris Plastering Co., supra, 61 Cal.App.3d 237 , it was held that contractual language of a generality comparable to that of the provision now before us was sufficient for this purpose. “[W]e recognize,” the court there stated “that it is possible to draw an agreement that specifically refers to ‘any person or persons including employees . . .’ of the indemnitor. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Davidson v. Welch
green
2 sentences1978Thus, as we stated in Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Cal.2d 951 , at page 961, [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 429 P.2d 129 ], when parties by express contractual provision establish a duty in one party to indemnify another, “the extent of that duty must be determined from the contract and not from the independent doctrine of equitable indemnity.” (Italics added.) (See also City of Los Angeles v. Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 416, 428 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 69 ]; Davidson v. Welch, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d 220, 232 . 7 ) When, however, the duty established by contract is by the terms and conditions o 1978Thus, as we stated in Markley v. Beagle (1967) 66 Cal.2d 951 , at page 961, [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 429 P.2d 129 ], when parties by express contractual provision establish a duty in one party to indemnify another, “the extent of that duty must be determined from the contract and not from the independent doctrine of equitable indemnity.” (Italics added.) (See also City of Los Angeles v. Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 416, 428 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 69 ]; Davidson v. Welch, supra, 270 Cal.App.2d 220, 232 . 7 ) When, however, the duty established by contract is by the terms and conditions o | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.