16 California opinions name it 1 courts 2002–2022 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Decker v. U.D. Registry, Inc.red2 sentences2007Registry, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1382 , *1349 1387-1390 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 ] held that the statutory requirement of a timely noticed hearing was mandatory and that the trial court must deny a special motion to strike that was noticed for a hearing more than 30 days after service of the motion, absent a showing that the court’s docket conditions necessitated the later hearing date. 2007Registry, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1382 , *1349 1387-1390 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 ] held that the statutory requirement of a timely noticed hearing was mandatory and that the trial court must deny a special motion to strike that was noticed for a hearing more than 30 days after service of the motion, absent a showing that the court’s docket conditions necessitated the later hearing date. | 2 | 3 |
Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberggreen2 sentences2015The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.” (§ 425.16, subd. (f).) The purpose of the time limitation is to permit “ ‘the defendant to test the foundation of the plaintiff’s action before having to “devote its time, energy and resources to combating” a “meritless” lawsuit. . . .’ ” (Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberg (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 772, 783 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 95 ], citation omitted (Platypus).) The statutory deadline also seeks “ ‘to avoid tacti 2015The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.” (§ 425.16, subd. (f).) The purpose of the time limitation is to permit “ ‘the defendant to test the foundation of the plaintiff’s action before having to “devote its time, energy and resources to combating” a “meritless” lawsuit. . . .’ ” (Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberg (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 772, 783 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 95 ], citation omitted (Platypus).) The statutory deadline also seeks “ ‘to avoid tacti | 2 | 2 |
Fair Political Practices Commission v. American Civil Rights Coalition, Inc.green2 sentences2007Registry, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1382, 1387-1390 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 ], and Fair Political Practices Commission v. American Civil Rights Coalition, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1174-1178 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 157 ].” 5 (Stats. 2005, ch. 535, § 3.) Thus, the Legislature expressly abrogated the rule on which Hall relies. 2004(See Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 459-461.) Although this waiver rule is not applied when the alleged error involves a pure question of law (ibid.), the applicability of the 30-day time period at issue here turns on a factual question—whether “the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.” (§ 425.16, subd. (f).) Moreover, as is exemplified by the discussion in FPPC of the trial court’s comments about its own calendaring practices (FPPC, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176 ), this factual question is clearly one that is best suited for resolution by the very court whose do | 1 | 2 |
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp.green1 sentence2022(Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1186 (Hewlett-Packard).) We review the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion as untimely for abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. Allstate Insurancegreen2 sentences2012Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073-1074 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 397 ] [no express or implied right in § 425.16 to be granted leave to amend complaint]; but see Nguyen-Lam v. Cao (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 858, 873 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 ] [“trial court did not err in permitting plaintiff to amend her complaint to plead actual malice in conformity with the proof presented at the hearing on the strike motion”].) In addition, the statute requires that the motion “be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the co 2012Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073-1074 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 397 ] [no express or implied right in § 425.16 to be granted leave to amend complaint]; but see Nguyen-Lam v. Cao (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 858, 873 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 ] [“trial court did not err in permitting plaintiff to amend her complaint to plead actual malice in conformity with the proof presented at the hearing on the strike motion”].) In addition, the statute requires that the motion “be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the co | 1 | 1 |
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.green1 sentence2011(Equilon Enterprises, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 65; Morin v. Rosenthal (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 673, 681 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 149 ].) Defendants argue that even a special motion to strike filed after the 60-day deadline must be decided on the merits and cannot be denied or stricken simply for being filed late. 4 Such a requirement would negate the 60-day deadline. | 1 | 1 |
Morin v. Rosenthalgreen2 sentences2011(Equilon Enterprises, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 65; Morin v. Rosenthal (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 673, 681 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 149 ].) Defendants argue that even a special motion to strike filed after the 60-day deadline must be decided on the merits and cannot be denied or stricken simply for being filed late. 4 Such a requirement would negate the 60-day deadline. 2011(Equilon Enterprises, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 65; Morin v. Rosenthal (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 673, 681 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 149 ].) Defendants argue that even a special motion to strike filed after the 60-day deadline must be decided on the merits and cannot be denied or stricken simply for being filed late. 4 Such a requirement would negate the 60-day deadline. | 1 | 1 |
Dickens v. Provedent Life & Accident Insurancegreen2 sentences2006Co (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 705, 713 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 877 ].) As applicable, former section 425.16, subdivision (f) provided: “The motion shall be noticed for hearing not more than 30 days after service unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.” (Italics added.) Appellant points out that here the special motion to strike was served on July 15, 2004, and set for hearing on August 17, 2004, or three days beyond the time required by subdivision (f). 2006Co (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 705, 713 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 877 ].) As applicable, former section 425.16, subdivision (f) provided: “The motion shall be noticed for hearing not more than 30 days after service unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.” (Italics added.) Appellant points out that here the special motion to strike was served on July 15, 2004, and set for hearing on August 17, 2004, or three days beyond the time required by subdivision (f). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kimoanh Nguyen-Lam v. Sinh Cuong Caogreen2 sentences2012Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073-1074 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 397 ] [no express or implied right in § 425.16 to be granted leave to amend complaint]; but see Nguyen-Lam v. Cao (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 858, 873 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 ] [“trial court did not err in permitting plaintiff to amend her complaint to plead actual malice in conformity with the proof presented at the hearing on the strike motion”].) In addition, the statute requires that the motion “be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the co 2012Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073-1074 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 397 ] [no express or implied right in § 425.16 to be granted leave to amend complaint]; but see Nguyen-Lam v. Cao (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 858, 873 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 ] [“trial court did not err in permitting plaintiff to amend her complaint to plead actual malice in conformity with the proof presented at the hearing on the strike motion”].) In addition, the statute requires that the motion “be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the co | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Greka Integrated, Inc. v. Lowrey
green
2 sentences2022In its October 24 order, the trial court rejected Veeva’s argument that the anti-SLAPP motions should be denied as untimely, stating “[t]he Court routinely hears anti-SLAPP motions outside of the 30-day window due to the conditions of the Court’s docket.” Veeva relies on Greka Integrated, Inc. v. Lowrey (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1572 (Greka) for the position that defendants have the burden of showing that docket conditions required a later hearing. 2021Section 425.16, subdivision (f) provides that an anti- SLAPP motion “shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.” As the court reasoned, “ ‘the burden is on the court clerk, not the moving party’s counsel, to explain why it is necessary to schedule a later hearing date.’ ” Greka Integrated, Inc. v. Lowrey (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1572 , 1577−1578 is inapposite: it was based on an older version of the statute that provided no leeway for delay based on docket cond | 2 | 2021–2022 |
Karnazes v. Ares
green
1 sentence2021(Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 344, 351 .) This standard also applies to the question of whether the motion was timely. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
San Diegans for Open Government v. Har Construction CA4/1
green
1 sentence2021The motion shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing not more than 30 days after the service of the motion unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (f).) The purpose of the time limitation is to permit ‘“the 9 defendant to test the foundation of the plaintiff’s action before having to ‘devote its time, energy and resources to combating’ a ‘meritless’ lawsuit. . . .”’ [Citation.] The statutory deadline also seeks ‘“to avoid tactical manipulation of the stays that attend anti-SLAPP proceedings.”’ [Citation.] All discovery is automatica | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Castillo v. Pacheco
green
1 sentence2015The law governing anti-SLAPP motions A SLAPP "is a civil lawsuit that is aimed at preventing citizens from exercising their political rights or punishing those who have done so. ' "While SLAPP suits masquerade as ordinary lawsuits such as defamation and interference with prospective economic advantage, they are generally meritless suits brought primarily to chill the exercise of free speech or petition rights by the threat of severe economic sanctions against the defendant, and not to vindicate a legally cognizable right." ' (Castillo v. Pacheco (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 242, 249-250 , quoting Se | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Hall v. Time Warner, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013Section 425.16, subdivision (f), as amended, requires the court clerk to schedule a special motion to strike for a hearing no more than 30 days after the motion is served if such a hearing date is available on the court’s docket, but does not require the moving party to ensure that the hearing is so scheduled and does not justify the denial of a special motion to strike solely because the motion was not scheduled for a hearing within 30 days after the motion was served.” (Hall v. Time Warner, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349 .) B. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Dixon v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2002(Dixon v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 741 .) Thus, the motion may be filed within 60 days from service of the initial action and it must be heard no later than 30 days from notice of the hearing unless the docket conditions of the court require a later hearing. (§ 425.16, subd. (f).) Discovery is also stayed until notice of entry of the order ruling on the motion, unless the court “on *1190 noticed motion and for good cause shown, . . . order[s] that specified discovery be conducted.” (§ 425.16, subd. (g).) Further discovery should be limited to the issues raised in the special | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.