restoration hearing in California

1990(See People v. Murrell (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 822, 826 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 175 ].) Thus it is not necessary to address the constitutionality of sections 1369 or 1372, but rather to determine where, as a matter of judicial rule, the burden of proof should lie in a restoration hearing under section 1372.

1990(See People v. Murrell (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 822, 826 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 175 ].) Thus it is not necessary to address the constitutionality of sections 1369 or 1372, but rather to determine where, as a matter of judicial rule, the burden of proof should lie in a restoration hearing under section 1372.

2021(See McCarthy v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1030, fn. 3 ; see also Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666 , 670–671.) The substance of the information contained in the declaration, which details case events and interactions between the district attorney and the bench officer who ruled on Rodriguez’s objection to the restoration hearing and motion to dismiss, appears to have been within the knowledge of the bench officer who made the order at issue in this writ proceeding.

2021(See McCarthy v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1030, fn. 3 ; see also Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666 , 670–671.) The substance of the information contained in the declaration, which details case events and interactions between the district attorney and the bench officer who ruled on Rodriguez’s objection to the restoration hearing and motion to dismiss, appears to have been within the knowledge of the bench officer who made the order at issue in this writ proceeding.

2021(See McCarthy v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1030, fn. 3 ; see also Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666 , 670–671.) The substance of the information contained in the declaration, which details case events and interactions between the district attorney and the bench officer who ruled on Rodriguez’s objection to the restoration hearing and motion to dismiss, appears to have been within the knowledge of the bench officer who made the order at issue in this writ proceeding.

2021(See McCarthy v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1030, fn. 3 ; see also Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666 , 670–671.) The substance of the information contained in the declaration, which details case events and interactions between the district attorney and the bench officer who ruled on Rodriguez’s objection to the restoration hearing and motion to dismiss, appears to have been within the knowledge of the bench officer who made the order at issue in this writ proceeding.

2011L.Rev. 309, 309-310.) In the majority of jurisdictions, including California, the restoration principle is employed; i.e., where an action is brought after expiration of a term for breach of a lessee’s covenant to keep the premises in repair or to surrender them in good repair or in a specified condition, the measure of damages is the reasonable cost of putting the demised premises into the required state of repair or the condition contemplated by the covenant. ( 80 A.L.R.2d 983 , 1001; 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 979, p. 951; Gold Min. & Water Co. [v.] Swinerton (1943) 23 Cal.2d 19,

2011L.Rev. 309, 309-310.) In the majority of jurisdictions, including California, the restoration principle is employed; i.e., where an action is brought after expiration of a term for breach of a lessee’s covenant to keep the premises in repair or to surrender them in good repair or in a specified condition, the measure of damages is the reasonable cost of putting the demised premises into the required state of repair or the condition contemplated by the covenant. ( 80 A.L.R.2d 983 , 1001; 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 979, p. 951; Gold Min. & Water Co. [v.] Swinerton (1943) 23 Cal.2d 19,

2011L.Rev. 309, 309-310.) In the majority of jurisdictions, including California, the restoration principle is employed; i.e., where an action is brought after expiration of a term for breach of a lessee’s covenant to keep the premises in repair or to surrender them in good repair or in a specified condition, the measure of damages is the reasonable cost of putting the demised premises into the required state of repair or the condition contemplated by the covenant. ( 80 A.L.R.2d 983 , 1001; 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 979, p. 951; Gold Min. & Water Co. [v.] Swinerton (1943) 23 Cal.2d 19,

2011L.Rev. 309, 309-310.) In the majority of jurisdictions, including California, the restoration principle is employed; i.e., where an action is brought after expiration of a term for breach of a lessee’s covenant to keep the premises in repair or to surrender them in good repair or in a specified condition, the measure of damages is the reasonable cost of putting the demised premises into the required state of repair or the condition contemplated by the covenant. ( 80 A.L.R.2d 983 , 1001; 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 979, p. 951; Gold Min. & Water Co. [v.] Swinerton (1943) 23 Cal.2d 19,

2011(Worthington [v.] Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 435, 442 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 272 ]; cf. Linforth [v.] S.F.

2011(Worthington [v.] Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 435, 442 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 272 ]; cf. Linforth [v.] S.F.

2013Application of Exception to Restoration Requirement Buyers argue that the court abused its discretion when it concluded that rescission was not available because it misunderstood the legal rules governing application of the “special circumstances” exception to the restoration requirement. 21 The trial court held that “[r]escission is not an available remedy because [Buyers] cannot restore the consideration received under the contract and because it is barred by laches. [¶] [Buyers] cannot restore the property to [Sellers] because through their voluntary actions in defaulting on the first trust

2010(Taylor, supra, 207 Cal. at p. 103 .) Two decades later, this court held in Carruth v. Fritch (1950) 36 Cal.2d 426 , 430—431 [ 224 P.2d 702 ] (Carruth), that Garcia and Taylor did not bar a rescission claim by a plaintiff who—unlike the plaintiff in Garcia— acknowledged the restoration requirement, but alleged that she could not satisfy that requirement because, after the defendants had paid her for her release, she had spent the money on medical expenses.

1990Defendant argues that to impose upon an accused the burden to prove his own incompetence creates an unconstitutional risk: when the evidence is *1483 balanced an incompetent defendant may be compelled to stand trial. ( People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d 870 , decides this issue adversely to defendant.) Although defendant "submits that for constitutional purposes there is no difference between a competency hearing ... and a restoration hearing" we, nevertheless, inquire whether there is such a difference.

1990(People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d 870 , decides this issue adversely to defendant.) Although defendant “submits that for constitutional purposes there is no difference between a competency hearing . . . and a restoration hearing” we, nevertheless, inquire whether there is such a difference.

2024Mayfield said that his expert witnesses would not be 8 Regarding the effect of a remittitur, our Supreme Court has explained that “ ‘as a general rule, [it] cannot exercise any jurisdiction over a cause in which the remittitur has been issued by its order and filed in the [c]ourt below.’ ” (In re McGee (1951) 37 Cal.2d 6, 9 ; see also Snukal v. Flightways Manufacturing, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 754, 774, fn. 5 [“The appellate court clerk’s issuance of the remittitur effects the transfer of jurisdiction to the lower court. [Citation.] The reviewing ‘court has no appellate jurisdiction over its ow

2024(Bakersfield Elementary Teachers Assn. v. Bakersfield City School Dist. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1293, fn. 20 .) “ ‘Tenure has been stated to be a relation between the teacher and the school district, guaranteeing job security to the 6 the District restored George to at least her prior placement on the salary schedule, George has not established a violation of the restoration requirement.

2024(Rodriguez, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 489.) The court noted its concern about the hypothetical situation it had described and reiterated its belief that courts “would be forced to send the case out for a restoration hearing when the [defendant’s] lawyer is not ready.” The court continued: “I 6 “Although the text of section 1387 is ‘hardly pellucid’ [citation], it generally permits the prosecution to refile felony charges following dismissal only once. [Citation.] This limitation, known as the ‘two-dismissal rule,’ was enacted in 1975 in order to prevent harassment of defendants by repeated dismi

2024Such a dismissal is ‘without prejudice to the initiation of any proceedings that may be appropriate’ under the LPS Act.” (Jackson, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 102 .) In other words, the competency scheme does not specifically provide procedures that should occur if a defendant has been certified as restored to competency and returned to the committing court but does not receive a restoration hearing before the maximum 11 Section 1370(c)(1) states in relevant part: “At the end of two years from the date of commitment . . . but no later than 90 days prior to the expiration of the defendant’s term of

2024(Adair, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 1444 .) This is further confirmed by the language of the restoration requirement deferring to other provisions of the Education Code when in conflict—“the governing board of the district shall . . . restore to [a teacher] all of the rights, benefits and burdens of, a permanent employee, except as otherwise provided in this code.” (§ 44931, italics added; see San Jose Teachers Assn. v. Allen (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 627, 641 [“The ‘except as otherwise provided in this code’ provision in [the restoration requirement] must be read as deferring to section 44848,”

2024(See Barron v. Superior Court (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 628 , 638 [“Under the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, ‘the explicit mention of some things in a text may imply other matters not similarly addressed are excluded’ ”]; see also Phillippe v. Shapell Industries (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1247, 1265 [“ ‘Courts may not read into a statute an exception not incorporated therein by the Legislature’ ”].) Still, the District argues the existence of the restoration requirement acts to provide an exception to the uniformity requirement.

2024(See Barron v. Superior Court (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 628 , 638 [“Under the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, ‘the explicit mention of some things in a text may imply other matters not similarly addressed are excluded’ ”]; see also Phillippe v. Shapell Industries (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1247, 1265 [“ ‘Courts may not read into a statute an exception not incorporated therein by the Legislature’ ”].) Still, the District argues the existence of the restoration requirement acts to provide an exception to the uniformity requirement.

2013(Stock v. Meek (1950) 35 Cal.2d 809, 814 [in determining whether appeal on cause of action for rescission was moot, court considered sale of property after entry of judgment]; Dreiske v. Los Angeles Investment Securities Corp. (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 59, 63-64 [plaintiff could not state a cause of action for rescission because of loss of consideration due to voluntary act by plaintiff]; Chamberlain v. Wakefield (1949) 95 Cal.App.2d 280 [applies a different exception to the restoration requirement].) None of these cases aid Buyers. 23 Buyers read too much into the phrase “before suit is brought” i

2013(Stock v. Meek (1950) 35 Cal.2d 809, 814 [in determining whether appeal on cause of action for rescission was moot, court considered sale of property after entry of judgment]; Dreiske v. Los Angeles Investment Securities Corp. (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d 59, 63-64 [plaintiff could not state a cause of action for rescission because of loss of consideration due to voluntary act by plaintiff]; Chamberlain v. Wakefield (1949) 95 Cal.App.2d 280 [applies a different exception to the restoration requirement].) None of these cases aid Buyers. 23 Buyers read too much into the phrase “before suit is brought” i

2013Application of Exception to Restoration Requirement Buyers argue that the court abused its discretion when it concluded that rescission was not available because it misunderstood the legal rules governing application of the “special circumstances” exception to the restoration requirement. 21 The trial court held that “[r]escission is not an available remedy because [Buyers] cannot restore the consideration received under the contract and because it is barred by laches. [¶] [Buyers] cannot restore the property to [Sellers] because through their voluntary actions in defaulting on the first trust

2013As we have noted, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “[t]here are exceptional cases where restoration, or an offer to restore before suit is brought, is not necessary.” (Carruth, supra, 36 Cal.2d at p. 430 ; California Farm, 151 Cal. at p. 739 ; Kelley, supra, 120 Cal. at p. 511 .) This merely means that restoration or an offer to restore is a condition precedent to filing an action for rescission and to obtaining rescission.

2013Application of Exception to Restoration Requirement Buyers argue that the court abused its discretion when it concluded that rescission was not available because it misunderstood the legal rules governing application of the “special circumstances” exception to the restoration requirement. 21 The trial court held that “[r]escission is not an available remedy because [Buyers] cannot restore the consideration received under the contract and because it is barred by laches. [¶] [Buyers] cannot restore the property to [Sellers] because through their voluntary actions in defaulting on the first trust

2013As we have noted, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “[t]here are exceptional cases where restoration, or an offer to restore before suit is brought, is not necessary.” (Carruth, supra, 36 Cal.2d at p. 430 ; California Farm, 151 Cal. at p. 739 ; Kelley, supra, 120 Cal. at p. 511 .) This merely means that restoration or an offer to restore is a condition precedent to filing an action for rescission and to obtaining rescission.

1990Section 1372, subdivision (c) is part of "a comprehensive scheme for dealing with criminal defendants whose mental competency is suspect." ( People v. Bye (1981) 116 Cal. App.3d 569, 571 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 186 ].) In construing this section we are guided by the following principles. (3) Our "quest [is] to determine the Legislature's intent so that the purpose of the legislation may be effectuated.... [A] statute should be construed with reference to the entire statutory system of which it forms a part in such a way that harmony may be achieved among the parts...." ( People v. Caudillo (1978) 21

1990Section 1372, subdivision (c) is part of "a comprehensive scheme for dealing with criminal defendants whose mental competency is suspect." ( People v. Bye (1981) 116 Cal. App.3d 569, 571 [ 172 Cal. Rptr. 186 ].) In construing this section we are guided by the following principles. (3) Our "quest [is] to determine the Legislature's intent so that the purpose of the legislation may be effectuated.... [A] statute should be construed with reference to the entire statutory system of which it forms a part in such a way that harmony may be achieved among the parts...." ( People v. Caudillo (1978) 21