Bailey error in Illinois

2021Relying on People v. Munson, 2018 IL App (3d) 150544 , People v. Baller, 2018 IL App (3d) 160165 , and People v. Partida, 2018 IL App (3d) 160581 , the State asks us to hold that the appellate court must reverse and remand for further leave-to-file proceedings when the trial court commits a “Bailey error.” ¶ 29 In Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24 , we noted that under section 122-1(f) the trial court must conduct a preliminary and independent screening of the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition for facts demonstrating cause and prejudice.

2020Relying on People v. Munson, 2018 IL App (3d) 150544 , People v. Baller, 2018 IL App (3d) 160165 , and People v. Partida, 2018 IL App (3d) 160581 , the State asks us to hold that the appellate court must reverse and remand for further leave-to-file proceedings when the trial court commits a “Bailey error.” ¶ 29 In Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24 , we noted that under section 122-1(f) the trial court must conduct a preliminary and independent screening of the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition for facts demonstrating cause and prejudice.

2026In Hampton, the reviewing court applied the Bailey factors “to determine whether the State offered circumstantial evidence from which [the] defendant’s knowledge could be inferred.” Hampton, 358 Ill.

2026In Hampton, the reviewing court applied the Bailey factors “to determine whether the State offered circumstantial evidence from which [the] defendant’s knowledge could be inferred.” Hampton, 358 Ill.

2021Relying on People v. Munson, 2018 IL App (3d) 150544 , People v. Baller, 2018 IL App (3d) 160165 , and People v. Partida, 2018 IL App (3d) 160581 , the State asks us to hold that the appellate court must reverse and remand for further leave-to-file proceedings when the trial court commits a “Bailey error.” ¶ 29 In Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24 , we noted that under section 122-1(f) the trial court must conduct a preliminary and independent screening of the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition for facts demonstrating cause and prejudice.

2020Relying on People v. Munson, 2018 IL App (3d) 150544 , People v. Baller, 2018 IL App (3d) 160165 , and People v. Partida, 2018 IL App (3d) 160581 , the State asks us to hold that the appellate court must reverse and remand for further leave-to-file proceedings when the trial court commits a “Bailey error.” ¶ 29 In Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24 , we noted that under section 122-1(f) the trial court must conduct a preliminary and independent screening of the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition for facts demonstrating cause and prejudice.

2021He contended the following: “If we affirm the denial of the defendant’s motion, it is difficult to say that our decision was not influenced, at least in some respect, by the State’s appellate -5- argument against the motion. [Citation.] Such influence from the State would clearly violate the Bailey rule.” Baller, 2018 IL App (3d) 160165 , ¶ 23 (Holdridge, J., specially concurring). ¶ 19 After Baller, the Third District decided People v. Lusby, 2018 IL App (3d) 150189 , ¶ 1, 117 N.E.3d 527 , appeal allowed, No. 124046 (Ill.

2021He contended the following: “If we affirm the denial of the defendant’s motion, it is difficult to say that our decision was not influenced, at least in some respect, by the State’s appellate -5- argument against the motion. [Citation.] Such influence from the State would clearly violate the Bailey rule.” Baller, 2018 IL App (3d) 160165 , ¶ 23 (Holdridge, J., specially concurring). ¶ 19 After Baller, the Third District decided People v. Lusby, 2018 IL App (3d) 150189 , ¶ 1, 117 N.E.3d 527 , appeal allowed, No. 124046 (Ill.

2019He contended the following: “If we affirm the denial of the defendant’s motion, it is difficult to say that our decision was not influenced, at least in some respect, by the State’s appellate argument against the motion. [Citation.] Such influence from the State would clearly violate the Bailey rule.” Baller, 2018 IL App (3d) 160165 , ¶ 23 (Holdridge, J., specially concurring). ¶ 19 After Baller, the Third District decided People v. Lusby, 2018 IL App (3d) 150189, ¶ 1 , 117 N.E.3d 527 , pet. for leave to appeal allowed, No. 124046 (Jan. 31, 2019), in which the defendant appealed the denial of

2019He contended the following: “If we affirm the denial of the defendant’s motion, it is difficult to say that our decision was not influenced, at least in some respect, by the State’s appellate argument against the motion. [Citation.] Such influence from the State would clearly violate the Bailey rule.” Baller, 2018 IL App (3d) 160165 , ¶ 23 (Holdridge, J., specially concurring). ¶ 19 After Baller, the Third District decided People v. Lusby, 2018 IL App (3d) 150189, ¶ 1 , 117 N.E.3d 527 , pet. for leave to appeal allowed, No. 124046 (Jan. 31, 2019), in which the defendant appealed the denial of

2021Relying on People v. Munson, 2018 IL App (3d) 150544 , People v. Baller, 2018 IL App (3d) 160165 , and People v. Partida, 2018 IL App (3d) 160581 , the State asks us to hold that the appellate court must reverse and remand for further leave-to-file proceedings when the trial court commits a “Bailey error.” ¶ 29 In Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24 , we noted that under section 122-1(f) the trial court must conduct a preliminary and independent screening of the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition for facts demonstrating cause and prejudice.

2020Relying on People v. Munson, 2018 IL App (3d) 150544 , People v. Baller, 2018 IL App (3d) 160165 , and People v. Partida, 2018 IL App (3d) 160581 , the State asks us to hold that the appellate court must reverse and remand for further leave-to-file proceedings when the trial court commits a “Bailey error.” ¶ 29 In Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24 , we noted that under section 122-1(f) the trial court must conduct a preliminary and independent screening of the defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition for facts demonstrating cause and prejudice.

2021See People v. Conway, 2019 IL App (2d) 170196, ¶ 23 (“Bailey *** indicates that, at least in some cases, considerations of judicial economy militate against remand to the trial court”); accord People v. Dolis, 2020 IL App (1st) 180267 ; People v. Coffey, 2020 IL App (3d) 160427 ; People v. Ames, 2019 IL App (4th) 170569 . - 12 - prohibition includes not only inherently barbaric penalties but also disproportionate ones.

2021See People v. Conway, 2019 IL App (2d) 170196, ¶ 23 (“Bailey *** indicates that, at least in some cases, considerations of judicial economy militate against remand to the trial court”); accord People v. Dolis, 2020 IL App (1st) 180267 ; People v. Coffey, 2020 IL App (3d) 160427 ; People v. Ames, 2019 IL App (4th) 170569 . - 12 - prohibition includes not only inherently barbaric penalties but also disproportionate ones.

2021See People v. Conway, 2019 IL App (2d) 170196, ¶ 23 (“Bailey *** indicates that, at least in some cases, considerations of judicial economy militate against remand to the trial court”); accord People v. Dolis, 2020 IL App (1st) 180267 ; People v. Coffey, 2020 IL App (3d) 160427 ; People v. Ames, 2019 IL App (4th) 170569 . - 12 - prohibition includes not only inherently barbaric penalties but also disproportionate ones.

2021See People v. Conway, 2019 IL App (2d) 170196, ¶ 23 (“Bailey *** indicates that, at least in some cases, considerations of judicial economy militate against remand to the trial court”); accord People v. Dolis, 2020 IL App (1st) 180267 ; People v. Coffey, 2020 IL App (3d) 160427 ; People v. Ames, 2019 IL App (4th) 170569 . - 12 - prohibition includes not only inherently barbaric penalties but also disproportionate ones.

2026People v. Welch, 2025 IL App (1st) 231116, ¶ 23 , pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 132441 (filed Nov. 17, 2025). ¶ 37 Here, applying the Bailey factors and viewing other circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant knew that the firearm was present.

2026People v. Welch, 2025 IL App (1st) 231116, ¶ 23 , pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 132441 (filed Nov. 17, 2025). ¶ 37 Here, applying the Bailey factors and viewing other circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant knew that the firearm was present.

2025People v. Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 132176, ¶ 25 . ¶ 24 Applying the specific Bailey factors and viewing the other circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that Welch knew the -6- 1-23-1116 firearm was under the passenger seat where he was sitting.

2025People v. Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 132176, ¶ 25 . ¶ 24 Applying the specific Bailey factors and viewing the other circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that Welch knew the -6- 1-23-1116 firearm was under the passenger seat where he was sitting.

2024The court listed the “Bailey factors” and further stated that the “State cannot rely on a defendant’s mere presence to establish knowledge that a controlled substance is in a vehicle.” Id. (citing People v. Horn, 2021 IL App (2d) 190190, ¶ 40 , People v. Ingram, 389 Ill.

2022As mentioned, “[k]nowledge may be shown by evidence of a defendant’s acts, declarations, or conduct from which it can be inferred that he knew the contraband existed in the place where it was found.” Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17 ; see also Bailey, 333 Ill.

2022As mentioned, “[k]nowledge may be shown by evidence of a defendant’s acts, declarations, or conduct from which it can be inferred that he knew the contraband existed in the place where it was found.” Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17 ; see also Bailey, 333 Ill.

2021The supreme court, however, also determined, with reference to People v. Conway, 2019 IL App (2d) 170196, ¶ 23 (“ ‘Bailey *** indicates that, at least in some cases, considerations of judicial economy militate against remand to the trial court.’ ”), that, even in the face of a Bailey error, a reviewing court may refrain from remanding a case when resolution of a defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive petition would be “ ‘[i]n the interest of judicial economy.’ ” Lusby, 2020 IL 124046 , ¶ 29 n.1 (citing Bailey, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 42 ).

2021The supreme court, however, also determined, with reference to People v. Conway, 2019 IL App (2d) 170196, ¶ 23 (“ ‘Bailey *** indicates that, at least in some cases, considerations of judicial economy militate against remand to the trial court.’ ”), that, even in the face of a Bailey error, a reviewing court may refrain from remanding a case when resolution of a defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive petition would be “ ‘[i]n the interest of judicial economy.’ ” Lusby, 2020 IL 124046 , ¶ 29 n.1 (citing Bailey, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 42 ).

2009Williams responded in relevant part by citing In re Estate of Hoellen, 367 Ill.App.3d 240 , 305 Ill.Dec. 182 , 854 N.E.2d 774 (2006), Alcantar v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 288 Ill.App.3d 644 , 224 Ill.Dec. 372 , 681 N.E.2d 993 (1997), and People v. Damnitz, 269 Ill.App.3d 51 , 206 Ill.Dec. 460 , 645 N.E.2d 465 (1994), for the proposition that a motion for substitution of judge for cause must make a threshold showing of prejudice to warrant transfer to another judge for hearing.

2009Williams responded in relevant part by citing In re Estate of Hoellen, 367 Ill.App.3d 240 , 305 Ill.Dec. 182 , 854 N.E.2d 774 (2006), Alcantar v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 288 Ill.App.3d 644 , 224 Ill.Dec. 372 , 681 N.E.2d 993 (1997), and People v. Damnitz, 269 Ill.App.3d 51 , 206 Ill.Dec. 460 , 645 N.E.2d 465 (1994), for the proposition that a motion for substitution of judge for cause must make a threshold showing of prejudice to warrant transfer to another judge for hearing.

2009Williams responded in relevant part by citing In re Estate of Hoellen, 367 Ill.App.3d 240 , 305 Ill.Dec. 182 , 854 N.E.2d 774 (2006), Alcantar v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 288 Ill.App.3d 644 , 224 Ill.Dec. 372 , 681 N.E.2d 993 (1997), and People v. Damnitz, 269 Ill.App.3d 51 , 206 Ill.Dec. 460 , 645 N.E.2d 465 (1994), for the proposition that a motion for substitution of judge for cause must make a threshold showing of prejudice to warrant transfer to another judge for hearing.

2009Williams responded in relevant part by citing In re Estate of Hoellen, 367 Ill.App.3d 240 , 305 Ill.Dec. 182 , 854 N.E.2d 774 (2006), Alcantar v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 288 Ill.App.3d 644 , 224 Ill.Dec. 372 , 681 N.E.2d 993 (1997), and People v. Damnitz, 269 Ill.App.3d 51 , 206 Ill.Dec. 460 , 645 N.E.2d 465 (1994), for the proposition that a motion for substitution of judge for cause must make a threshold showing of prejudice to warrant transfer to another judge for hearing.

2009Williams responded in relevant part by citing In re Estate of Hoellen, 367 Ill.

2009Williams responded in relevant part by citing In re Estate of Hoellen, 367 Ill.App.3d 240 , 305 Ill.Dec. 182 , 854 N.E.2d 774 (2006), Alcantar v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 288 Ill.App.3d 644 , 224 Ill.Dec. 372 , 681 N.E.2d 993 (1997), and People v. Damnitz, 269 Ill.App.3d 51 , 206 Ill.Dec. 460 , 645 N.E.2d 465 (1994), for the proposition that a motion for substitution of judge for cause must make a threshold showing of prejudice to warrant transfer to another judge for hearing.