10 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Vinogreen1 sentence2018See State v. Vino, 100 So. 3d 716, 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (holding that, in reviewing a trial court’s order on a motion seeking immunity under the Stand Your Ground Law, “the trial court’s legal conclusion is reviewed de novo, but its findings of fact are presumed correct and can be reversed only if they are not supported by competent substantial evidence.”) Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of prohibition. | 1 | 1 |
McCray v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See McCray v. State, 730 So.2d at 818 ; Acosta, 439 So.2d at 1027 ; Munford, 343 So.2d at 69 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Michael Barnett, United States of America v. Barry Jordan, (Two Cases)green1 sentence2006As we conclude that the investigatory stop of the vehicle Bailey was in was based upon reasonable well-founded suspicion, see Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993), and that the written consent to search obtained from Bailey was freely and voluntarily given, see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 , 96 S.Ct. 820 , 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)(holding that “custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a ... consent to search”); United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 555-56 (1st Cir.1993)(rejecting defendant’s argument that his consent was not voluntary due to the “stro | 1 | 1 |
Popple v. Stategreen1 sentence2006As we conclude that the investigatory stop of the vehicle Bailey was in was based upon reasonable well-founded suspicion, see Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993), and that the written consent to search obtained from Bailey was freely and voluntarily given, see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 , 96 S.Ct. 820 , 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)(holding that “custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a ... consent to search”); United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 555-56 (1st Cir.1993)(rejecting defendant’s argument that his consent was not voluntary due to the “stro | 1 | 1 |
Pagan v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792, 806 (Fla.2002)(“[A] trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness, and the reviewing court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.”) Affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
Janney v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Richardson v. State, 432 So.2d 750, 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Janney v. State, 599 So.2d 731, 731 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). | 1 | 1 |
Richardson v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Richardson v. State, 432 So.2d 750, 751 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Janney v. State, 599 So.2d 731, 731 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). | 1 | 1 |
The Florida Bar v. Rightmyergreen1 sentence2001See Florida Bar v. Rightmyer, 616 So.2d 953, 955 (Fla.1993) (holding that "[n]o breach of professional ethics, or of the law, is more harmful to the administration of justice or more hurtful to the public appraisal of the legal profession than the knowledgeable use by an attorney of false testimony in the judicial process"); Florida Bar v. Leon, 510 So.2d 873 (Fla.1987) (attorney disbarred for engaging in ex parte communication with judge to achieve alteration of sentences and then lying under oath to Judicial Qualifications Commission). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vancegreen1 sentence1998See State v. Vance, 692 So.2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (officer had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle based on a BOLO radio alert which described the vehicle and its occupants and the officer spotted the vehicle near its expected location a short time after the BOLO was issued); Freeman v. State, 450 So.2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (stop of the defendant was reasonable where the defendant matched the description of fugitives observed in the area, defendant was acting suspiciously and ran when approached by the officers); State v. Jones, 417 So.2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (stop of defendant's ve | 1 | 1 |
State v. Greenred1 sentence1994See also State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925 (Fla. 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Florida Bar: Amendment to Rules of Criminal Proceduregreen1 sentence1990Walker v. State, 498 So.2d 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); The Florida Bar: Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure (3.701, 3.988 Sentencing Guidelines), 451 So.2d 824, 826 (Fla. 1984); [2] The Florida Bar Re: Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sentencing Guidelines, 3.701, *608 3.988), 482 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1985). [3] Thus, the trial court was correct in assessing points for victim injury for each count of sexual battery. b. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State of Florida v. Anthony Duwayne Horsley, Jr.
green
1 sentence2019As for Bailey's claim that the statutory enhancement did not exist at the time of his indictment, the Florida Supreme Court holds that the 2014 version of section -4- 775.082(1)(b)(1) applies retroactively "to all juvenile offenders whose sentences are unconstitutional under Miller." Horsley, 160 So. 3d at 395 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Sommerville v. Allstate Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2016As discussed in Sommerville v. Allstate Insurance Co., 65 So.3d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), “[tlypically, automobile insurance policies recognize two classes of insureds. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Munford v. State
green
1 sentence2008See McCray v. State, 730 So.2d at 818 ; Acosta, 439 So.2d at 1027 ; Munford, 343 So.2d at 69 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Acosta
green
1 sentence2008See McCray v. State, 730 So.2d at 818 ; Acosta, 439 So.2d at 1027 ; Munford, 343 So.2d at 69 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Watson
green
2 sentences2006As we conclude that the investigatory stop of the vehicle Bailey was in was based upon reasonable well-founded suspicion, see Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993), and that the written consent to search obtained from Bailey was freely and voluntarily given, see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 , 96 S.Ct. 820 , 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)(holding that “custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a ... consent to search”); United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 555-56 (1st Cir.1993)(rejecting defendant’s argument that his consent was not voluntary due to the “stro 2006As we conclude that the investigatory stop of the vehicle Bailey was in was based upon reasonable well-founded suspicion, see Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993), and that the written consent to search obtained from Bailey was freely and voluntarily given, see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 , 96 S.Ct. 820 , 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)(holding that “custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a ... consent to search”); United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 555-56 (1st Cir.1993)(rejecting defendant’s argument that his consent was not voluntary due to the “stro | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Florida Bar v. Leon
neutral
1 sentence2001See Florida Bar v. Rightmyer, 616 So.2d 953, 955 (Fla.1993) (holding that "[n]o breach of professional ethics, or of the law, is more harmful to the administration of justice or more hurtful to the public appraisal of the legal profession than the knowledgeable use by an attorney of false testimony in the judicial process"); Florida Bar v. Leon, 510 So.2d 873 (Fla.1987) (attorney disbarred for engaging in ex parte communication with judge to achieve alteration of sentences and then lying under oath to Judicial Qualifications Commission). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Jones
green
1 sentence1998See State v. Vance, 692 So.2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (officer had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle based on a BOLO radio alert which described the vehicle and its occupants and the officer spotted the vehicle near its expected location a short time after the BOLO was issued); Freeman v. State, 450 So.2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (stop of the defendant was reasonable where the defendant matched the description of fugitives observed in the area, defendant was acting suspiciously and ran when approached by the officers); State v. Jones, 417 So.2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (stop of defendant's ve | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Freeman v. State
green
1 sentence1998See State v. Vance, 692 So.2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (officer had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle based on a BOLO radio alert which described the vehicle and its occupants and the officer spotted the vehicle near its expected location a short time after the BOLO was issued); Freeman v. State, 450 So.2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (stop of the defendant was reasonable where the defendant matched the description of fugitives observed in the area, defendant was acting suspiciously and ran when approached by the officers); State v. Jones, 417 So.2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (stop of defendant's ve | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Walker v. State
green
1 sentence1990Walker v. State, 498 So.2d 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); The Florida Bar: Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure (3.701, 3.988 Sentencing Guidelines), 451 So.2d 824, 826 (Fla. 1984); [2] The Florida Bar Re: Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sentencing Guidelines, 3.701, *608 3.988), 482 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1985). [3] Thus, the trial court was correct in assessing points for victim injury for each count of sexual battery. b. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Florida Bar Re: Rules of Criminal Procedure
green
1 sentence1990Walker v. State, 498 So.2d 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); The Florida Bar: Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure (3.701, 3.988 Sentencing Guidelines), 451 So.2d 824, 826 (Fla. 1984); [2] The Florida Bar Re: Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sentencing Guidelines, 3.701, *608 3.988), 482 So.2d 311 (Fla. 1985). [3] Thus, the trial court was correct in assessing points for victim injury for each count of sexual battery. b. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.