cancellation clause in Illinois

1992In addition, Quake Construction, Inc. is distinguishable because the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that parol evidence should have been considered to determine the parties' intent since the explicit language of the Letter of Intent's cancellation clause and anticipation of a further agreement caused an ambiguity regarding the letter's enforceability. ( Quake Construction, Inc., 141 Ill.2d at 294 , 152 Ill.

1992In addition, Quake Construction, Inc. is distinguishable because the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that parol evidence should have been considered to determine the parties' intent since the explicit language of the Letter of Intent's cancellation clause and anticipation of a further agreement caused an ambiguity regarding the letter's enforceability. ( Quake Construction, Inc., 141 Ill.2d at 294 , 152 Ill.

2010Mid-Century's Cancellation Clause For support of its first issue on appeal, Mid-Century relies on the supreme court's reference in Copley to a cancellation "in accordance with the terms of the insurance contract" (Copley, 111 Ill. 2d at 85 ), to claim that the cancellation clause in its policy "voids coverage for the accident." Although Mid-Century seeks to invoke the cancellation clause of its policy, the cancellation clause has no application here because, as we determined, the policy should have issued to provide coverage for the Durango and, therefore, the cancellation clause was never tri

2010Mid-Century’s Cancellation Clause For support of its first issue on appeal, Mid-Century relies on the supreme court’s reference in Copley to a cancellation “in accordance with the terms of the insurance contract” (Copley, 111 Ill. 2d at 85 ), to claim that the cancellation clause in its policy “voids coverage for the accident.” Although Mid-Century seeks to invoke the cancellation clause of its policy, the cancellation clause has no application here because, as we determined, the policy should have issued to provide coverage for the Durango and, therefore, the cancellation clause was never tri

1992(Garber, 104 Ill.

1984(Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Tyler (1980), 85 Ill.

1974Under such circumstances, the language of our supreme court in Christ v. Rake (1919), 287 Ill. 619, 622 , 122 N.E. 854 , is very pertinent: "* * * A written instrument will not be reformed on the ground of mistake unless the evidence that it does not express the intention of the parties is such as will strike all minds alike as being unquestionable and free from reasonable doubt.

1974Under such circumstances, the language of our supreme court in Christ v. Rake (1919), 287 Ill. 619, 622 , 122 N.E. 854 , is very pertinent: "* * * A written instrument will not be reformed on the ground of mistake unless the evidence that it does not express the intention of the parties is such as will strike all minds alike as being unquestionable and free from reasonable doubt.

1963In reversing a declaratory judgment of the Circuit Court, which held the policy was in force and effect at the time of a motor vehicle collision, the Appellate Court in its opinion (p 365) stated that there has been a great deal of litigation over insurance cancellations, called attention to a comprehensive annotation on the subject, appearing in 65 ALR 2d 982 , and cited Boyle v. Inter Ins.

1963Co., 32 111 App2d 363, 178 NE2d 149 , it appeared that the cancellation clause in the policy involved in that case was almost identical with the clause in this policy.

1961Exchange of Chicago Motor Club, 335 Ill App 386, 82 NE2d 179 , there was a cancellation clause practically identical with the one here.

1961In the case of Scapes v. Orr, 2 Ill App2d 363, 119 NE2d 479 , involving a similar cancellation clause, it was held that mailing of the notice constituted a proper and effective cancellation.

1952In Armes v. Carolan, Graham, Hoffman, Inc., 336 Ill. 542 , the Supreme Court had occasion to pass upon this same question, the question being whether the policy had been effectively cancelled prior to the loss.

1945It said of the several Appellate Court cases on the subject, that only the National Hotel Company v. Merchants Fire Assurance Corp., 183 Ill.

1945It is interesting to note, however, that the McKenzie case, the first Illinois case to announce the rule on the “standard cancellation clause”, based its decision upon Peoria Marine Fire Insurance Co. v. Botto, 47 Ill. 516 and Aetna Insurance Co. v. Maguire, et al., 51 Ill. 342 .

1945It is interesting to note, however, that the McKenzie case, the first Illinois case to announce the rule on the “standard cancellation clause”, based its decision upon Peoria Marine Fire Insurance Co. v. Botto, 47 Ill. 516 and Aetna Insurance Co. v. Maguire, et al., 51 Ill. 342 .

1923Butler & Hermann Co. v. Meth, 122 N. Y.

1911The provision for a cancellation of the lease in this case comes within the reasoning and conclusions of the court in Ulrey v. Keith, supra, and with such provision in the lease injunction will not lie.

1908Co., 155 N. Y. 163 ), under the cancellation clause in New York Standard Policies, such as the one involved here, that “the insured does not have to tender his policy in order to entitle bim to receive back the unearned premium, but it is for the company desiring cancellation to seek the assured and tender the money to him, and until it does so, the cancellation has not been effected.” No such tender was shown here.