cancellation clause in California

1996As stated in Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1801, 1808 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 ], “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the administrative agency has no jurisdiction to make the judicial determination that is the subject of dispute.” Since the Board, sitting as a board of supervisors reviewing the cancellation petition, did not have jurisdiction to make a determination on the valuation issue, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to plaintiffs with regard to the cancellation

1996As stated in Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1801, 1808 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 123 ], “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the administrative agency has no jurisdiction to make the judicial determination that is the subject of dispute.” Since the Board, sitting as a board of supervisors reviewing the cancellation petition, did not have jurisdiction to make a determination on the valuation issue, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to plaintiffs with regard to the cancellation

2016(Cf. Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 476-481, 482 [statute of limitations for quiet title action does not run against a party as long as he or she is in exclusive and undisputed possession of the land, and notices of default from a lender are “not sufficient to dispute or disturb plaintiffs’ possession”], with Ankoanda v. Walker-Smith (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 610, 616-618 [once landlord learned tenant was not going to reconvey disputed portion of property, her possession was no longer “‘exclusive and undisputed,’” and statute of limitations commenced running].) Because we affirm the

2016(Cf. Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 476-481, 482 [statute of limitations for quiet title action does not run against a party as long as he or she is in exclusive and undisputed possession of the land, and notices of default from a lender are “not sufficient to dispute or disturb plaintiffs’ possession”], with Ankoanda v. Walker-Smith (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 610, 616-618 [once landlord learned tenant was not going to reconvey disputed portion of property, her possession was no longer “‘exclusive and undisputed,’” and statute of limitations commenced running].) Because we affirm the

1998This case, by contrast, is not a follow-on matter (cf. U.S. v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D.Cal.1987) 656 F.Supp. 276, 285-286 [issue remained whether a cancellation of test and resulting freeze of hiring and promotions, for found adverse impact, had the effect of perpetuating past discrimination as found in a prior action]), or one in which the scope of allegations and relief extends beyond the one test cancellation (cf. id. at p. 285, fn. 7 [trial court might yet find the cancellation discriminatory "in the context of plaintiff-intervenors' much broader pattern and practice allegati

1998This case, by contrast, is not a follow-on matter (cf. U.S. v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D.Cal. 1987) 656 F.Supp. 276, 285-286 [issue remained whether a cancellation of test and resulting freeze of hiring and promotions, for found adverse impact, had the effect of perpetuating past discrimination as found in a prior action]), or one in which the scope of allegations and relief extends beyond the one test cancellation (cf. id. at p. 285, fn. 7 [trial court might yet find the cancellation discriminatory “in the context of plaintiff-intervenors ’ much broader pattern and practice allega

1998We also distinguish, of course, the typical case where a challenge is to the use—not cancellation—of a test with adverse impacts (Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977) 433 U.S. 321, 323-331 [ 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2723-2728 , 53 L.Ed.2d 786 ] [minimum height' and weight requirements affecting women]; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, 422 U.S. 405, 428-429 [ 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2376-2377 ] [verbal intelligence tests affecting Blacks]).

1998We also distinguish, of course, the typical case where a challenge is to the use—not cancellation—of a test with adverse impacts (Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977) 433 U.S. 321, 323-331 [ 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2723-2728 , 53 L.Ed.2d 786 ] [minimum height' and weight requirements affecting women]; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, 422 U.S. 405, 428-429 [ 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2376-2377 ] [verbal intelligence tests affecting Blacks]).

1998We also distinguish, of course, the typical case where a challenge is to the use—not cancellation—of a test with adverse impacts (Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977) 433 U.S. 321, 323-331 [ 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2723-2728 , 53 L.Ed.2d 786 ] [minimum height' and weight requirements affecting women]; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, 422 U.S. 405, 428-429 [ 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2376-2377 ] [verbal intelligence tests affecting Blacks]).

1998We also distinguish, of course, the typical case where a challenge is to the use—not cancellation—of a test with adverse impacts (Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977) 433 U.S. 321, 323-331 [ 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2723-2728 , 53 L.Ed.2d 786 ] [minimum height' and weight requirements affecting women]; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, 422 U.S. 405, 428-429 [ 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2376-2377 ] [verbal intelligence tests affecting Blacks]).

1992Co. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 310, 318 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 766 ], While Jensen did determine that a standard cancellation clause giving five days’ notice did not violate public policy, it did not concern the applicability of the good faith covenant to cancellation provisions nor did it review a factual determination of *906 breach.

1992Co. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 310, 318 [ 274 Cal.Rptr. 766 ], While Jensen did determine that a standard cancellation clause giving five days’ notice did not violate public policy, it did not concern the applicability of the good faith covenant to cancellation provisions nor did it review a factual determination of *906 breach.

1992(Commercial Union Assurance Companies v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 912, 918 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 709 , 610 P.2d 1038 ].) For our purposes the cancellation clause in Spindle was identical to the one at issue here.

1992(Commercial Union Assurance Companies v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 912, 918 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 709 , 610 P.2d 1038 ].) For our purposes the cancellation clause in Spindle was identical to the one at issue here.

1959In view of (i) this court’s dicta in Naify v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 11 Cal.2d 5, 10 [1] [ 76 P.2d 663 , 115 A.L.R. 476 ], where it said: “At the outset we are met with a question raised by amici curiae on behalf of various insurance companies, namely, whether a notice of cancellation, sent to the address of the assured as stated in the policy, and pursuant to a provision in the policy stating that the mailing thereof shall be sufficient notice, is effective despite lack of receipt by the insured.

1959In view of (i) this court’s dicta in Naify v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 11 Cal.2d 5, 10 [1] [ 76 P.2d 663 , 115 A.L.R. 476 ], where it said: “At the outset we are met with a question raised by amici curiae on behalf of various insurance companies, namely, whether a notice of cancellation, sent to the address of the assured as stated in the policy, and pursuant to a provision in the policy stating that the mailing thereof shall be sufficient notice, is effective despite lack of receipt by the insured.

1958(Sanborn v. Ballanfonte (1929), 98 Cal.App. 482, 488 [ 277 P. 152 ].) As said in Hyatt v. Allen, 54 Cal. 353, 358 , quoted with approval in Wagner v. Shapona (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d 451, 461 [ 267 P.2d 378 ] : “. . . it is our duty to so construe every provision of a written instrument as to give force and effect, not only to every clause but to every word in it, so that no clause or word may become redundant, unless such construction would be obviously repugnant to the intention of the framers of the instrument, to be collected from its terms, or would lead to some other inconvenience or absur

1958(Sanborn v. Ballanfonte (1929), 98 Cal.App. 482, 488 [ 277 P. 152 ].) As said in Hyatt v. Allen, 54 Cal. 353, 358 , quoted with approval in Wagner v. Shapona (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d 451, 461 [ 267 P.2d 378 ] : “. . . it is our duty to so construe every provision of a written instrument as to give force and effect, not only to every clause but to every word in it, so that no clause or word may become redundant, unless such construction would be obviously repugnant to the intention of the framers of the instrument, to be collected from its terms, or would lead to some other inconvenience or absur

1958(Sanborn v. Ballanfonte (1929), 98 Cal.App. 482, 488 [ 277 P. 152 ].) As said in Hyatt v. Allen, 54 Cal. 353, 358 , quoted with approval in Wagner v. Shapona (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d 451, 461 [ 267 P.2d 378 ] : “. . . it is our duty to so construe every provision of a written instrument as to give force and effect, not only to every clause but to every word in it, so that no clause or word may become redundant, unless such construction would be obviously repugnant to the intention of the framers of the instrument, to be collected from its terms, or would lead to some other inconvenience or absur

1958(Sanborn v. Ballanfonte (1929), 98 Cal.App. 482, 488 [ 277 P. 152 ].) As said in Hyatt v. Allen, 54 Cal. 353, 358 , quoted with approval in Wagner v. Shapona (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d 451, 461 [ 267 P.2d 378 ] : “. . . it is our duty to so construe every provision of a written instrument as to give force and effect, not only to every clause but to every word in it, so that no clause or word may become redundant, unless such construction would be obviously repugnant to the intention of the framers of the instrument, to be collected from its terms, or would lead to some other inconvenience or absur

1933Under such circumstances we think the clause quoted from section 1183 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies.” Similar rulings will be found in the cases of Hub Hardware Co. v. Aetna Acc. etc. Co., 178 Cal. 264, 267 [ 173 Pac. 81 ], and Los Angeles Stone Co.v.

1933Under such circumstances we think the clause quoted from section 1183 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies.” Similar rulings will be found in the cases of Hub Hardware Co. v. Aetna Acc. etc. Co., 178 Cal. 264, 267 [ 173 Pac. 81 ], and Los Angeles Stone Co.v.