telephonic hearing in Indiana

2012See Wolf Lake Pub, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 930 N.E.2d 1138, 1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that the appellant was not denied a reasonable opportunity to participate in a fair hearing where the appellant had actual notice of the telephonic hearing but chose to go on vacation without ensuring access to a telephone during the time of the scheduled telephonic hearing); Art Hill, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 898 N.E.2d 363, 367-368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that a party to an unemployment hearing may voluntarily waive the opportunity for

2011In Wolf Lake Pub, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 930 N.E.2d 1138 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), we held that where a party received actual notice of a telephonic hearing but was unable to participate due to its representatives' poor cell phone reception which could have been anticipated and prevented, the party was not denied a reasonable opportunity to participate in a hearing.

2020We held “that a party to an unemployment hearing may voluntarily waive the opportunity for a fair hearing where the party received actual notice of the hearing and failed to appear at or participate in the hearing.” Id. at 368 . [15] Like the employer in Art Hill, the County received actual notice of the telephonic hearing.

2012See Wolf Lake Pub, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 930 N.E.2d 1138, 1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding that the appellant was not denied a reasonable opportunity to participate in a fair hearing where the appellant had actual notice of the telephonic hearing but chose to go on vacation without ensuring access to a telephone during the time of the scheduled telephonic hearing); Art Hill, Inc. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 898 N.E.2d 363, 367-368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that a party to an unemployment hearing may voluntarily waive the opportunity for

2011Similarly, because S.S. does not point to any circumstance outside her control which caused her to miss the telephonic hearing, we conclude the Review Board reasonably found she failed to show good cause for reinstating her appeal. 941 N.E.2d at 557-58 (internal citations omitted).

2011Id. at 557-58 .

2019See T.R., 950 N.E.2d at 795-796 (noting the instructions received by the claimant and holding that, although the claimant alleged that she had mailed in a participation sheet, she did not follow up to confirm that the administrative law judge had received her sheet or had her correct phone number; that, while the claimant did not take an affirmative action to waive her opportunity to participate, her missed opportunity to participate in the hearing could have been anticipated and prevented; and that she was given notice and an opportunity to be heard and her failure to take advantage of the op

2011In T.R. v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development, 950 N.E.2d 792, 798 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), the employee alleged a due process violation when the ALJ did not call her for the telephonic hearing where the employee had mailed a participation form but the ALJ had not received it.

2019However, our court has previously found that, notwithstanding the confidentiality mandate of Indiana Code section 22-4-19-6 and Indiana Administrative Rule 9(G), “it is appropriate for this [c]ourt to use the full names of parties in routine appeals from the Review Board.” Moore v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 951 N.E.2d 301, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

2019Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 955 N.E.2d 790, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (finding the claimant did not submit a participation form despite provisions in the notice and hearing instructions requiring her to do so, she had an affirmative duty to provide a telephone number, that requirement Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-EX-614 | October 4, 2019 Page 9 of 11 was not unreasonable, and her failure to participate in the telephonic hearing resulted entirely from her disregard for the hearing instructions); Art Hill, Inc. v. Rev.

2018However, Esparza requested and was entitled to a telephonic hearing, Sabo v. Sabo, 812 N.E.2d 238, 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), but he does not contest this issue on appeal.

2013See Navarro v. State, 855 N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (Navarro was stopped for unsafe lane movement).

2012Given that Trial Rule 59(E) was “designed to expressly create an opportunity for the opponent of the motion to respond[,]” see Ralston v. State, 412 N.E.2d 239, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing the purpose of Indiana Trial Rule 59(F)(1), which has since been recodified as Indiana Trial Rule 6 59(E)), it would elevate form over substance to rule in Martinez’s favor when such an opportunity was, in fact, afforded to him.

2012In support of his claim, Martinez relies on a panel of this court’s opinion in Hubbard v. Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), in which the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Appellee’s motion to correct error without first giving the Appellant the opportunity to respond to the motion.

2011Thus, Davis has not shown good cause for her failure to appear at the hearing, and she has not shown that the Review Board abused its discretion when it denied her request to reinstate her appeal. 5 Issue Two: Termination for Cause In Indiana, an unemployed claimant is ineligible for unemployment benefits if he is discharged for “just cause.” See Russell v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Employment & Training Servs., 586 N.E.2d 942, 948 (Ind.Ct.App.1992).

2010See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 (providing that the fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner).

2010See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267-68 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 (providing that the fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner).

2008See also Kovacik v. Kovacik, 631 N.E.2d 509, 510 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (where court orally granted a motion to correct error during a telephonic hearing); In re Adult Protective Servs. for Hartman, 518 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (where the trial court’s findings were deemed sufficient when, during the trial, the appellant "heard the trial court announce the judgment which included the omissions of the prepared entry"); Kujaca v. Kujaca, 159 Ind.App. 6 , 304 N.E.2d 870, 874-75 (1973) (where appellant received adequate notice of a hearing date because he was present "when the trial judge anno

2008See also Kovacik v. Kovacik, 631 N.E.2d 509, 510 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (where court orally granted a motion to correct error during a telephonic hearing); In re Adult Protective Servs. for Hartman, 518 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (where the trial court’s findings were deemed sufficient when, during the trial, the appellant "heard the trial court announce the judgment which included the omissions of the prepared entry"); Kujaca v. Kujaca, 159 Ind.App. 6 , 304 N.E.2d 870, 874-75 (1973) (where appellant received adequate notice of a hearing date because he was present "when the trial judge anno

2008See also Kovacik v. Kovacik, 631 N.E.2d 509, 510 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (where court orally granted a motion to correct error during a telephonic hearing); In re Adult Protective Servs. for Hartman, 518 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (where the trial court’s findings were deemed sufficient when, during the trial, the appellant "heard the trial court announce the judgment which included the omissions of the prepared entry"); Kujaca v. Kujaca, 159 Ind.App. 6 , 304 N.E.2d 870, 874-75 (1973) (where appellant received adequate notice of a hearing date because he was present "when the trial judge anno

2008See also Kovacik v. Kovacik, 631 N.E.2d 509, 510 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (where court orally granted a motion to correct error during a telephonic hearing); In re Adult Protective Servs. for Hartman, 518 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (where the trial court’s findings were deemed sufficient when, during the trial, the appellant "heard the trial court announce the judgment which included the omissions of the prepared entry"); Kujaca v. Kujaca, 159 Ind.App. 6 , 304 N.E.2d 870, 874-75 (1973) (where appellant received adequate notice of a hearing date because he was present "when the trial judge anno