109 California opinions name it 4 courts 2008–2026 64 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Canizalesgreen2 sentences2026In the absence of such evidence, the kill zone instruction should not be given.’ ” (Ibid.) The Canizales court further emphasized that when “the kill zone theory is used to support an inference that the defendant concurrently intended to kill a nontargeted victim, … evidence of a primary target is required.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 608 .) “ ‘[W]ithout a primary target, there cannot be concurrent intent because there is no primary intent to kill as to which the intent to kill others could be concurrent.’ ” (Id. at p. 609; People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176 , 193 (Mumin) [“Without 2025Kill Zone Instruction Sullivan argues that we must reverse his attempted murder conviction because the trial court’s kill zone instruction misstated the law under People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591 (Canizales). | 17 | 63 |
People v. Blandgreen2 sentences2023Although the bench notes to CALCRIM No. 600 recognize that an instruction is “not required” and is “for the court to use at its discretion,” the instruction is accompanied by a directive to “Give when kill zone theory applies.” And because the instruction is long and complex, far more so than the rest of the attempted murder instruction, it may draw attention to the kill zone theory beyond what is warranted to inform the jury of “simply a reasonable inference [it] may draw in a given case.” (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 331, fn. 6 .) Because the potential for error in employing the kill zone 2022Indeed, we anticipate there will be relatively few cases in which the theory will be applicable and an instruction appropriate.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 11 p. 608.) Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that jury instructions on the kill zone theory are never required.2 ( Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 137-138; Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 746 ; Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 331, fn. 6 .) Given the Supreme Court’s words of caution, the apparently ongoing difficulty in crafting an error-free instruction on the kill zone theory, and the absence of any requirement to gi | 17 | 23 |
People v. Stonegreen2 sentences2025He cites People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131 , where the Supreme Court stated “it would be better for [CALCRIM No. 600] to use the word ‘kill’ consistently rather than the word ‘harm’” (id. at p. 138, fn. 3) and points out CALCRIM No. 600 “has since been amended” to replace “harm” with “kill.” Wallace argues he “could not currently be convicted of attempted murder under the instructions given here.” To be eligible for relief under section 1172.6, however, Wallace must show he can no longer be convicted of attempted 4 In his direct appeal Wallace argued the trial court erred in omitting the p 2024We explained that the bomber could be convicted of the attempted murder of all the passengers. [Citation.] But a terrorist who simply wants to kill as many people as possible, and does not know or care who the victims will be, can be just as guilty of attempted murder.” (Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 140 .) “ ‘[I]ntent to kill need not be directed at a specific person….’ [Citation.] ‘The social harm of murder is the “killing of a human being by another human being.” The requisite intent, therefore, is the intent to kill a, not a specific, human being.’ ” (Id. at p. 139.) The Stone court did f | 8 | 27 |
People v. Medinagreen2 sentences2024Rather, in a kill zone case, the defendant has a primary target and reasons [that] he cannot miss that intended target if he kills everyone in the area in which the target is located.’ ” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607 .) A kill zone instruction is warranted where “substantial evidence exists from which the [trier of fact] could draw the required inference.” (People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176 , 200 (Mumin).) “In the absence of such evidence, the kill zone instruction should not be given.” (People v. Medina (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 146, 156 (Medina); accord, Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th 2024Rather, in a kill zone case, the defendant has a primary target and reasons [that] he cannot miss that intended target if he kills everyone in the area in which the target is located.’ ” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607 .) A kill zone instruction is warranted where “substantial evidence exists from which the [trier of fact] could draw the required inference.” (People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176 , 200 (Mumin).) “In the absence of such evidence, the kill zone instruction should not be given.” (People v. Medina (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 146, 156 (Medina); accord, Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th | 7 | 15 |
People v. McCloudgreen2 sentences2023As one Court of Appeal recognized, “If the evidence supports a reasonable inference that, as a means of killing the primary target, the defendant specifically intended to kill every single person in the area in which the primary target was located, then the prosecutor can make that argument and the jury can draw that inference without the aid of a kill zone instruction — the ordinary instructions on attempted murder will provide all of the necessary legal tools.” (People v. McCloud (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 788, 803 (McCloud).) Indeed, the kill zone instruction is an anomaly; no other scenario- s 2019(E.g., Bland , supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 329 , 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546 , 48 P.3d 1107 ["The intent is concurrent ... when the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a primary victim, are such that we can conclude the perpetrator intended to ensure harm to the primary victim by harming everyone in that victim's vicinity."]; Perez , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 232 , 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 , 234 P.3d 557 ; People v. Cardona (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 608 , 615, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 ; McCloud , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 799-800, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 902 ; People v. Vang , (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554 , 10 | 5 | 16 |
People v. Vanggreen2 sentences2025(See People v. Vang, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 564 .) Appellant relies on People v. Booker (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 482 to argue that the trial court erred in giving the kill zone instruction, but Booker is readily distinguishable. 2019(E.g., Bland , supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 329 , 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546 , 48 P.3d 1107 ["The intent is concurrent ... when the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a primary victim, are such that we can conclude the perpetrator intended to ensure harm to the primary victim by harming everyone in that victim's vicinity."]; Perez , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 232 , 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 , 234 P.3d 557 ; People v. Cardona (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 608 , 615, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 ; McCloud , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 799-800, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 902 ; People v. Vang , (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554 , 10 | 3 | 8 |
People v. Smitheygreen2 sentences2019Although defendants did not object to the kill zone instruction, and the People contend this issue has been forfeited on appeal, we review any claim of instructional error that allegedly affects the defendants' substantial rights even in the absence of an objection. (§ 1259; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936 , 976-977, fn. 7, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) We can only determine if defendants' substantial rights were affected by deciding whether the instruction was given in error and, if so, whether the error was prejudicial. 2019Although defendants did not object to the kill zone instruction, and the People contend this issue has been forfeited on appeal, we review any claim of instructional error that allegedly affects the defendants' substantial rights even in the absence of an objection. (§ 1259; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936 , 976-977, fn. 7, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243 , 978 P.2d 1171 .) We can only determine if defendants' substantial rights were affected by deciding whether the instruction was given in error and, if so, whether the error was prejudicial. | 3 | 4 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2025(See Cardenas, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th 102 , 117, citing Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 [“Reversal is required if there is ‘ “ ‘a reasonable possibility’ ” ’ that the error may have contributed to the verdict”].) We therefore conclude that error in the kill zone instruction and related argument was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 15 DISPOSITION The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. 2021(Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 597 .) But even assuming the jury should not have been instructed on the kill zone theory because the evidence was insufficient to support a kill zone instruction, any error in giving the instruction was not prejudicial under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman). 3 (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 614 ; People v. Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th 1, 13 .) Error is harmless if the record shows “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24.) In other words, we must determine | 2 | 5 |
People v. Trangreen2 sentences2023While defendant failed to object to the kill zone instruction, we will address his claim on the merits because the asserted error affects his substantial rights. (§ 1259; People v. Tran (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 561, 565, fn. 2 .) 17 1. 2021In People v. Tran (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 561 (Tran), where a kill zone instruction erroneously listed the same person as the primary target and the nontargeted victim, the court rejected a similar assertion of prejudice. 4 While the instruction “could very well have prejudiced the prosecution, insofar as it effectively deprived it of the opportunity to obtain a conviction for attempted murder based on the theory of concurrent intent . . . it could not possibly have prejudiced [the defendant] because it expressly required the jury to find he harbored the intent to kill [the person alleged to be | 2 | 4 |
People v. Hudsongreen2 sentences2020In the absence of such evidence, the kill zone instruction should not be given.’” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607 , quoting People v. Medina People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012 [failure to object to instruction does not forfeit issue on appeal when alleged error concerns elements of offense]; People v. Gutierrez (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 847, 856, fn. 8 [“[W]hen an instruction allegedly affects the substantial rights of the defendant, it is reviewable even in the absence of an objection.”].) 24 (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 146, 156 .) Here, the type and extent of force used do not s 2013(People v. Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011-1012 [a party forfeits any challenge to a jury instruction that was correct in law and responsive to the evidence if the party fails to object in the trial court].) The rule of forfeiture does not apply if the 8 instruction was an incorrect statement of the law (id. at p. 1012), or if the instructional error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. | 2 | 2 |
| Donell R. Washington v. United Statesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Whisenhuntgreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2022Indeed, we anticipate there will be relatively few cases in which the theory will be applicable and an instruction appropriate.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 11 p. 608.) Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that jury instructions on the kill zone theory are never required.2 ( Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 137-138; Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 746 ; Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 331, fn. 6 .) Given the Supreme Court’s words of caution, the apparently ongoing difficulty in crafting an error-free instruction on the kill zone theory, and the absence of any requirement to gi 2022Indeed, we anticipate there will be relatively few cases in which the theory will be applicable and an instruction appropriate.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 11 p. 608.) Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that jury instructions on the kill zone theory are never required.2 ( Stone, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 137-138; Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 746 ; Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 331, fn. 6 .) Given the Supreme Court’s words of caution, the apparently ongoing difficulty in crafting an error-free instruction on the kill zone theory, and the absence of any requirement to gi | 1 | 13 |
People v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2025For that additional reason, Rodriguez’s argument does not apply to that conviction, which Rodriguez does not discuss in the argument sections of his briefing. 8 understands and follows the court’s instructions.” (People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198 , 205.) Rodriguez cites People v. Adams (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1009 (Adams) for the proposition that a kill zone instruction is just another form of the natural and probable consequences doctrine. 2025(E.g., People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176 , 209; People v. Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 614 .) In support of his claim that the kill zone instruction allowed for his murder conviction on the basis of imputed malice, Sanders cites People v. Adams (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1009 , where the court held that a defendant could be convicted of attempted murder under a kill zone theory even if he did not know whether anyone was in the kill zone so long as he recognized or accepted “that a natural and probable consequence of that act would be that anyone within that zone could or would die.” (Id. | 1 | 7 |
People v. Perezgreen2 sentences2022As part of its ruling, the court indicated that it would dismiss count 4 (Thrash) unless it was “something that you want to try and retry?” The prosecutor responded: “I wasn’t expecting that question, so no, at this point, we’re conceding that there was an instructional error, and that count should not remain.” This is entirely consistent with the People’s earlier briefing in the matter, in which the People conceded the facts of this case did not warrant the kill zone instruction after Canizales, and also stated that “as in 5 [People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222 ] and [People v. (2009) 46 Ca 2021(See ibid. [“The use or attempted use of force that merely endangered everyone in the area is insufficient to support a kill zone instruction”]; In re Rayford, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 780 [evidence was equivocal whether victim was hit by bullet within zone of fatal harm or was hit by bullet fired with conscious disregard of the risk of seriously injuring building occupants]; People v. Perez (2010) 50 Cal.4th 222, 232 [kill zone instruction was error because shooting not the equivalent of an explosive device with intent to kill everyone in the area of a blast or spraying a crowd with automa | 1 | 5 |
People v. Ramosgreen2 sentences2025We should interpret an instruction “ ‘to support the judgment rather than defeat it if [it is] reasonably susceptible to such an interpretation.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088 .) Following this principle, we conclude that the instruction included the three requirements noted by Summers, even if not in the exact language he articulates. 11 It did not contain erroneous language or misstate the law on the kill zone theory. 11 The terms identified by Summers appear to be some of the terms contained in the most recent iteration of the kill zone instruction. 2024(See People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176 , 223 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [observing that the revised instruction could still lead to juror confusion].) We must, however, consider the instructions as a whole and presume that “jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088 [cleaned up].) Moreover, we interpret instructions, when possible, “so as to support the judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonably susceptible to such interpretation.” (Ibid.) The kill zone instru | 1 | 3 |
Neder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019Far more likely on this record is that the jury would "quickly and easily have found the element satisfied" by "relying on the instructional misdefinition" available to it. ( People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407 , 445, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.); see Canizales , supra , 7 Cal.5th at p. 614, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 370 , 442 P.3d 686 [concluding there was "a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the kill zone instruction in a legally impermissible manner" because the prosecution's definition "was significantly broader than a proper understanding of the theory 2019Far more likely on this record is that the jury would "quickly and easily have found the element satisfied" by "relying on the instructional misdefinition" available to it. ( People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407 , 445, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.); see Canizales , supra , 7 Cal.5th at p. 614, 248 Cal.Rptr.3d 370 , 442 P.3d 686 [concluding there was "a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the kill zone instruction in a legally impermissible manner" because the prosecution's definition "was significantly broader than a proper understanding of the theory | 1 | 3 |
People v. Chinchillagreen2 sentences2020“The act of firing toward a victim at a close, but not point blank, range ‘in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal wound had the bullet been on target is sufficient to support an inference of intent to kill.”’ (People v. Chinchilla (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 683, 690 ; Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 742 .) Even if “the shooter merely perceiv[es] the victim as ‘a momentary obstacle or annoyance,’ the shooter’s purposeful ‘use of a lethal weapon with lethal force’ against the victim, if otherwise legally unexcused, will itself give rise to an inference of intent to kill.”11 (Smith, at p. 742.) 2014Such intent must usually be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the defendant's actions. [Citation.] . . .'" (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 741 .) "[T]he very act of firing a weapon '"in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal wound had the bullet been on target"' is sufficient to support an inference of intent to kill." (Id. at p. 742, quoting People v. Chinchilla (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 683, 690 (Chinchilla).) The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 600, the kill zone instruction. 3 Here, appellant asserts the victims of counts 2 through 5 were too fa | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Camposgreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Brockgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lewisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Sattiewhitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shalabi v. City of Fontanagreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Terrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Romerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gutierrezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Clarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shawn Garfield Price v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Romero and Selfgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Aledamat
green
2 sentences2023Just as in Canizales, “there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the kill zone instruction in a legally impermissible manner.” (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 614 .) Accordingly we apply the Chapman standard, which permits an affirmance only when, “after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, [the court] determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 13 .) Applying that standard, we cannot conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the attempted murd 2021(Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 597 .) But even assuming the jury should not have been instructed on the kill zone theory because the evidence was insufficient to support a kill zone instruction, any error in giving the instruction was not prejudicial under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman). 3 (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 614 ; People v. Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th 1, 13 .) Error is harmless if the record shows “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24.) In other words, we must determine | 7 | 2020–2025 |
People v. Guiton
green
2 sentences2019(See Guiton , supra , 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) In light of these facts, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the kill zone instruction in a legally impermissible manner. 2019(See Guiton , supra , 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128 , 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365 , 847 P.2d 45 .) In light of these facts, we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the kill zone instruction in a legally impermissible manner. | 5 | 2019–2023 |
People v. Windfield
green
2 sentences2019For example, a kill zone instruction is not appropriate where a defendant fires a deadly weapon into a group of 8 Implied malice is “ ‘an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107 .) With regard to those in a zone of harm around the primary target, we perceive little difference between that implied malice standard and one in which the defendant acts towards a prima 2019For example, a kill zone instruction is not appropriate where a defendant fires a deadly weapon into a group of 8 Implied malice is “ ‘an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107 .) With regard to those in a zone of harm around the primary target, we perceive little difference between that implied malice standard and one in which the defendant acts towards a prima | 4 | 2019–2025 |
People v. Burnett
green
2 sentences2024(People v. Shelmire (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1055 .) We review an instruction on the kill zone theory to determine “whether substantial evidence had been presented to support a reasonable inference by the jury ‘that defendant[] intended to create a zone of fatal harm around a primary target.’ ” (Mumin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 203, quoting People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 610 .) “ ‘[I]t is error to instruct . . . on a theory that is entirely unsupported by the evidence.’ ” (People v. Medina (2019) 33 Cal.App. 5th 146, 154 (Medina), quoting People v. Burnett (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 685 2019With regard to the John Does, the jury was instructed the People had to prove the defendants intended to kill John Doe One and Two, or alternatively under the kill zone theory intended to kill Alcaraz and Sanchez by killing everyone in the area in which Alcaraz and Sanchez were located (including Does One and Two). "[I]t is error to instruct[ ] on a theory that is entirely unsupported by the evidence." ( People v. Burnett (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 685 , 690, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 .) Defendants contend the giving of a kill zone instruction was error because the evidence adduced at trial did not support | 4 | 2019–2024 |
People v. Cardona
green
2 sentences2019(E.g., Bland , supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 329 , 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546 , 48 P.3d 1107 ["The intent is concurrent ... when the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a primary victim, are such that we can conclude the perpetrator intended to ensure harm to the primary victim by harming everyone in that victim's vicinity."]; Perez , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 232 , 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 , 234 P.3d 557 ; People v. Cardona (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 608 , 615, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 ; McCloud , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 799-800, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 902 ; People v. Vang , (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554 , 10 2019(E.g., Bland , supra , 28 Cal.4th at p. 329 , 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546 , 48 P.3d 1107 ["The intent is concurrent ... when the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a primary victim, are such that we can conclude the perpetrator intended to ensure harm to the primary victim by harming everyone in that victim's vicinity."]; Perez , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 232 , 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 310 , 234 P.3d 557 ; People v. Cardona (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 608 , 615, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 ; McCloud , supra , 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 799-800, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 902 ; People v. Vang , (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554 , 10 | 4 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Cole
green
2 sentences2025After independently reviewing the question (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206 ), we conclude any error was harmless. 1. 2021Stated differently, we must determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed [the offense based on the proffered theory].” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206 .) “There is no instructional error when the record contains substantial evidence in support of a guilty verdict on the basis of the challenged theory.” (People v. Jantz (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1290 .) In reviewing the evidence for sufficiency with respect to the giving of a kill zone instruction, we look to see whether the record includes “(1) evidence regardi | 3 | 2021–2025 |
People v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2020(People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 , abrogated on other grounds recognized in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 ; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52 , overruled on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879 .) The trial court gave the standard instruction without material change. “ ‘The trial court cannot reasonably be expected to attempt to revise or improve accepted and correct jury instructions absent some request from counsel.’ ” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 535 .) This contention regarding the kill zone instruction is forfeited. 20 Even 2020(People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 , abrogated on other grounds recognized in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 ; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52 , overruled on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879 .) The trial court gave the standard instruction without material change. “ ‘The trial court cannot reasonably be expected to attempt to revise or improve accepted and correct jury instructions absent some request from counsel.’ ” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 535 .) This contention regarding the kill zone instruction is forfeited. 20 Even | 3 | 2020–2024 |
People v. Breverman
green
2 sentences2023In evaluating what the jury is likely to have done in the absence of the kill zone instruction, we “may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 177 .) The evidence in this case established that defendant had been firing a gun in his neighborhood for several hours before law enforcement was called. 2019In evaluating what the jury is likely to have done in the absence of the kill zone instruction, we “may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 177 .) Here, it is not reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendants in the absence of kill zone instruction, as 19 uncontra | 3 | 2019–2023 |
People v. Lasko
green
2 sentences2019For example, a kill zone instruction is not appropriate where a defendant fires a deadly weapon into a group of 8 Implied malice is “ ‘an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107 .) With regard to those in a zone of harm around the primary target, we perceive little difference between that implied malice standard and one in which the defendant acts towards a prima 2019For example, a kill zone instruction is not appropriate where a defendant fires a deadly weapon into a group of 8 Implied malice is “ ‘an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 107 .) With regard to those in a zone of harm around the primary target, we perceive little difference between that implied malice standard and one in which the defendant acts towards a prima | 3 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Merritt
green
2 sentences2022First, reviewing courts must “examin[e] the entire cause, including the evidence, and consider[] all relevant circumstances.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 3 , italics added.) And we must then ask: “Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 18 ; Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 827 , italics added.) Accordingly, there is no one way to establish 48 harmlessness for instructional error, including alternative-theory error. 2020On page 32, line 10, after the sentence ending with “and the related enhancement findings” add the following new paragraphs: In a rehearing petition that for the first time acknowledges the legal inadequacy of the kill zone instruction under Canizales (a case which, to be sure, had yet to be decided when these *Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts III.A.2, III.A.3, III.A.5, III.A.6, and III.B through III.F. 1 appeals were originally briefed), the Attorney General suggests that “[w]hen viewed in | 2 | 2020–2022 |
People v. Jantz
green
2 sentences2021Stated differently, we must determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed [the offense based on the proffered theory].” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206 .) “There is no instructional error when the record contains substantial evidence in support of a guilty verdict on the basis of the challenged theory.” (People v. Jantz (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1290 .) In reviewing the evidence for sufficiency with respect to the giving of a kill zone instruction, we look to see whether the record includes “(1) evidence regardi 2021It must view the record favorably to the judgment below to determine whether there is evidence to support the instruction, not scour the record in search of evidence suggesting a contrary view.” (Ceja, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1143 .) “The presence of substantial evidence supporting the [challenged] jury instruction is not undermined by the existence of other interpretations of the evidence.” (Jantz, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291 .) While it is not entirely clear, to the extent Rayford believed that one reasonable inference from the evidence would support a kill zone instruction under Caniza | 2 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Ashmus green | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Yeoman
green
2 sentences2020(People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 , abrogated on other grounds recognized in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 ; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52 , overruled on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879 .) The trial court gave the standard instruction without material change. “ ‘The trial court cannot reasonably be expected to attempt to revise or improve accepted and correct jury instructions absent some request from counsel.’ ” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 535 .) This contention regarding the kill zone instruction is forfeited. 20 Even 2020(People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 , abrogated on other grounds recognized in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 ; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52 , overruled on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879 .) The trial court gave the standard instruction without material change. “ ‘The trial court cannot reasonably be expected to attempt to revise or improve accepted and correct jury instructions absent some request from counsel.’ ” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 535 .) This contention regarding the kill zone instruction is forfeited. 20 Even | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2020(People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 , abrogated on other grounds recognized in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 ; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52 , overruled on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879 .) The trial court gave the standard instruction without material change. “ ‘The trial court cannot reasonably be expected to attempt to revise or improve accepted and correct jury instructions absent some request from counsel.’ ” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 535 .) This contention regarding the kill zone instruction is forfeited. 20 Even 2020(People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 , abrogated on other grounds recognized in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 ; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52 , overruled on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879 .) The trial court gave the standard instruction without material change. “ ‘The trial court cannot reasonably be expected to attempt to revise or improve accepted and correct jury instructions absent some request from counsel.’ ” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 535 .) This contention regarding the kill zone instruction is forfeited. 20 Even | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2020(People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 , abrogated on other grounds recognized in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 ; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52 , overruled on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879 .) The trial court gave the standard instruction without material change. “ ‘The trial court cannot reasonably be expected to attempt to revise or improve accepted and correct jury instructions absent some request from counsel.’ ” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 535 .) This contention regarding the kill zone instruction is forfeited. 20 Even 2020(People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997 , abrogated on other grounds recognized in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117 ; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 52 , overruled on another ground in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 879 .) The trial court gave the standard instruction without material change. “ ‘The trial court cannot reasonably be expected to attempt to revise or improve accepted and correct jury instructions absent some request from counsel.’ ” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 535 .) This contention regarding the kill zone instruction is forfeited. 20 Even | 2 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Debose green | 2 | 2019–2019 |
| In Re Sheena K. green | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. Curiel green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Chhoun green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Nguyen green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Lee green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. SHELMIRE green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Delgadillo green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Castaneda green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Watson green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Tully green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Holloway green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| In Re Saldana green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In Re Harris green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Lee green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Samaniego green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Maury green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Wilson green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Ceja green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Lee red | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Nelson green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Towler green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Lam Thanh Nguyen green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Salazar green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Sánchez green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.