jeopardy bar in Texas

2015See Parrish, 869 S.W.2d at 354 (“the essential elements relevant to a jeopardy inquiry are those of the charging instrument, not of the penal statute itself”)- We conclude that this factor weighs heavily in favor of the offenses being the same for double-jeopardy purposes. 8.

2007Parrish , 869 S.W.2d at 354 ("[T]he essential elements relevant to a jeopardy inquiry are those of the charging instrument, not of the penal statute itself.").

2008State v. Perez, 947 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Crim.App.1997); Parrish, 869 S.W.2d at 354 .

2007State v. Perez , 947 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Crim.

2011See Murray v. State, 24 S.W.3d 881, 889 (Tex.App.--Waco 2000, pet. ref’d).

2011See Murray v. State , 24 S.W.3d 881, 889 (Tex.App.--Waco 2000, pet. ref’d).

2015Benavidez v. State, 323 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Tex.Crim.App.2010).

2012The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals with directions to conduct an evidentiary sufficiency review, observing that, while the charge error alone would not bar the State from retrying the case, “a finding of legal insufficiency on appeal would interpose a jeopardy bar to retrial.” Id. at 182-83 (footnote omitted).

2005See Jimenez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 493, 509 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref'd).

2005See Jimenez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 493, 509 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref’d).

1989Wockenfuss v. State, 521 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Guzman v. State, 732 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.).

1988Anderson v. State, 635 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Wockenfuss v. State, 521 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Ward v. State, 520 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Crim.App.1975).

2017Id. at 519-20. , The Court ultimately rejected the defendant’s jeopardy challenge, explaining that the State’s failure to prove the aggravating element of the greater offense did not mean that the defendant had been acquitted of thelesser offense: Because the evidence was insufficient only as to the capital element of the greater offense, it is clear both that, had the trial judge acted properly, only the' lesser offense 'of murder would have gone to the jury and it would have resulted in a conviction.

1993Granger v. State, 850 S.W.2d 513, 524 (Tex.Cr.App.1993).

1996P. 30(b)(9); Moore v. State, 749 S.W.2d 54, 58 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 , 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2147 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (holding that the jeopardy clause bars retrial when the prosecution failed to supply sufficient evidence to merit conviction).

1996P. 30(b)(9); Moore v. State, 749 S.W.2d 54, 58 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 , 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2147 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (holding that the jeopardy clause bars retrial when the prosecution failed to supply sufficient evidence to merit conviction).

2008Lewis, 219 S.W.3d at 380-82 (Price, J., dissenting).

2008Lewis, 219 S.W.3d at 380-82 (Price, J., dissenting).

2007Hipple v. State, 191 S.W. 1150, 1156 (Tex. Crim.

2007Hipple v. State , 191 S.W. 1150, 1156 (Tex. Crim.

2006App. 1998) ("trial upon the indictment bars prosecution only for offenses for which proof was offered at trial . . . the State or the trial court can exclude an instance of conduct from the jeopardy bar through an election"); see Sledge v. State , 953 S.W.2d 253 , 259 n.4 (Tex. Crim.

2006App. 1998) (“trial upon the indictment bars prosecution only for offenses for which proof was offered at trial . . . the State or the trial court can exclude an instance of conduct from the jeopardy bar through an election”); see Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253 , 259 n.4 (Tex. Crim.

1998See Queen, 940 S.W.2d at 784 .

1998See Queen, 940 S.W.2d at 784 .

1998The Chief Justice cautioned that a jeopardy bar should be applied only to offenses that can be "analogized to greater and lesser included offenses." Dixon, 113 S.Ct. at 2867-2868 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 582 .

1998The Chief Justice cautioned that a jeopardy bar should be applied only to offenses that can be "analogized to greater and lesser included offenses." Dixon, 113 S.Ct. at 2867-2868 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 582 .

2016Id. at 794 ; Kelson v. State, 167 S.W.3d 587, 592 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.).2 In addition to asserting that the trial court erred in denying his special plea of double jeopardy, Appellant asserts that his double jeopardy rights were violated because he was prosecuted twice for the same offense.

2013Apolinar v. State, 820 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tex. Crim.

1998Writing for a splintered Court, Justice Scalia, joined by four others, concluded that Dixon's subsequent prosecution and Foster's prosecution for assault were jeopardy barred. [10] As well, a majority of justices agreed to overrule the three-year old "same conduct" test—under which the critical inquiry to establish a jeopardy bar is the scope of the conduct the government will prove, not the evidence it will use to prove the conduct—that had been adopted in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990).

1998Writing for a splintered Court, Justice Scalia, joined by four others, concluded that Dixon's subsequent prosecution and Foster's prosecution for assault were jeopardy barred. [10] As well, a majority of justices agreed to overrule the three-year old "same conduct" test—under which the critical inquiry to establish a jeopardy bar is the scope of the conduct the government will prove, not the evidence it will use to prove the conduct—that had been adopted in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990).

1999The Blockburger test serves as a jeopardy bar only in prosecutions of multiple offenses arising from “the same act or transaction” under certain circumstances. 284 U.S. at 804 , 52 S.Ct. 180 .

1999The Blockburger test serves as a jeopardy bar only in prosecutions of multiple offenses arising from “the same act or transaction” under certain circumstances. 284 U.S. at 804 , 52 S.Ct. 180 .

1996Appellant cited United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), and Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 , 113 S.Ct. 2801 , 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), contending that the forfeiture of his money and cellular phone caused a jeopardy bar to criminal prosecution in his case.

1996Appellant cited United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), and Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 , 113 S.Ct. 2801 , 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), contending that the forfeiture of his money and cellular phone caused a jeopardy bar to criminal prosecution in his case.

1992See Ex parte Rathmell, 717 S.W.2d 33, 35-36 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). [3] The problem is exacerbated somewhat by a recurring suggestion in Supreme Court opinions, never quite made explicit, that the phrase "same offence" should be understood differently when a jeopardy challenge is to successive prosecutions than when it is to multiple punishments.

1989He relies generally on Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 , 97 S.Ct. 2034 , 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977); Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Ex parte Rathmell, 717 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), and specifically on Ex parte Stowe, 744 S.W.2d 615 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1987), no PDR history, and Hamilton v. State, 699 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1985), PDR refused. 2 For reasons about to be developed, we will affirm.

1990See, e.g., Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152 , 97 S.Ct. 2207, 2216 , 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977) (if the accused could have been tried in one proceeding for various offenses, but chooses separate trials, he cannot complain of a jeopardy violation).

1990See, e.g., Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 152 , 97 S.Ct. 2207, 2216 , 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977) (if the accused could have been tried in one proceeding for various offenses, but chooses separate trials, he cannot complain of a jeopardy violation).

1988Anderson v. State, 635 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Wockenfuss v. State, 521 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Ward v. State, 520 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Crim.

1988Anderson v. State, 635 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Wockenfuss v. State, 521 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Ward v. State, 520 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Crim.App.1975).

2026App. 2010) (“[A] finding of legal insufficiency on appeal would interpose a jeopardy bar to retrial.”); see also Ex parte Reyes, 474 S.W.3d 677, 681 (Tex. Crim.

2025App. 2010) (holding sufficiency of evidence, when raised, must be addressed before trial error because sustaining it results in acquittal and “would interpose a jeopardy bar to retrial”); Price v. State, 502 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“We address appellant’s second issue first because it challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and seeks rendition of a judgment of acquittal.”). 7 v. State, 412 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex. Crim.

2025App. 2010) (holding sufficiency of evidence, when raised, must be addressed before trial error because sustaining it results in acquittal and “would interpose a jeopardy bar to retrial”); Price v. State, 502 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“We address appellant’s second issue first because it challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and seeks rendition of a judgment of acquittal.”). 7 v. State, 412 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex. Crim.