product liability claim in Pennsylvania

2025Husak, supra. Husak involved a product liability claim against a successor corporation.

2025In Stevenson, for example, the trial court bifurcated a product liability claim into liability and damage phases. 521 A.2d at 414 .

2021Plaintiff's claim is without merit, as this Court’s instructions were properly guided by the parameters set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A and our Supreme Court’s decision in Tincher v, Omega Flex, Inc.®’ Scction 402A of the Second Restatement provides: (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 8 Wilkerson v. Alli

2019Rogers, 533 A.2d 739 (Pa. Super. 1987).

2017The Superior’ Court explained that “[e]vidence of prior accidents involving the same instrumentality is generally relevant to show that a defect or dangerous ' condition existed,” id. at 1228 , and concluded that twenty-five reports of prior, similar incidents from other consumers was admissible to prove that the truck's parking brake mechanism was defective. .

2016Notably, Plaintiff also advanced a strict product liability claim. pursuant to a product malfunction theory."); Harsh, 840 A.2d 404 .

2016Notably, Plaintiff also advanced a strict product liability claim pursuant to a product malfunction theory."); Harsh, 840 7The Commonwealth Court labeled the malfunction claim as a "manufactw:ing defect claim," but described the theory using the malfunction elements articulated i.n DafU(ZJ:, 703 A.2d at 496 . 20 Circulated 12/07/2015 09:49 AM A.2d 404.

2014Applying similar criteria, the Barker court reasoned that placing the burden on the defendant was appropriate “[b]e-cause most of the evidentiary matters which may be relevant to the determination of the adequacy of a product’s design under the ‘risk-benefit’ standard e.g., the feasibility and cost of alternative designs are similar to issues typically presented in a negligent design case and involve technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufacturer.” According to Barker, the shift in the burden of proof reflected the policy judgment that “one of the principal purposes behi

2014Applying similar criteria, the Barker court reasoned that placing the burden on the defendant was appropriate “[b]e-cause most of the evidentiary matters which may be relevant to the determination of the adequacy of a product’s design under the ‘risk-benefit’ standard e.g., the feasibility and cost of alternative designs are similar to issues typically presented in a negligent design case and involve technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the manufacturer.” According to Barker, the shift in the burden of proof reflected the policy judgment that “one of the principal purposes behi

2009In the absence of such a determination and entry of a final order, any order or other form of decision that adjudicates fewer than all the claims and parties shall not constitute a final order. [3] Conversely, in Poyser v. Newman & Co., Inc., 514 Pa. 32 , 522 A.2d 548 (1987), the plaintiff asserted a product liability claim and a claim based on his employer's willful disregard of the government safety regulations for physical injuries sustained while in the course of his employment.

2009In the absence of such a determination and entry of a final order, any order or other form of decision that adjudicates fewer than all the claims and parties shall not constitute a final order. [3] Conversely, in Poyser v. Newman & Co., Inc., 514 Pa. 32 , 522 A.2d 548 (1987), the plaintiff asserted a product liability claim and a claim based on his employer's willful disregard of the government safety regulations for physical injuries sustained while in the course of his employment.

2007It was established that the heat sensors worked properly for approximately 10 years, and “the trial court concluded that a reasonable jury could not conclude that the sensors were defective when they left GreCon’s control for purposes of establishing a product liability claim.” Id. at 644 .

2006For example, in a case where the plaintiff had a product liability claim based on defective design and another claim based on failure to warn, the Court of Appeals of Ohio held that a juror who dissented on one theory was free to vote on the other, because the claims were “separate and unrelated” and were "two distinct causes of action.” Gable v. Village of Gates Mills, 151 Ohio App.3d 480 , 784 N.E.2d 739 (Ohio Ct.App.2003), rev’d on other grounds, 103 Ohio St.3d 449 , 816 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio 2004).

2006For example, in a case where the plaintiff had a product liability claim based on defective design and another claim based on failure to warn, the Court of Appeals of Ohio held that a juror who dissented on one theory was free to vote on the other, because the claims were "separate and unrelated" and were "two distinct causes of action." Gable v. Village of Gates Mills, 151 Ohio App.3d 480 , 784 N.E.2d 739 (Ohio Ct. App.2003), rev'd on other grounds, 103 Ohio St.3d 449 , 816 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio 2004). [1] Cf. O'Connell v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R.

2006For example, in a case where the plaintiff had a product liability claim based on defective design and another claim based on failure to warn, the Court of Appeals of Ohio held that a juror who dissented on one theory was free to vote on the other, because the claims were "separate and unrelated" and were "two distinct causes of action." Gable v. Village of Gates Mills, 151 Ohio App.3d 480 , 784 N.E.2d 739 (Ohio Ct. App.2003), rev'd on other grounds, 103 Ohio St.3d 449 , 816 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio 2004). [1] Cf. O'Connell v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R.

2006For example, in a case where the plaintiff had a product liability claim based on defective design and another claim based on failure to warn, the Court of Appeals of Ohio held that a juror who dissented on one theory was free to vote on the other, because the claims were "separate and unrelated" and were "two distinct causes of action." Gable v. Village of Gates Mills, 151 Ohio App.3d 480 , 784 N.E.2d 739 (Ohio Ct. App.2003), rev'd on other grounds, 103 Ohio St.3d 449 , 816 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio 2004). [1] Cf. O'Connell v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R.

2003To the extent that there is a ‘duty,’ it would involve a manufacturer’s ‘duty’ to design, manufacturer or *437 distribute a product which is free from defects.” (Trial court’s opinion at 44.) GM also takes issue with the trial court’s instruction to the jury that a manufacturer is a guarantor of its product rather than an insurer of its product and its rebanee upon Azzarello v. Black Brothers Company, Inc., 480 Pa. 547 , 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).

2003To the extent that there is a ‘duty,’ it would involve a manufacturer’s ‘duty’ to design, manufacturer or *437 distribute a product which is free from defects.” (Trial court’s opinion at 44.) GM also takes issue with the trial court’s instruction to the jury that a manufacturer is a guarantor of its product rather than an insurer of its product and its rebanee upon Azzarello v. Black Brothers Company, Inc., 480 Pa. 547 , 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).

1999The Pennsylvania Superior Court accepted the occasional seller defense to a product liability claim in McKenna v. Art Pearl Works Inc., 225 Pa. Super. 362 , 365 n.2, 310 A.2d 677 , 679 n.2 (1973).

1999The Pennsylvania Superior Court accepted the occasional seller defense to a product liability claim in McKenna v. Art Pearl Works Inc., 225 Pa. Super. 362 , 365 n.2, 310 A.2d 677 , 679 n.2 (1973).

1998In O'Donnell v. Big Yank, 696 A.2d 846 (Pa.Super.1997), we refused to apply spoliation where the product liability claim was based on a design defect theory rather than a manufacturing defect.

1998In O’Donnell v. Big Yank, 696 A.2d 846 (Pa.Super.1997), we refused to apply spoliation where the product liability claim was based on a design defect theory rather than a manufacturing defect.

1998In Long v. Yingling, supra , we refused to apply spoliation against a plaintiff where the allegedly defective product was in the control of defendant's bailee at the time it was lost.

1998In Long v. Yingling, supra, we refused to apply spoliation against a plaintiff where the allegedly defective product was in the control of defendant’s bailee at the time it was lost.