product liability claim in California

1995Under the risk-benefit test, the plaintiff’s burden is to “prov[e] that the product’s design proximately caused his injury . . . .” (Barker, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 435 .) The defendant then bears the burden of proving “that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.” (Ibid.) This allocation of burdens reflects and responds to both the traditional purposes of the strict product liability doctrine and the presumptive balance of the parties’ knowledge of the often technical factors that make up the risk-benefit equation.

1984This court has stated that "one of the principal purposes behind the strict product liability doctrine is to relieve an injured plaintiff of many of the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of action." ( Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413, 431 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 573 P.2d 443 , 96 A.L.R.3d 1 ].) Yet, in order to prevail, plaintiff not only had to prove that Diodoquin was defective, but also that Searle had not acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer.

2004Likewise Luque v. McLean (1972) 8 Cal.3d 136, 145 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 501 P.2d 1163 , is concerned not with proximate cause but with the kind of contributory negligence that will constitute a defense to a product liability claim." `For such a defense to arise,'" the court wrote, "`the user or consumer must become aware of the defect and danger and still proceed unreasonably to make use of the product.'" ( Ibid., italics added; see id. at p. 145, fn. 9, 104 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 501 P.2d 1163 [discussing Rest.2d Torts, § 402A, com. n, and other authorities on "`assumption of risk'" in strict liabil

2004Likewise Luque v. McLean (1972) 8 Cal.3d 136, 145 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 501 P.2d 1163 , is concerned not with proximate cause but with the kind of contributory negligence that will constitute a defense to a product liability claim." `For such a defense to arise,'" the court wrote, "`the user or consumer must become aware of the defect and danger and still proceed unreasonably to make use of the product.'" ( Ibid., italics added; see id. at p. 145, fn. 9, 104 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 501 P.2d 1163 [discussing Rest.2d Torts, § 402A, com. n, and other authorities on "`assumption of risk'" in strict liabil

1990Second, a product may alternatively be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product’s design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.” (Id., at p. 432.) Noting that past authorities had generally not devoted much attention to the appropriate allocation of the burden of proof, the Supreme Court (citing, inter alia, Baker v. Chrysler Corp., supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 716 ) remarked that the “burden is

1978(Cf. Self v. General Motors Corp., supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 8 with Baker v. Chrysler Corp., supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 716.) The allocation of such burden is particularly significant in this context inasmuch as this court’s product liability decisions, from Greenman to Cronin , have repeatedly emphasized that one of the principal purposes behind the strict product liability doctrine is to relieve an injured plaintiff of many of the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of action.

2024Co. v. DiDomenico (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 673, 676 [claim “accrues ‘when the wrongful act is done and the obligation or the liability arises’ ”].) In Buechel v. Five Star Quality Care, Inc. (Iowa 2008) 745 N.W.2d 732 (Buechel), the Iowa Supreme Court explained the limitation period for a product liability claim resulting in personal injury is set forth in Iowa Code section 614.1(2), and “such claims must be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action.” (Buechel, at p. 736.) Accrual occurs when “a plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered

2023(See, e.g., Godfried v. Ford Motor Co. (D.Me., May 6, 2021, No. 1:19-cv-00372-NT) 2021 WL 1819696 , at p. *5 [“it is not necessarily a prerequisite for specific jurisdiction that a company market or sell the specific product model at issue in the forum state”]; Sibley v. Air and Liquid Systems Corp. (N.D.Cal., June 30, 2021, No. 20-cv-07697-MMC) 2021 WL 2688819 , at p. *3 [same]; Harding v. Cordis Corp. (Ill.Ct.App. 2021) 196 N.E.3d 514, 523 [“nothing in Ford suggests that the only way to demonstrate that a defendant has minimum contacts with a forum state is through sales of the injurious pro

2008(Id. at p. 681.) In doing so, the Court of Appeal observed, “It is critical to the issue posed to determine if the dominant role of a pharmacist in supplying a prescription drug should be characterized as the performance of a service or the sale of a product.” (Id. at p. 677.) Quoting with approval from the Court of Appeal decision in Carmichael v. Reitz (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 958, 978 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 381 ], the court in Murphy stated that the distinction for purposes of the product liability analysis was “ ‘between a transaction where the primary objective is the acquisition of ownership or use

2008(Id. at p. 681.) In doing so, the Court of Appeal observed, “It is critical to the issue posed to determine if the dominant role of a pharmacist in supplying a prescription drug should be characterized as the performance of a service or the sale of a product.” (Id. at p. 677.) Quoting with approval from the Court of Appeal decision in Carmichael v. Reitz (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 958, 978 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 381 ], the court in Murphy stated that the distinction for purposes of the product liability analysis was “ ‘between a transaction where the primary objective is the acquisition of ownership or use

2008(Reigelsperger v. *435 Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, 579-580 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 887 , 150 P.3d 764 ] [uncommunicated subjective intent irrelevant to mutual consent, which is determined from the reasonable meaning of the words and acts of the parties].) From the language of her agreement and defendant’s uncontradicted evidence, we conclude that the dominant purpose of plaintiff’s membership agreement was to make available fitness services; accordingly, plaintiff has no valid claim under the strict product liability doctrine.

2008(Reigelsperger v. *435 Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, 579-580 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 887 , 150 P.3d 764 ] [uncommunicated subjective intent irrelevant to mutual consent, which is determined from the reasonable meaning of the words and acts of the parties].) From the language of her agreement and defendant’s uncontradicted evidence, we conclude that the dominant purpose of plaintiff’s membership agreement was to make available fitness services; accordingly, plaintiff has no valid claim under the strict product liability doctrine.

2008(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 845 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ].) 3 Although the declaration of defendant’s risk management analyst provided an explanation of an “Active” and a “Sport” facility, he did not explain the characteristics of an “Express” facility. 4 Plaintiff’s facts are taken from plaintiff’s separate statement of disputed facts and the evidence to which she referred in that separate statement. 5 See footnote 1, ante. 6 It is not clear from the trial court’s order whether the court considered the membership agreement as a waiver of the product l

2008(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 845 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841 , 24 P.3d 493 ].) 3 Although the declaration of defendant’s risk management analyst provided an explanation of an “Active” and a “Sport” facility, he did not explain the characteristics of an “Express” facility. 4 Plaintiff’s facts are taken from plaintiff’s separate statement of disputed facts and the evidence to which she referred in that separate statement. 5 See footnote 1, ante. 6 It is not clear from the trial court’s order whether the court considered the membership agreement as a waiver of the product l

2003(Barker, supra, at pp. 431-432 ; see also Harris v. Irish Truck Lines, Inc. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 373, 378 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 489 , 521 P.2d 481 ] [defendant who possessed vehicle before and after accident had burden of proving brake failure not caused by its failure to keep brakes in good working order].) Greater access to relevant evidence does not mandate that a defendant bear the burden of proof on the issue.

2003(Barker, supra, at pp. 431-432 ; see also Harris v. Irish Truck Lines, Inc. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 373, 378 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 489 , 521 P.2d 481 ] [defendant who possessed vehicle before and after accident had burden of proving brake failure not caused by its failure to keep brakes in good working order].) Greater access to relevant evidence does not mandate that a defendant bear the burden of proof on the issue.

2003“We cannot conceive of how [Bigge] could have had, objectively or reasonably, a contrary expectation.” (American Dynasty, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059 .) 7 This is particularly true insofar as the strict product liability claim against Bigge is concerned, as the “purpose of imposing strict liability is to ensure the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are placed on the manufacturer and others [including lessors] who place the product on the market.” (San Diego Hospital Assn. v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 8, 15-16 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 ]; Westlye v. Look Sports, In

2003“We cannot conceive of how [Bigge] could have had, objectively or reasonably, a contrary expectation.” (American Dynasty, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059 .) 7 This is particularly true insofar as the strict product liability claim against Bigge is concerned, as the “purpose of imposing strict liability is to ensure the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are placed on the manufacturer and others [including lessors] who place the product on the market.” (San Diego Hospital Assn. v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 8, 15-16 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 ]; Westlye v. Look Sports, In

2003“We cannot conceive of how [Bigge] could have had, objectively or reasonably, a contrary expectation.” (American Dynasty, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059 .) 7 This is particularly true insofar as the strict product liability claim against Bigge is concerned, as the “purpose of imposing strict liability is to ensure the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are placed on the manufacturer and others [including lessors] who place the product on the market.” (San Diego Hospital Assn. v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 8, 15-16 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 ]; Westlye v. Look Sports, In

2003“We cannot conceive of how [Bigge] could have had, objectively or reasonably, a contrary expectation.” (American Dynasty, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1059 .) 7 This is particularly true insofar as the strict product liability claim against Bigge is concerned, as the “purpose of imposing strict liability is to ensure the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are placed on the manufacturer and others [including lessors] who place the product on the market.” (San Diego Hospital Assn. v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 8, 15-16 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 489 ]; Westlye v. Look Sports, In

2003(Accord, Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 931 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 ] [where claims seek to impose liability based on unprotected conduct, collateral references to additional protected conduct do not make claims subject to anti-SLAPP treatment]; ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1001 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ] [same].) *189 Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, at least in the present context, is essentially a variant of their product liability claim.

2003(Accord, Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 931 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 ] [where claims seek to impose liability based on unprotected conduct, collateral references to additional protected conduct do not make claims subject to anti-SLAPP treatment]; ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1001 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ] [same].) *189 Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, at least in the present context, is essentially a variant of their product liability claim.

2003(See generally Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 547, 556-558 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 ] [concepts of strict liability and negligence are alternative theories parallel and supplementary to each other].) The gravamen of the wrongful conduct forming the foundation for Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, like the gravamen of their product liability claim, is indistinguishable for purposes of applying the anti-SLAPP statute in this case.

2003(See generally Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 547, 556-558 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 ] [concepts of strict liability and negligence are alternative theories parallel and supplementary to each other].) The gravamen of the wrongful conduct forming the foundation for Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, like the gravamen of their product liability claim, is indistinguishable for purposes of applying the anti-SLAPP statute in this case.

2003(Accord, Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 931 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 ] [where claims seek to impose liability based on unprotected conduct, collateral references to additional protected conduct do not make claims subject to anti-SLAPP treatment]; ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1001 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ] [same].) *189 Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, at least in the present context, is essentially a variant of their product liability claim.

2003(Accord, Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 931 [ 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 187 ] [where claims seek to impose liability based on unprotected conduct, collateral references to additional protected conduct do not make claims subject to anti-SLAPP treatment]; ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1001 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 ] [same].) *189 Plaintiffs’ negligence claim, at least in the present context, is essentially a variant of their product liability claim.

1996(See (Streicher v. Tommy’s Electric Co., supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 883 ; Garrett v. Crown Coach Corp., supra, 259 Cal.App.2d at p. 650 ; Breceda v. Gamsby, supra, 267 Cal.App.2d at p. 174 [the fact that the plaintiff had the means of ascertaining the needed facts earlier is not a bar to the application of section 474]; Mishalow v. Horwald (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 517, 523-524 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 895 ] [“whether plaintiffs could or could not have ascertained the [necessary facts] before suit was filed is immaterial”]; Larson v. Barnett (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 282, 289-290 [ 225 P.2d 297 ]; Johnson v. G

1996(See (Streicher v. Tommy’s Electric Co., supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 883 ; Garrett v. Crown Coach Corp., supra, 259 Cal.App.2d at p. 650 ; Breceda v. Gamsby, supra, 267 Cal.App.2d at p. 174 [the fact that the plaintiff had the means of ascertaining the needed facts earlier is not a bar to the application of section 474]; Mishalow v. Horwald (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 517, 523-524 [ 41 Cal.Rptr. 895 ] [“whether plaintiffs could or could not have ascertained the [necessary facts] before suit was filed is immaterial”]; Larson v. Barnett (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 282, 289-290 [ 225 P.2d 297 ]; Johnson v. G