objective reasonable person standard in Texas

2015We abate this appeal and remand this cause for a new hearing, with instructions to address whether, under an objective reasonable-person standard, Judge Mills (1) was disqualified as an interested party, see Whitehead, 273 S. W.3d at 286 , or (2) should have been recused because his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, see Tex. R.

2015We abate this appeal and remand this cause for a new hearing, with instructions to address whether, under an objective reasonable-person standard, Judge Mills (1) was disqualified as an interested party, see Whitehead, 273 S.W.3d at 286 , or (2) should have been recused because his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, see Tex. R.

2015"The objective reasonable-person standard for disqualification" as an injured party is "identical to the 7 objective reasonable-person standard for recusal under rule 18b(b)( 1)." Id. (comparing Whitehead, 273 S.W.3d at 286 , with Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d 109, 115-17 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.».

2015"The objective reasonable-person standard for disqualification" as an injured party is "identical to the 7 objective reasonable-person standard for recusal under rule 18b(b)( 1)." Id. (comparing Whitehead, 273 S.W.3d at 286 , with Ex parte Ellis, 275 S.W.3d 109, 115-17 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.».

2015This objective reasonable-person standard "is concerned not only with actual personal or pecuniary interests, but also the appearance of impartiality." Fuelberg, 410 S.W.3d at 509 . "[B]eyond the demand that a judge be impartial is the requirement that a judge appear to be impartial so that no doubts or suspicions exist as to the fairness or integrity ofthe court." Sears v. Olivarez, 28 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); see also Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex. 1995) ("Declaration of Recusal" by Gammage, J.) (noting that issue is one of perception).

2015This objective reasonable-person standard "is concerned not only with actual personal or pecuniary interests, but also the appearance of impartiality." Fuelberg, 410 S.W.3d at 509 . "[B]eyond the demand that a judge be impartial is the requirement that a judge appear to be impartial so that no doubts or suspicions exist as to the fairness or integrity ofthe court." Sears v. Olivarez, 28 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); see also Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex. 1995) ("Declaration of Recusal" by Gammage, J.) (noting that issue is one of perception).

2015This objective reasonable-person standard "is concerned not only with actual personal or pecuniary interests, but also the appearance of impartiality." Fuelberg, 410 S.W.3d at 509 . "[B]eyond the demand that a judge be impartial is the requirement that a judge appear to be impartial so that no doubts or suspicions exist as to the fairness or integrity ofthe court." Sears v. Olivarez, 28 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); see also Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex. 1995) ("Declaration of Recusal" by Gammage, J.) (noting that issue is one of perception).

2015This objective reasonable-person standard "is concerned not only with actual personal or pecuniary interests, but also the appearance of impartiality." Fuelberg, 410 S.W.3d at 509 . "[B]eyond the demand that a judge be impartial is the requirement that a judge appear to be impartial so that no doubts or suspicions exist as to the fairness or integrity ofthe court." Sears v. Olivarez, 28 S.W.3d 611, 614 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); see also Rogers v. Bradley, 909 S.W.2d 872, 873 (Tex. 1995) ("Declaration of Recusal" by Gammage, J.) (noting that issue is one of perception).

2024“There is also a reasonable-person element to the mens rea required for the offense, criminal negligence, which involves ‘a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.’” Watson v. State, 369 S.W.3d 865, 871 (Tex. Crim.