right of control test in Texas

2010See Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d at 144 ; Del Indus., 35 S.W.3d at 595 (courts determine whether a company is an employer under the right-of-control test); Thompson, 789 S.W.2d at 278 ; Gibson, 866 S.W.2d at 760 ; Marshall, 825 S.W.2d at 195-96 .

2010See Alvarado , 111 S.W.3d at 144 ; Del Indus. , 35 S.W.3d at 595 (courts determine whether a company is an employer under the right-of-control test); Thompson , 789 S.W.2d at 278 ; Gibson , 866 S.W.2d at 760 ; Marshall , 825 S.W.2d at 195–96.

2021Fund v. DEL Indus., Inc., 35 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tex. 2000) (explaining that, for purposes of workers’ compensation, a worker’s employee status is determined “under the right-of-control test”); State Farm Mut.

2010See Alvarado , 111 S.W.3d at 144 ; Del Indus. , 35 S.W.3d at 595 (courts determine whether a company is an employer under the right-of-control test); Thompson , 789 S.W.2d at 278 ; Gibson , 866 S.W.2d at 760 ; Marshall , 825 S.W.2d at 195–96.

2013Appellants further argue that “[b]ecause Appellees retained a right of re-entry to make repairs to the windows, coupled with the prohibition on Appellants[’] repairing or altering the windows, Appellees retained control over the windows, creating a duty to maintain them so as not to pose a danger to Appellants.” Liability under the right-of-control exception is based on physical possession of common areas; the liability question “turns on who had possession of a part of the premises rather than a mere right of re-entry.” Shell Oil Co. v. Khan , 138 S.W.3d 288, 296 (Tex. 2004).

2013Appellants further argue that “[b]ecause Appellees retained a right of re-entry to make repairs to the windows, coupled with the prohibition on Appellants[’] repairing or altering the windows, Appellees retained control over the windows, creating a duty to maintain them so as not to pose a danger to Appellants.” Liability under the right-of-control exception is based on physical possession of common areas; the liability question “turns on who had possession of a part of the premises rather than a mere right of re-entry.” Shell Oil Co. v. Khan, 138 S.W.3d 288, 296 (Tex. 2004).

2010The recorded demonstrates [the employee’s] awareness that she was loaned [to the defendant company], Mosqueda v. G & H Diversified Mfg., Inc., 223 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 4 Applying the right-of-control rule, the record reveals that AEP pleaded and presented sufficient summary judgment evidence that Phillips was a borrowed servant.

2010Mosqueda v. G & H Diversified Mfg., Inc. , 223 S.W.3d 571, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). [4] Applying the right-of-control rule, the record reveals that AEP pleaded and presented sufficient summary judgment evidence that Phillips was a borrowed servant.

2010Pederson v. Apple Corrugated Packaging, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1994, writ denied); Hughes v. Compaq Computer Corp., No. 14-96-00025-CV, 1996 WL 711233 , at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 12, 1996, writ denied) (not designated for publication).

2010Pederson v. Apple Corrugated Packaging, Inc. , 874 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1994, writ denied); Hughes v. Compaq Computer Corp. , No. 14-96-00025-CV, 1996 WL 711233 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 12, 1996, writ denied) (not designated for publication).

2010See Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d at 144 ; Del Indus., 35 S.W.3d at 595 (courts determine whether a company is an employer under the right-of-control test); Thompson, 789 S.W.2d at 278 ; Gibson, 866 S.W.2d at 760 ; Marshall, 825 S.W.2d at 195-96 .

2010See Alvarado , 111 S.W.3d at 144 ; Del Indus. , 35 S.W.3d at 595 (courts determine whether a company is an employer under the right-of-control test); Thompson , 789 S.W.2d at 278 ; Gibson , 866 S.W.2d at 760 ; Marshall , 825 S.W.2d at 195–96.

2025In Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, we considered whether an oil company owed a duty to protect an employee of its service station tenant from criminal acts by third parties. 867 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1993).

2021See Farlow, 284 S.W.3d at 911 ; Smith v. Foodmaker, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ).

2021See Farlow, 284 S.W.3d at 911 ; Smith v. Foodmaker, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ).

2019See Wesby v. Act Pipe & Supply, Inc., 199 S.W.3d 614, 619 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding that the client company was entitled to the exclusive remedy defense under 10 the borrowed servant doctrine); Flores v. N. Am.

2015See Long v. Turner, 871 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, writ denied) (distinguishing McKelvy where both the plaintiff and defendant were regular employees of the same employer).

2012See id. (“Although some of these factors may not, alone, be enough to demonstrate a worker’s independent-contractor status, together they provide conclusive summary-judgment evidence that Mathis was an independent contractor and not Limestone’s employee when the accident occurred.”).

2001See, e.g., Carr, 646 S.W.2d at 562 ; see also Coppedge v. Colonial Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 721 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.) (when the legislature creates a cause of action and remedy for its enforcement, we regard that legislation as cumulative of the common law, unless the statute expressly or impliedly negates the latter).

2001See, e.g., Carr, 646 S.W.2d at 562 ; see also Coppedge v. Colonial Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 721 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.) (when the legislature creates a cause of action and remedy for its enforcement, we regard that legislation as cumulative of the common law, unless the statute expressly or impliedly negates the latter).