16 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pickens v. Stategreen1 sentence2025R. 4.1(a), 10.5(b), 26.3; Olivo, 918 S.W.2d at 522 ; Pickens v. State, 105 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (“[B]ecause [appellant’s] motion for extension of time to file his notice of appeal was not filed within the time prescribed by rule 26.3, it is ineffective.” (citation omitted)); see also Bedford v. State, No. 13-22-00225- CR, 2022 WL 2251813 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Appellant’s notice of appeal, filed more than two months after sentence was imposed, was untimely, and the motion for ex | 1 | 1 |
Kirschberg v. Lowegreen1 sentence2008Justice, 896 S.W.2d 176, 176-177 (Tex.1995) (per curiam) (treating an instrument filed as a "bill of review" as assailing the judgment and thus extending the time for perfecting appeal and the trial court's plenary jurisdiction to alter its judgment); see also Kirschberg v. Lowe, 974 S.W.2d 844, 847-848 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (treating a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto as assailing the judgment and concluding that "the filing of any postjudgment motion or other instrument that (1) is filed within the time for filing a motion for a new trial and (2) `assail[s] the trial | 1 | 1 |
Gomez v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Divisiongreen1 sentence2008Justice, 896 S.W.2d 176, 176-177 (Tex.1995) (per curiam) (treating an instrument filed as a "bill of review" as assailing the judgment and thus extending the time for perfecting appeal and the trial court's plenary jurisdiction to alter its judgment); see also Kirschberg v. Lowe, 974 S.W.2d 844, 847-848 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (treating a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto as assailing the judgment and concluding that "the filing of any postjudgment motion or other instrument that (1) is filed within the time for filing a motion for a new trial and (2) `assail[s] the trial | 1 | 1 |
Monroe v. Frankgreen1 sentence2003See Las Vegas Pecan & Cattle Co. v. Zavala County , 682 S.W.2d 254, 255-56 (Tex.1984); Monroe v. Frank , 936 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). | 1 | 1 |
Las Vegas Pecan & Cattle Co. v. Zavala Countygreen1 sentence2003See Las Vegas Pecan & Cattle Co. v. Zavala County , 682 S.W.2d 254, 255-56 (Tex.1984); Monroe v. Frank , 936 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Denton County Appraisal Districtgreen1 sentence2002Compare Franklin, 53 S.W.3d at 404 (holding that a post-dismissal oral hearing on motion to reinstate renders harmless the trial court’s error in failing to hold hearing prior to dismissal under rule 165a(2) for noncompliance with the time standards promulgated by the supreme court); Montgomery Ward & Co., 13 S.W.3d at 831 (holding that a litigant’s receipt of an order dismissing a case under rule 165a within the time prescribed by rule 165a(3) to file a verified motion to reinstate provides due process concerning the dismissal). | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. State Bargreen2 sentences2002See In re Wade, 948 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that the Arizona State Bar "acts as an instrumentality of the Arizona Supreme Court enforcing its police or regulatory power, and therefore the disciplinary proceedings ... are excepted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(4)”); In re Friedman & Shapiro, P.C., 185 B.R. 143, 145 (S.D.N.Y.1995); In re Williams, 158 B.R. 488, 491 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1993); In re Hanson, 71 B.R. 193, 194 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1987); Cooper v. State Bar, 43 Cal.3d 1016 , 239 Cal. Rptr. 709 , 741 P.2d 206, 211 (1987) (explaining that disciplinary proceedin 2002See In re Wade, 948 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that the Arizona State Bar "acts as an instrumentality of the Arizona Supreme Court enforcing its police or regulatory power, and therefore the disciplinary proceedings ... are excepted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(4)”); In re Friedman & Shapiro, P.C., 185 B.R. 143, 145 (S.D.N.Y.1995); In re Williams, 158 B.R. 488, 491 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1993); In re Hanson, 71 B.R. 193, 194 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1987); Cooper v. State Bar, 43 Cal.3d 1016 , 239 Cal. Rptr. 709 , 741 P.2d 206, 211 (1987) (explaining that disciplinary proceedin | 1 | 1 |
Franklin v. Sherman Independent School Districtgreen1 sentence2002Compare Franklin, 53 S.W.3d at 404 (holding that a post-dismissal oral hearing on motion to reinstate renders harmless the trial court’s error in failing to hold hearing prior to dismissal under rule 165a(2) for noncompliance with the time standards promulgated by the supreme court); Montgomery Ward & Co., 13 S.W.3d at 831 (holding that a litigant’s receipt of an order dismissing a case under rule 165a within the time prescribed by rule 165a(3) to file a verified motion to reinstate provides due process concerning the dismissal). | 1 | 1 |
In Re E. Gene Wade Joyzelle I. Wade, Debtors. E. Gene Wade Joyzelle I. Wade v. State Bar of Arizonagreen1 sentence2002See In re Wade, 948 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that the Arizona State Bar "acts as an instrumentality of the Arizona Supreme Court enforcing its police or regulatory power, and therefore the disciplinary proceedings ... are excepted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(4)”); In re Friedman & Shapiro, P.C., 185 B.R. 143, 145 (S.D.N.Y.1995); In re Williams, 158 B.R. 488, 491 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1993); In re Hanson, 71 B.R. 193, 194 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1987); Cooper v. State Bar, 43 Cal.3d 1016 , 239 Cal. Rptr. 709 , 741 P.2d 206, 211 (1987) (explaining that disciplinary proceedin | 1 | 1 |
In Re Hansongreen1 sentence2002See In re Wade, 948 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that the Arizona State Bar "acts as an instrumentality of the Arizona Supreme Court enforcing its police or regulatory power, and therefore the disciplinary proceedings ... are excepted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(4)”); In re Friedman & Shapiro, P.C., 185 B.R. 143, 145 (S.D.N.Y.1995); In re Williams, 158 B.R. 488, 491 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1993); In re Hanson, 71 B.R. 193, 194 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1987); Cooper v. State Bar, 43 Cal.3d 1016 , 239 Cal. Rptr. 709 , 741 P.2d 206, 211 (1987) (explaining that disciplinary proceedin | 1 | 1 |
In Re Williamsgreen1 sentence2002See In re Wade, 948 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that the Arizona State Bar "acts as an instrumentality of the Arizona Supreme Court enforcing its police or regulatory power, and therefore the disciplinary proceedings ... are excepted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(4)”); In re Friedman & Shapiro, P.C., 185 B.R. 143, 145 (S.D.N.Y.1995); In re Williams, 158 B.R. 488, 491 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1993); In re Hanson, 71 B.R. 193, 194 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1987); Cooper v. State Bar, 43 Cal.3d 1016 , 239 Cal. Rptr. 709 , 741 P.2d 206, 211 (1987) (explaining that disciplinary proceedin | 1 | 1 |
Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial Department v. Shapiro (In Re Friedman & Shapiro, P.C.)green1 sentence2002See In re Wade, 948 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that the Arizona State Bar "acts as an instrumentality of the Arizona Supreme Court enforcing its police or regulatory power, and therefore the disciplinary proceedings ... are excepted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (b)(4)”); In re Friedman & Shapiro, P.C., 185 B.R. 143, 145 (S.D.N.Y.1995); In re Williams, 158 B.R. 488, 491 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1993); In re Hanson, 71 B.R. 193, 194 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1987); Cooper v. State Bar, 43 Cal.3d 1016 , 239 Cal. Rptr. 709 , 741 P.2d 206, 211 (1987) (explaining that disciplinary proceedin | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Davisgreen1 sentence1984Although appellee’s argument is supported by Odom v. Olafson, 675 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1984, no writ), we are committed to a different view by our decision in Moore v. Davis, 644 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Olivo v. State
green
2 sentences2025R. 4.1(a), 10.5(b), 26.3; Olivo, 918 S.W.2d at 522 ; Pickens v. State, 105 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (“[B]ecause [appellant’s] motion for extension of time to file his notice of appeal was not filed within the time prescribed by rule 26.3, it is ineffective.” (citation omitted)); see also Bedford v. State, No. 13-22-00225- CR, 2022 WL 2251813 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Appellant’s notice of appeal, filed more than two months after sentence was imposed, was untimely, and the motion for ex 2003Olivo, 918 S.W.2d at 522 . | 4 | 2003–2025 |
Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. Benton
green
1 sentence2002P. 329b(g) (a motion to modify a judgment, if filed, shall be filed and determined within the time prescribed by this rule for a motion for new trial and shall extend the trial court’s plenary power in the same manner as a motion for new trial); id. 329b(e) (if a motion for new trial is timely filed by any party, the trial court, regardless of whether an appeal has been perfected, has plenary power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment until thirty days after all such timely-filed motions are overruled or by operation of law, whichever occurs first). 18 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Bohlin v. Brass Rail, Inc.
green
1 sentence1987Bohlin v. Brass Rail, 20 F.R.D. at 225 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Odom v. Olafson
green
1 sentence1984Although appellee’s argument is supported by Odom v. Olafson, 675 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1984, no writ), we are committed to a different view by our decision in Moore v. Davis, 644 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, no writ). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Glidden Company v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
green
2 sentences1977Rule 5, T.R.C.P.; Glidden Company v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 155 Tex. 591 , 291 S.W.2d 315 (1956); Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.1976). 1977Rule 5, T.R.C.P.; Glidden Company v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 155 Tex. 591 , 291 S.W.2d 315 (1956); Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.1976). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Reese v. Piperi
green
1 sentence1977Rule 5, T.R.C.P.; Glidden Company v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 155 Tex. 591 , 291 S.W.2d 315 (1956); Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.1976). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Masten v. Masten
green
1 sentence1967Typical is O’Connor v. City of Dallas, 337 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Civ.App., 1960, writ dism.), where the court stated: “The defendant (after having been timely served) wholly failed to make any answer to the request for admission of facts, within the time and as provided by Rule 169, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore, the answers called for under the decision of Masten v. Masten, Tex.Civ.App., 165 S.W.2d 225 , writ refused, must be taken as true * * Facts admitted by the defendant by reason of his failure to answer the requests were sufficient to support the judgment rendered. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
O'CONNOR v. City of Dallas
neutral
1 sentence1967Typical is O’Connor v. City of Dallas, 337 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Civ.App., 1960, writ dism.), where the court stated: “The defendant (after having been timely served) wholly failed to make any answer to the request for admission of facts, within the time and as provided by Rule 169, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore, the answers called for under the decision of Masten v. Masten, Tex.Civ.App., 165 S.W.2d 225 , writ refused, must be taken as true * * Facts admitted by the defendant by reason of his failure to answer the requests were sufficient to support the judgment rendered. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Matlock v. Matlock
green
2 sentences1958Matlock v. Matlock, 151 Texas 308 , 249 S.W. 2d 587 . 1958Matlock v. Matlock, 151 Texas 308 , 249 S.W. 2d 587 . | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Garrett v. Mercantile Nat. Bank at Dallas
neutral
1 sentence1949Garrett v. Mercantile National Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 238 , affirmed, 140 Tex. 394 , 168 S.W.2d 636, 638 ; Walker v. Cleere, 141 Tex. 550 , 174 S.W.2d 956 ; State ex rel. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Walker v. Cleere
green
2 sentences1949Garrett v. Mercantile National Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 238 , affirmed, 140 Tex. 394 , 168 S.W.2d 636, 638 ; Walker v. Cleere, 141 Tex. 550 , 174 S.W.2d 956 ; State ex rel. 1949Garrett v. Mercantile National Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 238 , affirmed, 140 Tex. 394 , 168 S.W.2d 636, 638 ; Walker v. Cleere, 141 Tex. 550 , 174 S.W.2d 956 ; State ex rel. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Garrett v. Mercantile National Bank
green
2 sentences1949Garrett v. Mercantile National Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 238 , affirmed, 140 Tex. 394 , 168 S.W.2d 636, 638 ; Walker v. Cleere, 141 Tex. 550 , 174 S.W.2d 956 ; State ex rel. 1949Garrett v. Mercantile National Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 170 S.W.2d 238 , affirmed, 140 Tex. 394 , 168 S.W.2d 636, 638 ; Walker v. Cleere, 141 Tex. 550 , 174 S.W.2d 956 ; State ex rel. | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Johnson v. Blount
neutral
1 sentence1922Johnson v. Blount, 48 Tex. 38 ; Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 390 , 13 S. W. 324 ; Insurance Co. v. Railway Co., 102 Tex. 307 , 116 S. W. 46 ; Railway Co. v. Perkins (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Rains v. Wheeler
green
2 sentences1922Johnson v. Blount, 48 Tex. 38 ; Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 390 , 13 S. W. 324 ; Insurance Co. v. Railway Co., 102 Tex. 307 , 116 S. W. 46 ; Railway Co. v. Perkins (Tex. Civ. 1922Johnson v. Blount, 48 Tex. 38 ; Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 390 , 13 S. W. 324 ; Insurance Co. v. Railway Co., 102 Tex. 307 , 116 S. W. 46 ; Railway Co. v. Perkins (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Royal Insurance v. Texas & Gulf Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1922Johnson v. Blount, 48 Tex. 38 ; Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 390 , 13 S. W. 324 ; Insurance Co. v. Railway Co., 102 Tex. 307 , 116 S. W. 46 ; Railway Co. v. Perkins (Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Saylor v. Marx
neutral
1 sentence1911Saylor v. Marx, 56 Tex. 90 . [4, 5] If we could consider the motion, it should not be sustained. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.