unlawful acts doctrine in Texas

2020See, e.g., Ward v. Emmett, 37 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2001, no pet.) (holding that unlawful-acts rule barred plaintiff, who was convicted of murdering her mother, from recovering on various claims because her damages arose from the murder); Saks v. Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson & Troilo, 880 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied) (holding public policy barred 25 plaintiffs’ legal-malpractice claim because their damages were caused by their illegal conduct, which resulted in their convictions for bank fraud).

2013Since then, “[cjourts throughout Texas ... have used this rule, along with public policy principles, to prevent a plaintiff from recovering damages that arose out of his or her own illegal conduct.” Ward, 37 S.W.3d at 502 (internal citations omitted).

2020See Denson, 262 S.W.3d at 855 (holding that unlawful- acts rule barred plaintiff’s tort claims because they were “inextricably intertwined with their illegal contract to sell automobiles in Dallas County without a [statutorily required] license”); Sharpe, 191 S.W.3d at 369 (“Because [Sharpe’s] conduct in removing the Diocese’s items from Diocesan property without its permission is the foundation of his allegation that he has a superior right to the items and that alleged right is the basis of his fraud claim against Turley, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Turley [

2011Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 93.001(a)(1) (emphasis added), while the unlawful acts doctrine requires proximate cause or that the unlawful act was inextricably intertwined with the claim, see Johnson, 9 S.W. at 603; Price, 269 S.W. at 428 ; Sharpe, 191 S.W.3d at 366 .

2020See Denson, 262 S.W.3d at 855 (holding that unlawful- acts rule barred plaintiff’s tort claims because they were “inextricably intertwined with their illegal contract to sell automobiles in Dallas County without a [statutorily required] license”); Sharpe, 191 S.W.3d at 369 (“Because [Sharpe’s] conduct in removing the Diocese’s items from Diocesan property without its permission is the foundation of his allegation that he has a superior right to the items and that alleged right is the basis of his fraud claim against Turley, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Turley [

2011Credit Union, 262 S.W.3d 846, 855 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) ("We agree with the Credit Union that the [unlawful acts] rule applies and bars appellants' claims arising in tort because they are inextricably intertwined with their illegal contract to sell automobiles in Dallas County without a license.”); Sharpe, 191 S.W.3d at 369 ("Because [Sharpe's] conduct in removing the Diocese's items from Diocesan property without its permission is the foundation of his allegation that he has a superior right to the items and that alleged right is the basis of his fraud claim against Turley, the tria

2013The court of appeals reversed, holding that section 93.001 superseded the unlawful acts doctrine. 347 S.W.3d 757 , 768–69 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. granted).

2012See Arredondo, 347 S.W.3d at 767 (discussing Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 98.001). 8 However, because the sole basis for the trial court’s granting summary judgment was the unlawful acts rule, and the Mestenas did not conclusively establish the defense, we do not reach the statutory affirmative defense issue.

2020See, e.g., Ward v. Emmett, 37 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2001, no pet.) (holding that unlawful-acts rule barred plaintiff, who was convicted of murdering her mother, from recovering on various claims because her damages arose from the murder); Saks v. Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson & Troilo, 880 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied) (holding public policy barred 25 plaintiffs’ legal-malpractice claim because their damages were caused by their illegal conduct, which resulted in their convictions for bank fraud).

2012See Saks v. Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson & Troilo, 880 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).

2013See Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 551 (Tex.1981) (“To hold otherwise would violate the rule of statutory construction that the [L]egislature is never presumed to do a useless act”).

2011See Hunter, 620 S.W.2d at 551 . 23 Dugger also argues that section 93.001 and the unlawful acts doctrine can coexist, but he cites no authority other than the statement in Ward that the two are similar.

2020See Denson, 262 S.W.3d at 855 (holding that unlawful- acts rule barred plaintiff’s tort claims because they were “inextricably intertwined with their illegal contract to sell automobiles in Dallas County without a [statutorily required] license”); Sharpe, 191 S.W.3d at 369 (“Because [Sharpe’s] conduct in removing the Diocese’s items from Diocesan property without its permission is the foundation of his allegation that he has a superior right to the items and that alleged right is the basis of his fraud claim against Turley, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Turley [

2011Credit Union, 262 S.W.3d 846, 855 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) ("We agree with the Credit Union that the [unlawful acts] rule applies and bars appellants' claims arising in tort because they are inextricably intertwined with their illegal contract to sell automobiles in Dallas County without a license.”); Sharpe, 191 S.W.3d at 369 ("Because [Sharpe's] conduct in removing the Diocese's items from Diocesan property without its permission is the foundation of his allegation that he has a superior right to the items and that alleged right is the basis of his fraud claim against Turley, the tria

2013See Parker, 565 S.W.2d at 518 (holding that Chapter 33 replaces common law doctrines that lead to a “system of absolute victory or total defeat”).

2013See Parker, 565 S.W.2d at 518 (holding that Chapter 33 replaces common law doctrines that lead to a “system of absolute victory or total defeat”).

2000See, e .g., Duncan Land & Exploration, Inc. v. Littlepage, 984 S.W.2d 318, 328 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied); Rodriquez v. Love, 860 S.W.2d 541, 544 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, no writ); Farha v. Elam, 385 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stevens v. Hallmark , 109 S.W.2d 1106 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1937, no writ).

1999See, e.g., Rodriquez v. Love, 860 S.W.2d 541, 544 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, no writ); Farha v. Elam, 385 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1964, writ refd n.r.e.).

2000See, e .g., Duncan Land & Exploration, Inc. v. Littlepage, 984 S.W.2d 318, 328 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied); Rodriquez v. Love, 860 S.W.2d 541, 544 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, no writ); Farha v. Elam, 385 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stevens v. Hallmark , 109 S.W.2d 1106 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1937, no writ).

1999See, e.g., Rodriquez v. Love, 860 S.W.2d 541, 544 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, no writ); Farha v. Elam, 385 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1964, writ refd n.r.e.).

2024But in 2014, the supreme court held that “the comparative responsibility scheme under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code abrogated the unlawful acts doctrine.” Boerjan v. Rodriguez, 436 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. 2014) (citing Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. 2013)).

2014In our recent opinion in Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825 (Tex.2013), we held that the comparative responsibility scheme under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code abrogated the unlawful acts doctrine.

2013Cf. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653-55 (Tex.1994) (holding that an injured passenger in a fleeing vehicle could maintain a suit for unreasonable chase because officers owed a duty of reasonable care).

2013Cf. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650 , 653–55 (Tex. 1994) (holding that an injured passenger in a fleeing vehicle could maintain a suit for unreasonable chase because officers owed a duty of reasonable care).

2013See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.65.210 (2012) (setting out a detailed statutory affirmative defense based on the unlawful acts doctrine); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19 , 479 N.Y.S.2d 201 , 468 N.E.2d 39, 43-44 (1984) (holding that a teenager who was injured while constructing a “pipe bomb” could not recover from the young boy who supplied the gun powder); see also Vincent R.

2013See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.65.210 (2012) (setting out a detailed statutory affirmative defense based on the unlawful acts doctrine); Barker v. Kallash, 63 N.Y.2d 19 , 479 N.Y.S.2d 201 , 468 N.E.2d 39, 43-44 (1984) (holding that a teenager who was injured while constructing a “pipe bomb” could not recover from the young boy who supplied the gun powder); see also Vincent R.

2024But in 2014, the supreme court held that “the comparative responsibility scheme under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code abrogated the unlawful acts doctrine.” Boerjan v. Rodriguez, 436 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. 2014) (citing Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.W.3d 825 (Tex. 2013)).

2013See, e.g., Bosworth v. Inhabitants of Swansey, 51 Mass. 363 (1845) (barring an action by an injured plaintiff illegally traveling on a Sunday); Hinckley v. Inhabitants of Penobscot, 42 Me. 89 (1856) (barring an action for injuries to a plaintiff’s horse caused by a defective highway because plaintiff was illegally traveling during daylight hours on a Sunday). .

2013Tex. Dec. 26, 2006) (dismissing action for the wrongful death of an undocumented alien who expired from heat exhaustion while entering the country illegally as barred by the unlawful acts doctrine). 25 See, e.g., Bosworth v. Inhabitants of Swansey, 51 Mass. 363 (1845) (barring an action by an injured plaintiff illegally traveling on a Sunday); Hinckley v. Inhabitants of Pensobscot, 42 Me. 89 (1856) (barring an action for injuries to a plaintiff’s horse caused by a defective highway because plaintiff was illegally traveling during daylight hours on a Sunday). 9 plaintiff] has violated the law i

2013See Lord v. Fogcutter Bar, 813 P.2d 660 , 662 n. 9 (Alaska 1991) (citing, as support for applying the unlawful acts doctrine, a statute providing that a "person who suffers personal injury or death may not recover damages ... if the injuries or death occurred while the person was engaged in the commission of a felony, the person has been convicted of the felony, including conviction based on a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere, and the felony substantially contributed to the injury or death”). .

2013Confusing felonies with tortious conduct, as the Court does, ends up treating heroin like aspirin.5 Section 93.001, the other basis for today’s ruling, is nothing more than the Legislature’s reaffirmation that the unlawful acts doctrine applies specifically when the plaintiff or her decedent was not only engaged in criminal conduct but was also convicted of the crime.6 Nothing in the 3 See, e.g., Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W .2d 512, 514 (Tex. 1993) (refusing to consider the possibility of a defense to liability not yet established). 4 All statutory references are to the Texas Civil Practice

2013Contrast Flanagan v. Baker, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 444, 449 , 621 N.E.2d 1190, 1193 (1993) (a boy injured while constructing a pipe bomb out of fireworks in defendants’ basement was not barred from recovery). 23 But cf. Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W .2d 494, 498 (Tex. 1995) (“Because of public policy, we . . . hold that plaintiffs who have been convicted of a criminal offense may negate the sole proximate cause bar to their claim for legal malpractice in connection with that conviction only if they have been exonerated on direct appeal, through post-conviction relief, or otherwise.”); Sharpe v.

2013Contrast Flanagan v. Baker, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 444, 449 , 621 N.E.2d 1190, 1193 (1993) (a boy injured while constructing a pipe bomb out of fireworks in defendants’ basement was not barred from recovery). 23 But cf. Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W .2d 494, 498 (Tex. 1995) (“Because of public policy, we . . . hold that plaintiffs who have been convicted of a criminal offense may negate the sole proximate cause bar to their claim for legal malpractice in connection with that conviction only if they have been exonerated on direct appeal, through post-conviction relief, or otherwise.”); Sharpe v.

2013See, e.g., Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex.1993) (refusing to consider the possibility of a defense to liability not yet established). .

2011This uncertainty supports our conclusion that the district court’s finding of improper joinder was in error.” Rico v. Flores, 481 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir.2007).

2011See Ward v. Emmett, 37 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.); see also Rico, 481 F.3d at 241 n. 5 ("The court of appeals’ analysis [in Ward], however, was not especially searching.”). 19 .

2011Id,.; see Del Indus., 35 S.W.3d at 596 (“The common law has been dramatically engrafted upon by the legislature.

2011See Russell v. Ingersollr-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Tex.1992) (wrongful death and survival causes of action barred by limitations where decedent’s personal injury cause of action would have been barred by limitations at the time of his death).

2011Additionally, Dugger can claim no vested right in the general common law rule to defeat that policy. “[N]o one has any vested or property interest in the rules of the common law, and therefore no one is deprived of a constitutional right by their change through legislative enactment.” Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96 , 185 S.W. 556, 561 (1916) (upholding constitutionality of workers’ compensation act). 20 Dugger argues section 93.001 applies only “to those civil actions for damages for personal injury or death in which the sole cause of the damages was either (1) the claimant’s

2011Additionally, Dugger can claim no vested right in the general common law rule to defeat that policy. “[N]o one has any vested or property interest in the rules of the common law, and therefore no one is deprived of a constitutional right by their change through legislative enactment.” Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96 , 185 S.W. 556, 561 (1916) (upholding constitutionality of workers’ compensation act). 20 Dugger argues section 93.001 applies only “to those civil actions for damages for personal injury or death in which the sole cause of the damages was either (1) the claimant’s

2011Credit Union, 262 S.W.3d 846, 855 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) ("We agree with the Credit Union that the [unlawful acts] rule applies and bars appellants' claims arising in tort because they are inextricably intertwined with their illegal contract to sell automobiles in Dallas County without a license.”); Sharpe, 191 S.W.3d at 369 ("Because [Sharpe's] conduct in removing the Diocese's items from Diocesan property without its permission is the foundation of his allegation that he has a superior right to the items and that alleged right is the basis of his fraud claim against Turley, the tria

2008See Macias v. Moreno, 30 S.W.3d 25, 29 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. denied); Stevens v. Hallmark, 109 S.W.2d 1106, 1106 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1937, no writ) (“A person cannot maintain a cause of action if, in order to establish it, he must rely, in whole or in part, on an illegal or immoral act or transaction to which he is a party.”).