voluntary and intelligent waiver in Arkansas

1997He cites Philyaw v. State, 288 Ark. 237 , 704 S.W.2d 608 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Oliver v. State, 323 Ark. 743 , 918 S.W.2d 690 (1996), a case in which the supreme court announced: When an accused appears with retained counsel, the trial judge should not allow the attorney of record to withdraw until: (1) new counsel has been retained; or (2) a showing of indigency has been made and counsel has been appointed; or (3) a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is established on the record. 288 Ark. at 248 , 704 S.W.2d at 613 .

1997He cites Philyaw v. State, 288 Ark. 237 , 704 S.W.2d 608 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Oliver v. State, 323 Ark. 743 , 918 S.W.2d 690 (1996), a case in which the supreme court announced: When an accused appears with retained counsel, the trial judge should not allow the attorney of record to withdraw until: (1) new counsel has been retained; or (2) a showing of indigency has been made and counsel has been appointed; or (3) a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is established on the record. 288 Ark. at 248 , 704 S.W.2d at 613 .

1996Jackson v. State, 249 Ark. 653 , 460 S.W.2d 319 (1970), and United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 ([9th Cir.] 1973).

1996Jackson v. State, 249 Ark. 653 , 460 S.W.2d 319 (1970), and United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 (1973).

1996Jackson v. State, 249 Ark. 653 , 460 S.W.2d 319 (1970), and United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 ([9th Cir.] 1973).

1996Jackson v. State, 249 Ark. 653 , 460 S.W.2d 319 (1970), and United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 ([9th Cir.] 1973).

2015Attorneys from the public defender’s office represented appellant for the remainder of the proceedings, including the entirety of the trial. 1 Faretta, supra, recognizes that in order to represent himself, an accused must knowingly and intelligently forgo many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. | Jd, So, although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order to completely and intelligently choose self-representation, Faretta provides that “he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that th

2015Attorneys from the public defender’s office represented appellant for the remainder of the proceedings, including the entirety of the trial. 1 Faretta, supra, recognizes that in order to represent himself, an accused must knowingly and intelligently forgo many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. | Jd, So, although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order to completely and intelligently choose self-representation, Faretta provides that “he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that th

2014Beyer v. State, 331 Ark. 197 , 962 S.W.2d 751 (1998).

2014Beyer v. State, 331 Ark. 197 , 962 S.W.2d 751 (1998).

2012Pierce v. State, 362 Ark. 491 , 209 S.W.3d 364 (2005) (citing Faretta, supra, and Bledsoe v. State, 337 Ark. 403 , 989 S.W.2d 510 (1999)).

2012Pierce v. State, 362 Ark. 491 , 209 S.W.3d 364 (2005) (citing Faretta, supra, and Bledsoe v. State, 337 Ark. 403 , 989 S.W.2d 510 (1999)).

2002Mayo v. State, 336 Ark. 275 , 984 S.W.2d 801 (1999).

2002Mayo v. State, 336 Ark. 275 , 984 S.W.2d 801 (1999).

1997The judge must also explain the desirability of having the assistance of an attorney during the trial and the drawbacks of not having an attorney.” Gibson v. State, 298 Ark. 43 , 764 S.W.2d 617 (1989).

1997The judge must also explain the desirability of having the assistance of an attorney during the trial and the drawbacks of not having an attorney.” Gibson v. State, 298 Ark. 43 , 764 S.W.2d 617 (1989).

1997He cites Philyaw v. State, 288 Ark. 237 , 704 S.W.2d 608 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Oliver v. State, 323 Ark. 743 , 918 S.W.2d 690 (1996), a case in which the supreme court announced: When an accused appears with retained counsel, the trial judge should not allow the attorney of record to withdraw until: (1) new counsel has been retained; or (2) a showing of indigency has been made and counsel has been appointed; or (3) a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is established on the record. 288 Ark. at 248 , 704 S.W.2d at 613 .

1997He cites Philyaw v. State, 288 Ark. 237 , 704 S.W.2d 608 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Oliver v. State, 323 Ark. 743 , 918 S.W.2d 690 (1996), a case in which the supreme court announced: When an accused appears with retained counsel, the trial judge should not allow the attorney of record to withdraw until: (1) new counsel has been retained; or (2) a showing of indigency has been made and counsel has been appointed; or (3) a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is established on the record. 288 Ark. at 248 , 704 S.W.2d at 613 .

1996In considering whether Mr. Weber’s statement was properly admitted, “we evaluate the totality of the circumstances and reverse only if the trial court’s finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.” Day v. State, 306 Ark. 520, 525 , 816 S.W.2d 852 (1991).

1996In considering whether Mr. Weber’s statement was properly admitted, “we evaluate the totality of the circumstances and reverse only if the trial court’s finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.” Day v. State, 306 Ark. 520, 525 , 816 S.W.2d 852 (1991).

1986Further, I cannot find any meaningful distinction between the case at bar and Suire v. State, 18 Ark.