8 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bearstop v. Bearstopgreen2 sentences1992“Overwhelming proof of a defendant’s guilt proffered by the government does not overshadow the fundamental right of a defendant to choose between proceeding to trial or, in the alternative, making a voluntary and intelligent waiver of that right and other rights pursuant to a plea agreement.” Goodall, 584 A.2d at 563 (citing Byrd v. United States, 377 A.2d at 405). 1992"Overwhelming proof of a defendant's guilt proffered by the government does not overshadow the fundamental right of a defendant to choose between proceeding to trial or, in the alternative, making a voluntary and intelligent waiver of that right and other rights pursuant to a plea agreement." Goodall, 584 A.2d at 563 (citing Byrd v. United States, 377 A.2d at 405). | 2 | 2 |
Frendak v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1991His status changed to Senior Judge on July 24, 1991. [2] Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C.1979). [3] Five remand hearings were held over a two year period: June 29, 1987; March 16, 1988; March 17, 1988; May 4, 1988; and June 20, 1989. [4] The inquiry into productivity was within the scope of the remand order which provided that if, following a conclusion by the court that appellant had not made a voluntary and intelligent waiver, "appellant cooperates with a productivity examination and the court concludes, after an appropriate review, that there is insufficient evidence to raise a 1984Accordingly: whenever the evidence suggests a substantial question of the defendant’s sanity at the time of the crime, the trial judge must conduct an inquiry designed to assure that the defendant has been fully informed of the alternatives available, comprehends the consequences of failing to assert the defense, and freely chooses to raise or waive the defense. sfc sji Sfc if: * * If the judge finds that the defendant is capable of making a voluntary and intelligent decision to forego an insanity defense, the judge must respect the defendant’s decision and permit the jury’s verdict to stand. | 1 | 2 |
District of Columbia v. Trustees of Amherst Collegegreen1 sentence1991Kennedy v. Barry, 516 A.2d 176 , 178 n. 3 (D.C.1986); District of Columbia v. Trustees of Amherst College, 499 A.2d 918, 920 (D.C.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Briggs v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1991This court rejected Briggs’s first two contentions, id. at 584, 590-91 , but found that the trial court erred in disposing of the productivity issue without making the appropriate Frendak inquiry, i.e., whether Briggs was competent to enter a voluntary and intelligent waiver of an insanity defense. 1991The inquiry into productivity was within the scope of the remand order which provided that if, following a conclusion by the court that appellant had not made a voluntary and intelligent waiver, "appellant cooperates with a productivity examination and the court concludes, after an appropriate review, that there is insufficient evidence to raise a fact issue of productivity, the convictions shall stand.” Briggs, supra, 525 A.2d at 595 . . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Garrett Brock Trapnellgreen2 sentences1978As stated by [the Ninth Circuit] in United States v. Dujanovic, supra, 486 F.2d at 188 , ‘. . . one of the penalties of the appellant’s self-representation is that he is bound by his own acts and conduct and held to his record.’ [United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).] In any event, as long as a trial judge makes an inquiry sufficient to demonstrate a voluntary and intelligent waiver and preserves the foundation for his conclusion on the record, no waiver problem should arise. 1978As stated by [the Ninth Circuit] in United States v. Dujanovic, supra, 486 F.2d at 188 , `. . . one of the penalties of the appellant's self-representation is that he is bound by his own acts and conduct and held to his record.' [ United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).] In any event, as long as a trial judge makes an inquiry sufficient to demonstrate a voluntary and intelligent waiver and preserves the foundation for his conclusion on the record, no waiver problem should arise. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Scott v. State
green
2 sentences2019He cites Scott v. State , 298 Ark. 214 , 766 S.W.2d 428 (1989), for the proposition that the record must show that an accused intelligently and understandably rejected counsel. 2019He cites Scott v. State , 298 Ark. 214 , 766 S.W.2d 428 (1989), for the proposition that the record must show that an accused intelligently and understandably rejected counsel. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Robinson v. State
green
2 sentences2019In Robinson v. State , 2017 Ark. 2019App. 377 , 526 S.W.3d 20 , this court held: We note that, even in the absence of a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, the right to counsel may be forfeited by a defendant who engages in conduct that prevents a fair and orderly exposition of the issues. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Kennedy v. Barry
green
1 sentence1991Kennedy v. Barry, 516 A.2d 176 , 178 n. 3 (D.C.1986); District of Columbia v. Trustees of Amherst College, 499 A.2d 918, 920 (D.C.1985). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Hsu v. United States
green
1 sentence1981Hsu v. United States, D.C.App., 392 A.2d 972 (1978). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Snyder v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences1978Because the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that a defendant must attend a proceeding “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow,” Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra *1072 291 U.S. at 106-07 , 54 S.Ct. at 332 , we hold that a defendant has a right to absent himself from a suppression hearing, where there is clearly on the record a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to be present. 7 On the facts of the present case, however, even though the trial judge was incorrect in refusing to permit the defendant to absent himself from the proceedings, reversal is 1978Because the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that a defendant must attend a proceeding “when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow,” Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra *1072 291 U.S. at 106-07 , 54 S.Ct. at 332 , we hold that a defendant has a right to absent himself from a suppression hearing, where there is clearly on the record a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to be present. 7 On the facts of the present case, however, even though the trial judge was incorrect in refusing to permit the defendant to absent himself from the proceedings, reversal is | 1 | 1978–1978 |
The United States of America v. Ronald Paul Dujanovic
green
2 sentences1978As stated by [the Ninth Circuit] in United States v. Dujanovic, supra, 486 F.2d at 188 , ‘. . . one of the penalties of the appellant’s self-representation is that he is bound by his own acts and conduct and held to his record.’ [United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).] In any event, as long as a trial judge makes an inquiry sufficient to demonstrate a voluntary and intelligent waiver and preserves the foundation for his conclusion on the record, no waiver problem should arise. 1978As stated by [the Ninth Circuit] in United States v. Dujanovic, supra, 486 F.2d at 188 , `. . . one of the penalties of the appellant's self-representation is that he is bound by his own acts and conduct and held to his record.' [ United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).] In any event, as long as a trial judge makes an inquiry sufficient to demonstrate a voluntary and intelligent waiver and preserves the foundation for his conclusion on the record, no waiver problem should arise. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.