15 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blakely v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2015We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 32.9(c). ¶3 Turner argues the trial court must resentence him pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004), because the trial court, rather than a jury, determined the existence of aggravating factors for sentencing purposes. 2014Pinzon argues he should be resentenced pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004), because the trial court, rather than the jury, determined the existence of aggravating factors for sentencing purposes. | 2 | 5 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2010Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 189 ¶ 42, 119 P.3d at 456 ; Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 352-53 n. 19, ¶ 111, 111 P.3d at 394 -95 n. 19. ¶44 Hargrave argues that these limiting interpretations no longer save the (F)(6) ag-gravator from unconstitutional vagueness because juries, rather than judges, now find the existence of aggravating factors. 2010Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 189 ¶ 42, 119 P.3d at 456 ; Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 352-53 n. 19, ¶ 111, 111 P.3d at 394 -95 n. 19. ¶44 Hargrave argues that these limiting interpretations no longer save the (F)(6) ag-gravator from unconstitutional vagueness because juries, rather than judges, now find the existence of aggravating factors. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cromwellgreen2 sentences2010Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 189 ¶ 42, 119 P.3d at 456 ; Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 352-53 n. 19, ¶ 111, 111 P.3d at 394 -95 n. 19. ¶44 Hargrave argues that these limiting interpretations no longer save the (F)(6) ag-gravator from unconstitutional vagueness because juries, rather than judges, now find the existence of aggravating factors. 2010Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 189 ¶ 42, 119 P.3d at 456 ; Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 352-53 n. 19, ¶ 111, 111 P.3d at 394 -95 n. 19. ¶44 Hargrave argues that these limiting interpretations no longer save the (F)(6) ag-gravator from unconstitutional vagueness because juries, rather than judges, now find the existence of aggravating factors. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Federicogreen1 sentence2026State v. Federico, 104 Ariz. 49, 51 (1968). ¶15 The state argues that the trial court did not violate the mandate by sentencing LaPorte to an aggravated term because, citing Raimey v. Ditsworth, the “obvious intent” of this court’s memorandum decision was to protect LaPorte’s right to a jury finding of the existence of aggravating factors. 227 Ariz. 552, ¶ 6 (App. 2011) (“A trial court does not have ‘authority to transgress upon the obvious intent of this court’ by contravening on remand a decision and mandate previously issued.” (quoting Tucson Gas & Elec. | 1 | 1 |
Raimey v. Ditsworthgreen1 sentence2026State v. Federico, 104 Ariz. 49, 51 (1968). ¶15 The state argues that the trial court did not violate the mandate by sentencing LaPorte to an aggravated term because, citing Raimey v. Ditsworth, the “obvious intent” of this court’s memorandum decision was to protect LaPorte’s right to a jury finding of the existence of aggravating factors. 227 Ariz. 552, ¶ 6 (App. 2011) (“A trial court does not have ‘authority to transgress upon the obvious intent of this court’ by contravening on remand a decision and mandate previously issued.” (quoting Tucson Gas & Elec. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schmidtgreen2 sentences2016State v. Schmidt, 220 Ariz. 563, 566, ¶ 10 , 208 P.3d 214, 217 (2009). 2016State v. Schmidt, 220 Ariz. 563, 566, ¶ 10 , 208 P.3d 214, 217 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Holsingergreen1 sentence2015State v. Holsinger, 124 Ariz. 18, 20-22 (1979). 8 Shields waived his right to have a jury determine the existence of aggravating factors for sentencing purposes. 11 STATE v. SHIELDS Decision of the Court of that circumstance. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Viramontesgreen1 sentence2004See id. ("In non-capital cases, aggravators need only be supported by reasonable evidence."). ¶ 16 Thus, while Ring error and Blakely error arise from the same essential flawthe failure to afford a defendant a jury trial on facts that are necessary predicates to an increased sentence Blakely error far more dramatically insults the core structures under which a trial proceeds and without which a trial could not "reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence." Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78 , 106 S.Ct. at 3106 , 92 L.Ed.2d at 470 . | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2004See id. ("In non-capital cases, aggravators need only be supported by reasonable evidence."). ¶ 16 Thus, while Ring error and Blakely error arise from the same essential flawthe failure to afford a defendant a jury trial on facts that are necessary predicates to an increased sentence Blakely error far more dramatically insults the core structures under which a trial proceeds and without which a trial could not "reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence." Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78 , 106 S.Ct. at 3106 , 92 L.Ed.2d at 470 . 2004See id. ("In non-capital cases, aggravators need only be supported by reasonable evidence."). ¶ 16 Thus, while Ring error and Blakely error arise from the same essential flawthe failure to afford a defendant a jury trial on facts that are necessary predicates to an increased sentence Blakely error far more dramatically insults the core structures under which a trial proceeds and without which a trial could not "reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence." Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78 , 106 S.Ct. at 3106 , 92 L.Ed.2d at 470 . | 1 | 1 |
James Dean Clark v. James R. Rickettsgreen2 sentences1993The same Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the fact that the judge determines the existence of aggravating factors was rejected in Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851, 859 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 117 , 121 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). 1993The same Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the fact that the judge determines the existence of aggravating factors was rejected in Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851, 859 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 117 , 121 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Walton v. Arizona
red
2 sentences2007The Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the factor against a constitutional challenge because this Court’s narrowing construction of the (F)(6) aggravator “gives meaningful guidance to the sen-tencer.” Id. at 653-55 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 . ¶ 38 Because juries rather than trial judges now find the existence of aggravating factors, see A.R.S. § 13-703.01(0 (Supp. 2006), Andriano argues that the judge’s knowledge of the narrowing construction cannot save the (F)(6) aggravator from unconstitutional vagueness. 2005Walton, 497 U.S. at 653-54 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 . 4 . | 3 | 1993–2007 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2007The Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the factor against a constitutional challenge because this Court’s narrowing construction of the (F)(6) aggravator “gives meaningful guidance to the sen-tencer.” Id. at 653-55 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 . ¶ 38 Because juries rather than trial judges now find the existence of aggravating factors, see A.R.S. § 13-703.01(0 (Supp. 2006), Andriano argues that the judge’s knowledge of the narrowing construction cannot save the (F)(6) aggravator from unconstitutional vagueness. 2005Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 , 122 S.Ct. 2428 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). | 2 | 2005–2007 |
Tucson Gas & Electric Company v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2026Co., 9 Ariz. App. at 212 )). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2006Id. at 544-45 ¶ 31, 115 P.3d at 138-39 . ¶ 10 McMullen then filed a petition for review in this Court, arguing that the aggravation statutes were unconstitutional and that the superior court lacked the power to convene a jury trial on the existence of aggravating factors. 2006Id. at 544-45 ¶ 31, 115 P.3d at 138-39 . ¶ 10 McMullen then filed a petition for review in this Court, arguing that the aggravation statutes were unconstitutional and that the superior court lacked the power to convene a jury trial on the existence of aggravating factors. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Godfrey v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2005In fact, the Supreme Court had previously stated the reason for overturning the sentences in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 , 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 , 100 S.Ct. 1759 , 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), was because of the insufficiency of the limiting instruction, and not the fact that juries were deciding the existence of aggravating factors. 2005In fact, the Supreme Court had previously stated the reason for overturning the sentences in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 , 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 , 100 S.Ct. 1759 , 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), was because of the insufficiency of the limiting instruction, and not the fact that juries were deciding the existence of aggravating factors. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Maynard v. Cartwright
green
2 sentences2005In fact, the Supreme Court had previously stated the reason for overturning the sentences in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 , 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 , 100 S.Ct. 1759 , 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), was because of the insufficiency of the limiting instruction, and not the fact that juries were deciding the existence of aggravating factors. 2005In fact, the Supreme Court had previously stated the reason for overturning the sentences in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 , 108 S.Ct. 1853 , 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 , 100 S.Ct. 1759 , 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), was because of the insufficiency of the limiting instruction, and not the fact that juries were deciding the existence of aggravating factors. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Clemons v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences1993Clark reasoned: The Supreme Court has forcefully rejected a similar challenge in the context of the sixth amendment: ‘“Any argument that the Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court.’ ” Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 , [647] 110 S.Ct. 3047,3054 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (quoting Clemms v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 , [745] *124 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1446 , 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990))____ Clark’s invocation of the equal protection clause does not change this r 1993Clark reasoned: The Supreme Court has forcefully rejected a similar challenge in the context of the sixth amendment: ‘“Any argument that the Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court.’ ” Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 , [647] 110 S.Ct. 3047,3054 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (quoting Clemms v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 , [745] *124 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1446 , 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990))____ Clark’s invocation of the equal protection clause does not change this r | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Milke
green
2 sentences1993The first two challenges to Arizona’s death penalty statute were again addressed and again rejected in State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118 , 865 P.2d 779 (1993). 1993The first two challenges to Arizona’s death penalty statute were again addressed and again rejected in State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118 , 865 P.2d 779 (1993). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Freeman v. Idaho
green
2 sentences1993The same Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the fact that the judge determines the existence of aggravating factors was rejected in Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851, 859 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 117 , 121 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). 1993The same Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the fact that the judge determines the existence of aggravating factors was rejected in Clark v. Ricketts, 958 F.2d 851, 859 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 117 , 121 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.