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14 Washington opinions name it 1 courts 2001–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blakely v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2005Offender Score ¶ 13 The issue is whether Mr. Hunt's offender score determination violates the Sixth Amendment jury requirements under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). ¶ 14 A jury must determine beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating factors used to increase a sentence above the presumptive maximum set by the legislature. 2005Offender Score ¶ 13 The issue is whether Mr. Hunt's offender score determination violates the Sixth Amendment jury requirements under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). ¶ 14 A jury must determine beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating factors used to increase a sentence above the presumptive maximum set by the legislature. | 1 | 3 |
State v. McKimyellow2 sentences2001Our Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in State v. McKim, 98 Wn.2d 111 , 653 P.2d 1040 (1982) when it considered “whether the deadly weapon statute . . . can be applied to enhance the sentence of a defendant who was not personally armed during the commission of an offense.” McKim, 98 Wn.2d at 112 (footnote omitted). 2001Our Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in State v. McKim, 98 Wn.2d 111 , 653 P.2d 1040 (1982) when it considered “whether the deadly weapon statute . . . can be applied to enhance the sentence of a defendant who was not personally armed during the commission of an offense.” McKim, 98 Wn.2d at 112 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2006Id. at 301 (“ ‘Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 , 147 L. 2006Id. at 301 (“ ‘Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 , 147 L. | 7 | 2005–2006 |
State v. Van Buren
green
2 sentences2021Additionally, Rancour argues the prosecutor unnecessarily referred to both the recommendation in the PSI report and facts constituting aggravating factors that would support an exceptional sentence. 7 In Van Buren, the court highlighted Washington courts’ “concern about conduct by the State that crosses the line from objectively reporting facts that may have some bearing on the existence of aggravating factors to outright advocacy for those factors.” Id. at 215 . 2020Cf State v. Van Buren, 101 Wn. App. 206, 215 , 2 P.3d 991 (2000) (State breaches plea agreement when it “crosses the line from objectively reporting facts that may have some bearing on the existence of aggravating factors to outright advocacy for those factors”); State v. Xaviar, 117 Wn. App. 196, 201 , 69 P.3d 901 (2003) (concluding that breach occurred and observing that prosecutor referenced aggravating circumstances that went beyond those mentioned in presentence report). | 2 | 2020–2021 |
Washington v. Recuenco
green
2 sentences2025State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 141-42 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2006). 2025State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 141-42 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2006). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Hughes
red
2 sentences2025State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 141-42 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2006). 2025State v. Hughes, 154 Wn.2d 118, 141-42 , 110 P.3d 192 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L. Ed. 2d 466 (2006). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Suleiman
green
2 sentences2024State v. Suleiman, 158 Wn.2d 280, 290-91 , 143 P.3d 795 (2006). 2024State v. Suleiman, 158 Wn.2d 280, 290-91 , 143 P.3d 795 (2006). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Xaviar
green
2 sentences2020Cf State v. Van Buren, 101 Wn. App. 206, 215 , 2 P.3d 991 (2000) (State breaches plea agreement when it “crosses the line from objectively reporting facts that may have some bearing on the existence of aggravating factors to outright advocacy for those factors”); State v. Xaviar, 117 Wn. App. 196, 201 , 69 P.3d 901 (2003) (concluding that breach occurred and observing that prosecutor referenced aggravating circumstances that went beyond those mentioned in presentence report). 2020Cf State v. Van Buren, 101 Wn. App. 206, 215 , 2 P.3d 991 (2000) (State breaches plea agreement when it “crosses the line from objectively reporting facts that may have some bearing on the existence of aggravating factors to outright advocacy for those factors”); State v. Xaviar, 117 Wn. App. 196, 201 , 69 P.3d 901 (2003) (concluding that breach occurred and observing that prosecutor referenced aggravating circumstances that went beyond those mentioned in presentence report). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Van Buren
green
1 sentence2020Cf State v. Van Buren, 101 Wn. App. 206, 215 , 2 P.3d 991 (2000) (State breaches plea agreement when it “crosses the line from objectively reporting facts that may have some bearing on the existence of aggravating factors to outright advocacy for those factors”); State v. Xaviar, 117 Wn. App. 196, 201 , 69 P.3d 901 (2003) (concluding that breach occurred and observing that prosecutor referenced aggravating circumstances that went beyond those mentioned in presentence report). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2017The Supreme Court rejected this argument and stated that under CrR 6.1(a), "the power to empanel a jury to hear aggravating factors is a court mandated component of the power to hear cases 'required to be tried by jury." Thomas 11, 166 Wn.2d at 393 , quoting CrR 6.1(a). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Carreno-Maldonado
green
1 sentence2015App. 313, 320 , 165 P.3d 409 (2007). 13 State v. Carreno-Maldonado. 135 Wn. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Halsey
green
2 sentences2015No. 71348-5-1/5 prosecutor contradicted by words or conduct the State's recommendation for a standard range sentence."12 "A breach occurs when the State offers unsolicited information by way of report, testimony, or argument that undercuts the State's obligations under the plea agreement."13 Viewed objectively in the context of the whole proceeding, a breach occurs when the State "crosses the line from objectively reporting facts that may have some bearing on the existence of aggravating factors to outright advocacy for those factors."14 "But the State does not breach the agreement when it rei 2015App. 313, 320 , 165 P.3d 409 (2007). 13 State v. Carreno-Maldonado. 135 Wn. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.