15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1860–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mendozagreen1 sentence2025(People v. Mendoza (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 72, 79 [“Sexual intercourse means any penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or genitalia by the penis.”].) Consequently, we agree with the parties that, drawing an analogy with the analysis in Miranda, battery is a lesser included offense of rape of an intoxicated person. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hernandezgreen1 sentence2025(Compare People v. Hernandez (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1006 [battery is not a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious or asleep person] with People v. Miranda (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 162 , 176 [disagreeing with Hernandez and concluding that battery is a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious or asleep person]; see also People v. Mirabal (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 708 , 727–728 [in the context of the similar crime of rape of an intoxicated person, agreeing with the People’s concession that Miranda is the better reasoned authority, and concluding that “drawing an analogy with t | 1 | 1 |
People v. Roblesgreen1 sentence2015(Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 130 ; Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 322 ; Myers v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1250 [“did not know he was on probation”].) Despite historical inconsistency, the more recent cases in that vein have uniformly held that a search made without such awareness cannot be justified after the fact by the officer’s later-acquired knowledge that the subject was on probation or parole. ( Sanders, supra, at p. 335 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 793 [cohabitant on probation]; Medina, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577 ; People v. Hoeninghaus, su | 1 | 1 |
Myers v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2015(Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 130 ; Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 322 ; Myers v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1250 [“did not know he was on probation”].) Despite historical inconsistency, the more recent cases in that vein have uniformly held that a search made without such awareness cannot be justified after the fact by the officer’s later-acquired knowledge that the subject was on probation or parole. ( Sanders, supra, at p. 335 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 793 [cohabitant on probation]; Medina, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577 ; People v. Hoeninghaus, su | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Marriage of Spiegelgreen1 sentence2000(See Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, supra, 143 So.2d at p. 20; see also Estate of Schwartz (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 308, 310 [ 179 P.2d 868 ] [examining a premarital agreement for proper waiver of marital rights]; In re Marriage of Spiegel (Iowa 1996) 553 N.W.2d 309, 315 [drawing the same analogy to the waiver doctrine in examining the voluntariness of premarital agreements]; Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, supra, 40 Rutgers L.Rev. at p. 1078 [same].) We observe that the factors relevant to the voluntariness of a waiver generally depend upon the statutory scheme involved, and most fr | 1 | 1 |
Schwartz v. Schwartzgreen2 sentences2000(See Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, supra, 143 So.2d at p. 20; see also Estate of Schwartz (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 308, 310 [ 179 P.2d 868 ] [examining a premarital agreement for proper waiver of marital rights]; In re Marriage of Spiegel (Iowa 1996) 553 N.W.2d 309, 315 [drawing the same analogy to the waiver doctrine in examining the voluntariness of premarital agreements]; Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, supra, 40 Rutgers L.Rev. at p. 1078 [same].) We observe that the factors relevant to the voluntariness of a waiver generally depend upon the statutory scheme involved, and most fr 2000(See Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, supra, 143 So.2d at p. 20; see also Estate of Schwartz (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 308, 310 [ 179 P.2d 868 ] [examining a premarital agreement for proper waiver of marital rights]; In re Marriage of Spiegel (Iowa 1996) 553 N.W.2d 309, 315 [drawing the same analogy to the waiver doctrine in examining the voluntariness of premarital agreements]; Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, supra, 40 Rutgers L.Rev. at p. 1078 [same].) We observe that the factors relevant to the voluntariness of a waiver generally depend upon the statutory scheme involved, and most fr | 1 | 1 |
In Re Tahlgreen2 sentences1976(See In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 131 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ].) This rule, however, has not been applied to the waiver of jury trial in civil proceedings; Code of Civil Procedure section 631, for example, permits implied waiver of jury trial by failure to request a jury or to post jury fees. 1976(See In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 131 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ].) This rule, however, has not been applied to the waiver of jury trial in civil proceedings; Code of Civil Procedure section 631, for example, permits implied waiver of jury trial by failure to request a jury or to post jury fees. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Masseygreen2 sentences1968Defendant attempts to draw an analogy to the principle that “in order to commit a burglary, it is not necessary that the defendant’s whole body enter the building.” (People v. Massey (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 230, 236 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 402 ].) The culprit, however, must have the felonious intent before the entry will sustain the charge. 1968Defendant attempts to draw an analogy to the principle that “in order to commit a burglary, it is not necessary that the defendant’s whole body enter the building.” (People v. Massey (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 230, 236 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 402 ].) The culprit, however, must have the felonious intent before the entry will sustain the charge. | 1 | 1 |
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence1966(Bank of America v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 697, 701 [ 128 P.2d 357 ].) The rule that there must be a single judgment even though a complaint states several counts is also strikingly parallel. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re JR
green
2 sentences1977This changes existing law because the analogy to rule 3 was rejected in In re J.R., supra, 5 Cal. App.3d 597, 601 . 1977R., supra, 5 Cal.App.3d 597, 601 . | 2 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Shockley
green
1 sentence2025(Miranda, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.) The act of engaging in intercourse with an intoxicated person who is, by definition, “prevented from resisting” (§ 261, subd. (a)(3)) is necessarily a “harmful or offensive” touching (Shockley, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 404 ) because it is performed without the consent of the other person. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Bains v. Moores
green
1 sentence2024(Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 483 .) We agree that the good cause inquiry is not limited to whether the defendant seeks to litigate a colorable claim in an alternative forum, but instead takes into account all relevant circumstances and interests that counsel for and against a stay of appellate proceedings while that litigation occurs. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Brown
green
1 sentence2020(People v. Brown (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 332, 341 .) They argue, premised on this false analogy, that the prosecutor’s argument clearly indicated to the jury that a verdict under the natural and probable consequences theory was limited to second degree murder. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Sanders
green
2 sentences2015(Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 130 ; Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 322 ; Myers v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1250 [“did not know he was on probation”].) Despite historical inconsistency, the more recent cases in that vein have uniformly held that a search made without such awareness cannot be justified after the fact by the officer’s later-acquired knowledge that the subject was on probation or parole. ( Sanders, supra, at p. 335 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 793 [cohabitant on probation]; Medina, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577 ; People v. Hoeninghaus, su 2015(Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 130 ; Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 322 ; Myers v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1250 [“did not know he was on probation”].) Despite historical inconsistency, the more recent cases in that vein have uniformly held that a search made without such awareness cannot be justified after the fact by the officer’s later-acquired knowledge that the subject was on probation or parole. ( Sanders, supra, at p. 335 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 793 [cohabitant on probation]; Medina, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577 ; People v. Hoeninghaus, su | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Medina
green
2 sentences2015(Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 130 ; Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 322 ; Myers v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1250 [“did not know he was on probation”].) Despite historical inconsistency, the more recent cases in that vein have uniformly held that a search made without such awareness cannot be justified after the fact by the officer’s later-acquired knowledge that the subject was on probation or parole. ( Sanders, supra, at p. 335 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 793 [cohabitant on probation]; Medina, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577 ; People v. Hoeninghaus, su 2015(Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 130 ; Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 322 ; Myers v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1250 [“did not know he was on probation”].) Despite historical inconsistency, the more recent cases in that vein have uniformly held that a search made without such awareness cannot be justified after the fact by the officer’s later-acquired knowledge that the subject was on probation or parole. ( Sanders, supra, at p. 335 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 793 [cohabitant on probation]; Medina, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577 ; People v. Hoeninghaus, su | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Hoeninghaus
green
1 sentence2015(Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 130 ; Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 322 ; Myers v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1250 [“did not know he was on probation”].) Despite historical inconsistency, the more recent cases in that vein have uniformly held that a search made without such awareness cannot be justified after the fact by the officer’s later-acquired knowledge that the subject was on probation or parole. ( Sanders, supra, at p. 335 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 793 [cohabitant on probation]; Medina, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577 ; People v. Hoeninghaus, su | 1 | 2015–2015 |
United States v. Caseres
green
1 sentence2015(Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 130 ; Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 322 ; Myers v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1250 [“did not know he was on probation”].) Despite historical inconsistency, the more recent cases in that vein have uniformly held that a search made without such awareness cannot be justified after the fact by the officer’s later-acquired knowledge that the subject was on probation or parole. ( Sanders, supra, at p. 335 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 793 [cohabitant on probation]; Medina, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577 ; People v. Hoeninghaus, su | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Jaime P.
green
1 sentence2015(Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 130 ; Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 322 ; Myers v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1250 [“did not know he was on probation”].) Despite historical inconsistency, the more recent cases in that vein have uniformly held that a search made without such awareness cannot be justified after the fact by the officer’s later-acquired knowledge that the subject was on probation or parole. ( Sanders, supra, at p. 335 ; People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 793 [cohabitant on probation]; Medina, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577 ; People v. Hoeninghaus, su | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Thomas S.
green
1 sentence1985(In re Michael M., supra, 11 Cal.App.3d at p. 744 .) The Arbuckle right, however, is neither constitutional nor statutory, but “a hybrid, judicially promulgated contractual right.” (In re Thomas S., supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 939 .) It is not as fundamental a right as the rights of confrontation and against self-incrimination. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Davis v. Michael M.
green
1 sentence1985(In re Michael M., supra, 11 Cal.App.3d at p. 744 .) The Arbuckle right, however, is neither constitutional nor statutory, but “a hybrid, judicially promulgated contractual right.” (In re Thomas S., supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 939 .) It is not as fundamental a right as the rights of confrontation and against self-incrimination. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Blair
green
2 sentences1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi 1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Cheffen
green
2 sentences1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi 1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Green
green
2 sentences1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi 1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Ballard
green
2 sentences1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi 1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Chavez
green
2 sentences1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi 1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Moore
green
2 sentences1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi 1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Diaz
green
2 sentences1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi 1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi | 1 | 1971–1971 |
People v. Ross
green
2 sentences1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi 1971(See, e.g., People v. Chavez (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 832 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 783 ]; People v. Moore (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 668 [ 84 Cal. Rptr. 771 ]; People v. Green (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d 240 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 ]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 658 ]; People v. Blair (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 249 [ 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 ]; People v. Ballard (1969) 1 Cal. App.3d 602 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 742 ]; People v. Ross (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 729 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 296 ]; People v. Diaz (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 547 [ 81 Cal. Rptr. 16 ].) [*] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council. [*] Assi | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Altramano v. Rodeo Del Legionarro, Inc.
green
1 sentence1966(Bank of America v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 697, 701 [ 128 P.2d 357 ].) The rule that there must be a single judgment even though a complaint states several counts is also strikingly parallel. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co. green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Industrial Commission v. Hampton
green
2 sentences1948(Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Hampton, 123 Ohio St. 500 [ 176 N.E. 74, 76 ].) In an appeal from an award to an industrial claimant whose injuries were due to her fall resulting from a cardiac condition, the New York Court of Appeals observed that accidental industrial injuries do “not always” arise from risks related to the employment. 1948(Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Hampton, 123 Ohio St. 500 [ 176 N.E. 74, 76 ].) In an appeal from an award to an industrial claimant whose injuries were due to her fall resulting from a cardiac condition, the New York Court of Appeals observed that accidental industrial injuries do “not always” arise from risks related to the employment. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Lenox v. Wilson neutral | 1 | 1860–1860 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.