15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Laffitte v. Robert Half International Inc.green2 sentences2022Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488 [“ ‘Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award’ ”].) II. 2020Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488 ; Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1018, 1025 .) “‘Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.’ [Citation.]” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. | 3 | 8 |
Consumer Privacy Casesgreen2 sentences2025“We review attorney fee awards on an abuse of discretion standard. ‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’ [(Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 .)] ‘Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.’ (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 556 .)” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. 2016We granted review on the objector’s petition, which presented a single issue: whether Serrano III permits a trial court to calculate an attorney fee award from a class action common fund as a percentage of the fund, while using the lodestar-multiplier method as a cross-check of the selected percentage. 2 Discussion We review attorney fee awards on an abuse of discretion standard. ‘“The ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court | 2 | 5 |
Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2014We defer to the trial court’s discretion “because of its ‘superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 ; accord, Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1329 ; Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 140, 159 .) The “[f]ees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.” (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 1 2014We defer to the trial court’s discretion “because of its ‘superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 ; accord, Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1329 ; Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 140, 159 .) The “[f]ees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.” (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 1 | 2 | 3 |
Loeffler v. Medinagreen2 sentences2023(In re Marriage of Knox (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 15 , 25.) “‘[A]n experienced trial judge is in a much better position than an appellate court to assess the value of the legal services rendered in his or her court, and the amount of a fee awarded by such a judge will therefore not be set aside on appeal absent a showing that it is manifestly excessive in the circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘The only proper basis of reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the amount awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the determin 2023(In re Marriage of Knox (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 15 , 25.) “‘[A]n experienced trial judge is in a much better position than an appellate court to assess the value of the legal services rendered in his or her court, and the amount of a fee awarded by such a judge will therefore not be set aside on appeal absent a showing that it is manifestly excessive in the circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘The only proper basis of reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the amount awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the determin | 2 | 2 |
Holguin v. Dish Network LLCgreen2 sentences2014We defer to the trial court’s discretion “because of its ‘superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 ; accord, Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1329 ; Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 140, 159 .) The “[f]ees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.” (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 1 2014We defer to the trial court’s discretion “because of its ‘superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 ; accord, Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1329 ; Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 140, 159 .) The “[f]ees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.” (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 1 | 2 | 2 |
Serrano v. Priestgreen2 sentences2025“We review attorney fee awards on an abuse of discretion standard. ‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’ [(Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 .)] ‘Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.’ (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 556 .)” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. 2016We granted review on the objector’s petition, which presented a single issue: whether Serrano III permits a trial court to calculate an attorney fee award from a class action common fund as a percentage of the fund, while using the lodestar-multiplier method as a cross-check of the selected percentage. 2 Discussion We review attorney fee awards on an abuse of discretion standard. ‘“The ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court | 1 | 4 |
Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LPgreen2 sentences2015(Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1250 [ 166 Cal.Rptr.3d 676 ].) “Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.” (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 556 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 127 ].) *1271 We find no abuse of discretion. 2015(Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1250 [ 166 Cal.Rptr.3d 676 ].) “Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.” (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 545, 556 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 127 ].) *1271 We find no abuse of discretion. | 1 | 3 |
Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.green2 sentences2014Percentage of the Common Fund In Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 19 the court stated that “[t]he primacy of the lodestar method in California was established in 1977 in Serrano [v. Priest (1977)] 20 Cal.3d 25 . . . . [O]ur Supreme Court declared: ‘“The starting point of every fee award . . . must be a calculation of the attorney’s services in terms of the time he has expended on the case.”’” (Id. at p. 26.) The court added that “[i]n so-called fee shifting cases, in which the responsibility to pay attorney fees is statutorily or otherwise transferred from the preva 2009(Lealao, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award. | 1 | 3 |
Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bankgreen1 sentence1996“A finding that the settlement was fair is not dispositive of the *1809 attorney fees issue. ‘The test to be applied is whether, at the time a fee sharing agreement is reached, class counsel are placed in a position that might endanger the fair representation of their clients and whether they will be compensated on some basis other than for legal services performed.’ [Citation.] To make the fairness of the settlement the test would encourage concealment of the agreement until after the settlement. [Citation.]” (Rebney I, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 1143, fn. 8 .) Nevertheless, the fees approve | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
North Bay Regional Center v. Maldonado
green
2 sentences2020Inc., supra, at p. 488.) “‘“However, de novo review of such a trial court order is warranted where the determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs in this context have been satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a question of law.”’ [Citation.]” (Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1213 .) Under some circumstances, determining whether the criteria for a fee award are satisfied may involve “a mixed question of law and fact and, if factual questions predominate, may warrant a deferential standard of review.” (Connerly v. State Personnel B 2020Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488 .) “‘Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.’” (Ibid.) “‘“However, de novo review of such a trial court order is warranted where the determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs in this context have been satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a question of law.”’” (Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1213 .) “In other words, ‘it is a discretionary trial court decision on the propriety or amount of statutory attorney fees to be awarded, | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Collins v. City of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2014We defer to the trial court’s discretion “because of its ‘superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 ; accord, Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1329 ; Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 140, 159 .) The “[f]ees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.” (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 1 2014We defer to the trial court’s discretion “because of its ‘superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 ; accord, Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1329 ; Collins v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 140, 159 .) The “[f]ees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.” (Consumer Privacy Cases (2009) 1 | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Jones v. Union Bank of California
green
1 sentence2025Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488 .) However, an appellant may show an abuse of discretion “when the [fee] award shocks the conscience or is not supported by the evidence.” (Jones v. Union Bank of Calif. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 542 , 549–550.) 8 While the notice of appeal states that it is from the judgment after court trial, the briefing focuses on the award of attorney fees. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Garcia v. Santana
green
2 sentences2021An “ ‘ “ ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’ ” [Citations.] For this reason “[o]ur review of the amount of attorney fees awarded is deferential.” [Citations.] We apply an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.’ ” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2 2021An “ ‘ “ ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’ ” [Citations.] For this reason “[o]ur review of the amount of attorney fees awarded is deferential.” [Citations.] We apply an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.’ ” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg.
green
1 sentence2021An “ ‘ “ ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his [or her] judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.’ ” [Citations.] For this reason “[o]ur review of the amount of attorney fees awarded is deferential.” [Citations.] We apply an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.’ ” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2 | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Mountain Air Enters., LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC
green
1 sentence2020Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488 .) “‘Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.’” (Ibid.) “‘“However, de novo review of such a trial court order is warranted where the determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs in this context have been satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a question of law.”’” (Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1213 .) “In other words, ‘it is a discretionary trial court decision on the propriety or amount of statutory attorney fees to be awarded, | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence2020Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488 ; Serrano v. Stefan Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1018, 1025 .) “‘Fees approved by the trial court are presumed to be reasonable, and the objectors must show error in the award.’ [Citation.]” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Connerly v. State Personnel Board
green
1 sentence2020Inc., supra, at p. 488.) “‘“However, de novo review of such a trial court order is warranted where the determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees and costs in this context have been satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a question of law.”’ [Citation.]” (Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1213 .) Under some circumstances, determining whether the criteria for a fee award are satisfied may involve “a mixed question of law and fact and, if factual questions predominate, may warrant a deferential standard of review.” (Connerly v. State Personnel B | 1 | 2020–2020 |