revised rule in Illinois

2025Although the revised instruction broadly covers all these scenarios, the distinct idea of the sole proximate cause defense is not explicitly stated. ¶ 58 Our supreme court stated that: “[a] defendant has the right not only to rebut evidence tending to show that defendant’s acts are negligent and the proximate cause of claimed injuries, but also has the right to endeavor to establish by competent evidence that the conduct of a third person, or some other causative factor, is the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” (Emphases added.) Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 101 .

2025Although the revised instruction broadly covers all these scenarios, the distinct idea of the sole proximate cause defense is not explicitly stated. ¶ 58 Our supreme court stated that: “[a] defendant has the right not only to rebut evidence tending to show that defendant’s acts are negligent and the proximate cause of claimed injuries, but also has the right to endeavor to establish by competent evidence that the conduct of a third person, or some other causative factor, is the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” (Emphases added.) Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 101 .

2020Id. ¶ 54 Here, plaintiffs’ own proposed instruction was nearly identical to the revised instruction given to the jury and did not include any additional qualifying information.

2019Id. ¶ 55 Here, plaintiffs' own proposed instruction was nearly identical to the revised instruction 17 No. 1-18-1705 given to the jury and did not include any additional qualifying information.

2012Orzel v. Szewczyk, 391 Ill.

1982Although “[t]he State’s interest in promoting the general welfare by licensing physicians is of great importance” (Rios v. Jones (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 488, 497 , 348 N.E.2d 825, 830 ), the fact that the Department issued licenses for several years in the manner revealed in the record suggests that the stringent requirements for approval of a medical school program established by the revised rule are not essential to protecting the State’s interest.

1982Although “[t]he State’s interest in promoting the general welfare by licensing physicians is of great importance” (Rios v. Jones (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 488, 497 , 348 N.E.2d 825, 830 ), the fact that the Department issued licenses for several years in the manner revealed in the record suggests that the stringent requirements for approval of a medical school program established by the revised rule are not essential to protecting the State’s interest.

1979(People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551 , 363 N.E.2d 838 .) Pursuant to the King precedent, to which we gave extended analysis in People v. Jackson (3d Dist. 1978), 64 Ill.

1979(Cf. Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Association of Franciscan Fathers (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 308, 319 , 371 N.E.2d 616 .) As it was, the case went to the jury not only with no instructions as to the substantive law applicable to the case, but with no instructions as to the issues in the case or the party who bore the burden of proof on those issues.

1979(Cf. Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Association of Franciscan Fathers (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 308, 319 , 371 N.E.2d 616 .) As it was, the case went to the jury not only with no instructions as to the substantive law applicable to the case, but with no instructions as to the issues in the case or the party who bore the burden of proof on those issues.

1979(People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551 , 363 N.E.2d 838 .) Pursuant to the King precedent, to which we gave extended analysis in People v. Jackson (3d Dist. 1978), 64 Ill.

1979(People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551 , 363 N.E.2d 838 .) Pursuant to the King precedent, to which we gave extended analysis in People v. Jackson (3d Dist. 1978), 64 Ill.

1965The first is alleged to be that the Department misconceives the purport of this court’s opinion in Caterpillar v. Department of Revenue, 29 Ill.2d 564 .