16 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Zuniga v. Statered2 sentences2005See Zuniga, *114 [ 144 S.W.3d at 484-85 .] This revised standard encompasses both objectives stated in Zuniga ; first, it directly links the burden of proof to the standard of review on appeal, and second, it removes the great weight and preponderance language from the standard of review. 2005See Zuniga, [ 144 S.W.3d at 484-85 .] This revised standard encompasses both objectives stated in Zuniga ; first, it directly links the burden of proof to the standard of review on appeal, and second, it removes the great weight and preponderance language from the standard of review. | 3 | 3 |
Holland v. Floridagreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, — U.S.-,-, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2563 , 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (courts of equity must take account of “specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, [that] could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case”); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 , 84 S.Ct. 1316 , 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964) (“exercise of a court’s equity powers ... must be made on a case-by-case basis”); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 , 66 S.Ct. 582 , 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946) (“Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility”). 2013See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, — U.S.-,-, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2563 , 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (courts of equity must take account of “specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, [that] could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case”); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 , 84 S.Ct. 1316 , 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964) (“exercise of a court’s equity powers ... must be made on a case-by-case basis”); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 , 66 S.Ct. 582 , 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946) (“Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility”). | 2 | 2 |
Holmberg v. Armbrechtgreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, — U.S.-,-, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2563 , 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (courts of equity must take account of “specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, [that] could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case”); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 , 84 S.Ct. 1316 , 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964) (“exercise of a court’s equity powers ... must be made on a case-by-case basis”); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 , 66 S.Ct. 582 , 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946) (“Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility”). 2013See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, — U.S.-,-, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2563 , 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (courts of equity must take account of “specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, [that] could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case”); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 , 84 S.Ct. 1316 , 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964) (“exercise of a court’s equity powers ... must be made on a case-by-case basis”); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 , 66 S.Ct. 582 , 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946) (“Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility”). | 2 | 2 |
Baggett v. Bullittgreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, — U.S.-,-, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2563 , 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (courts of equity must take account of “specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, [that] could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case”); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 , 84 S.Ct. 1316 , 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964) (“exercise of a court’s equity powers ... must be made on a case-by-case basis”); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 , 66 S.Ct. 582 , 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946) (“Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility”). 2013See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, — U.S.-,-, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2563 , 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (courts of equity must take account of “specific circumstances, often hard to predict in advance, [that] could warrant special treatment in an appropriate case”); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 , 84 S.Ct. 1316 , 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964) (“exercise of a court’s equity powers ... must be made on a case-by-case basis”); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 , 66 S.Ct. 582 , 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946) (“Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility”). | 2 | 2 |
Roy v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See Zuniga, [ 144 S.W.3d at 484 .] Roy v. State, 161 S.W.3d 30, 35-36 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.). 2005See Zuniga, [ 144 S.W.3d at 484 .] Roy v. State, 161 S.W.3d 30, 35-36 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.). | 2 | 2 |
Perez, Ex Parte Alberto Girongreen2 sentences2018In Issue One, he contends the trial court erred in “not acting as a court of equity to apply the Applicant’s equities for the Applicant’s writ of habeas corpus.” Appellant contends the trial court should have acted as a “court of equity” and should have performed the revised analysis established by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 208, 215 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). 2018Perez expanded the definition of prejudice under the then-existing laches standard and was developed with regard to the “parameters of the equitable doctrine of laches as it applies to bar a long-delayed application for a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Floridagreen1 sentence2015After reformulating the standard, I would remand this case for the habeas court to consider whether, under the revised standard, it recommends granting relief to Bobby 6 See maj. op., at 5-6 (quoting Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014)). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Drakegreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Ex parte Emmons, 660 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Ex parte Drake, 883 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). 13 This revised standard will permit courts to engage in a case-by-case inquiry to deter mine whether equitable relief is warranted in light of the particular circumstances surrounding each case. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Emmonsgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Ex parte Emmons, 660 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Ex parte Drake, 883 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). 13 This revised standard will permit courts to engage in a case-by-case inquiry to deter mine whether equitable relief is warranted in light of the particular circumstances surrounding each case. | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Texas Gulf Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2012See Cooper, 513 S.W.2d at 203 . | 1 | 1 |
Bruno v. Stategreen1 sentence2004See id. | 1 | 1 |
Sutter v. Hendricksgreen1 sentence1997Johnson v. Johnson, 869 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1993, writ denied); Sutter v. Hendricks, 575 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Johnsongreen1 sentence1997Johnson v. Johnson, 869 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1993, writ denied); Sutter v. Hendricks, 575 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen1 sentence1992However, in Young v. State, 826 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) the court, in discussing whether a statement in a footnote was a holding of the court or dictum, stated, in a footnote: “As is generally true with footnotes, we regard this footnote [Footnote 6A in Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), aff'd, 490 U.S. 754 , 109 S.Ct. 2180 , 104 L.Ed.2d 834 (1989) ] as dictum_” Thus it seems our highest criminal court seems to regard footnotes as dictum. 4 Consequently, we must utilize the revised standard established by the rule and used by Justice Vance, but without his pre-r | 1 | 1 |
Yellow Cab and Baggage Company v. Greengreen2 sentences1978Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc., 414 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.1967); Yellow Cab and Baggage Company v. Green, 154 Tex. 330 , 277 S.W.2d 92, 93 (1955). 1978Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc., 414 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.1967); Yellow Cab and Baggage Company v. Green, 154 Tex. 330 , 277 S.W.2d 92, 93 (1955). | 1 | 1 |
Lavender v. Kurngreen2 sentences1977See Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 , 66 S.Ct. 740 , 90 L.Ed.2d 916 (1945); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. 1977See Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 , 66 S.Ct. 740 , 90 L.Ed.2d 916 (1945); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. Payne
green
1 sentence1998Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Tompkins v. Texas
green
2 sentences1992However, in Young v. State, 826 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) the court, in discussing whether a statement in a footnote was a holding of the court or dictum, stated, in a footnote: “As is generally true with footnotes, we regard this footnote [Footnote 6A in Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), aff'd, 490 U.S. 754 , 109 S.Ct. 2180 , 104 L.Ed.2d 834 (1989) ] as dictum_” Thus it seems our highest criminal court seems to regard footnotes as dictum. 4 Consequently, we must utilize the revised standard established by the rule and used by Justice Vance, but without his pre-r 1992However, in Young v. State, 826 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) the court, in discussing whether a statement in a footnote was a holding of the court or dictum, stated, in a footnote: “As is generally true with footnotes, we regard this footnote [Footnote 6A in Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), aff'd, 490 U.S. 754 , 109 S.Ct. 2180 , 104 L.Ed.2d 834 (1989) ] as dictum_” Thus it seems our highest criminal court seems to regard footnotes as dictum. 4 Consequently, we must utilize the revised standard established by the rule and used by Justice Vance, but without his pre-r | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Tompkins v. State
green
1 sentence1992However, in Young v. State, 826 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) the court, in discussing whether a statement in a footnote was a holding of the court or dictum, stated, in a footnote: “As is generally true with footnotes, we regard this footnote [Footnote 6A in Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), aff'd, 490 U.S. 754 , 109 S.Ct. 2180 , 104 L.Ed.2d 834 (1989) ] as dictum_” Thus it seems our highest criminal court seems to regard footnotes as dictum. 4 Consequently, we must utilize the revised standard established by the rule and used by Justice Vance, but without his pre-r | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Express-News Corp. v. Spears
green
1 sentence1990Express-News Corp. v. Spears, 766 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.App.1989, no writ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence1978Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc., 414 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.1967); Yellow Cab and Baggage Company v. Green, 154 Tex. 330 , 277 S.W.2d 92, 93 (1955). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Members Mutual Insurance Co. v. Muckelroy
green
1 sentence1976We said in Members Mutual Insurance Co. v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77 (1975, writ ref. n. r. e.): “Under the revised rule, where the broad form of submission is adopted, the extent of the jury’s consideration of the elements comprising the controlling issue becomes a matter of evidence and argument, subject to appropriate instruction of the court.” See Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.1974); Shasteen v. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co., 517 S.W .2d 437 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, writ ref. n. r. e.); Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A, Better Special Verdict System of Texas, 27 S.W.L.J. 577 | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Mobil Chemical Company v. Bell
green
1 sentence1976We said in Members Mutual Insurance Co. v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77 (1975, writ ref. n. r. e.): “Under the revised rule, where the broad form of submission is adopted, the extent of the jury’s consideration of the elements comprising the controlling issue becomes a matter of evidence and argument, subject to appropriate instruction of the court.” See Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.1974); Shasteen v. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co., 517 S.W .2d 437 (Tex.Civ.App.1975, writ ref. n. r. e.); Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A, Better Special Verdict System of Texas, 27 S.W.L.J. 577 | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.