scheme or plan exception in Indiana

1995The cases cited in that discussion, such as Penley v. State (1987) Ind., 506 N.E.2d 806 , and Schumpert v. State (1992) 4th Dist.Ind.App., 603 N.E.2d 1359 , also treat the admissibility of evidence under the common scheme or plan exception.

1995The cases cited in that discussion, such as Penley v. State (1987) Ind., 506 N.E.2d 806 , and Schumpert v. State (1992) 4th Dist.Ind.App., 603 N.E.2d 1359 , also treat the admissibility of evidence under the common scheme or plan exception.

1995The Street court, cited Gibbs v. State (1989) Ind., 538 N.E.2d 937, 939 , to the effect that extrinsic offenses may be admitted to prove “intent, motive, purpose, or identity by showing the defendant committed other offenses with a similar modus operandi.” The court in Street proposed a more complex analysis: “extrinsic offense evidence introduced to show state of mind, that is, intent, motive, or purpose,” does not have to show distinctive characteristics which would constitute a “signature” crime under the identity branch, but must only demonstrate some similarity in order to be admissible.

1993Even though only a lesser degree of similarity between the charged crime and the extrinsic offense is required when proving state of mind, as opposed to proving identity, id., that "lesser degree" is not sufficiently present in this case to make evidence of the burglary admissible under the common scheme or plan exception.

1987Malone v. State (1982), Ind., 441 *166 N.E.2d 1339; Jenkins v. State (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 84 .

1987In Malone v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E. 2d 1339 and Jenkins v. State (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 84 , this Court held that testimony regarding other alleged rapes committed by the defendant was not admissible to prove lack of consent under the common scheme or plan exception.

1987In Malone v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E. 2d 1339 and Jenkins v. State (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 84 , this Court held that testimony regarding other alleged rapes committed by the defendant was not admissible to prove lack of consent under the common scheme or plan exception.

1985In Malone, supra, the material issue in dispute at trial was whether the prosecutrix consented to sex with the appellant.

1995In Street, supra, 567 N.E.2d at 1184 , the court enumerated a different incarnation of the common scheme or plan exception which focused not upon identify but rather upon several possible factors.

1995In Street, supra, 567 N.E.2d at 1184 , the court enumerated a different incarnation of the common scheme or plan exception which focused not upon identify but rather upon several possible factors.

1995The cases cited in that discussion, such as Penley v. State (1987) Ind., 506 N.E.2d 806 , and Schumpert v. State (1992) 4th Dist.Ind.App., 603 N.E.2d 1359 , also treat the admissibility of evidence under the common scheme or plan exception.

1995App., 603 N.E.2d 1359 , also treat the admissibility of evidence under the common scheme or plan exception.

1995This case is very unlike Butcher v. State (1994) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 627 N.E.2d 855 , reh'g denied, which offers an excellent example of a case in which the court found the defendant to have specifically placed his intent at issue by asserting one contrary to that required for conviction under the statute.

1995Id. at 858 . [11] Specifically, the record reveals that A.L. could not identify Moore as her attacker. [12] Further, I disagree with footnote 6 in the majority opinion that proof of motive, intent, and purpose are subsumed into the common scheme or plan exception.

1993First, although both victims were Pirnat's stepchildren, and were fondled while lying in bed, those facts are insufficient to create a unique modus operandi, or Pirnat's "signature," in molesting children, and we cannot agree with the State's contention at oral argument that the two events were "remarkably similar." See Lannan, 600 N.E.2d at 1340; Hudson, 884 F.2d at 1021 .

1989Nonetheless, Crabtree urges us to adopt the rationale of the Indiana Supreme Court in Clark v. State (1989), Ind., 536 N.E.2d 493 , a drug case involving the common scheme or plan exception to the general rule precluding admission, and apply the same reasoning to the facts of this case.

1989Nonetheless, Crabtree urges us to adopt the rationale of the Indiana Supreme Court in Clark v. State (1989), Ind., 536 N.E.2d 493 , a drug case involving the common scheme or plan exception to the general rule precluding admission, and apply the same reasoning to the facts of this case.

1987Hobbs, 466 N.E.2d at 733 .

1987In the case of Reichard v. State (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 163 , both Malone and Jenkins were cited for this proposition.

1987Boyd, 494 N.E.2d at 295 .