car violation in New York

1986I acknowledge that the officers had the right to stop the car in which defendant was riding as a passenger and to order the defendant and his two companions out of the car for inquiry (Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 ; People v Russ, 61 NY2d 693, 695 ; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 376 ).

1984Finding defendant in a car meeting the description and the specific location indicated by the informant provided reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred or was about to occur and warranted the officer’s request that she step out of the car for inquiry (Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 ; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 376 ).

1986I acknowledge that the officers had the right to stop the car in which defendant was riding as a passenger and to order the defendant and his two companions out of the car for inquiry (Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 ; People v Russ, 61 NY2d 693, 695 ; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 376 ).

1984Finding defendant in a car meeting the description and the specific location indicated by the informant provided reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred or was about to occur and warranted the officer’s request that she step out of the car for inquiry (Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 ; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 376 ).

1910Co., 165 N. Y. 139 , 58 N. E. 770 , where a passenger was ejected from a car' for violation of a rule forbidding standing on the platform, and it was insisted it was unreasonable to enforce the rule under the circumstances of that case because the passenger was nauseated at the time.

1910Co., 165 N. Y. 139 , where a passenger was' ejected from a car for violation of a rule forbidding standing on the platform, and it was insisted it was unreasonable to enforce the rule under the circumstances of that case because the passenger was nauseated at the time.

2010Under the circumstances, the testimony of both witnesses was appropriately presented to rebut evidence presented by the defense, and County Court did not err in admitting it at trial (see People v Harris, 98 NY2d 452, 489 [2002]; People v Harris, 57 NY2d 335, 345 [1982], cert denied 460 US 1047 [1983]; People v Gragnano, 63 AD3d 1437, 1443 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 939 [2010]).

2010Under the circumstances, the testimony of both witnesses was appropriately presented to rebut evidence presented by the defense, and County Court did not err in admitting it at trial (see People v Harris, 98 NY2d 452, 489 [2002]; People v Harris, 57 NY2d 335, 345 [1982], cert denied 460 US 1047 [1983]; People v Gragnano, 63 AD3d 1437, 1443 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 939 [2010]).

2005The People do not assert that the police officers in this case were exercising the common-law right to inquire, which requires “a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot” (De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223 : see also May, 81 NY2d at 728 ). .

1990(See, People v Meyers, 139 AD2d 601 , lv denied 72 NY2d 959 .) At the fact-finding hearing, the lower court did not err in prohibiting, as hearsay, nonparty testimony that four men had driven up to the appellant in the car and offered to sell it to him for $100, prompting him to agree to take the car for a test drive.

1989Moreover, while the inadvertent introduction of the testimony of one of the arresting officers that marihuana was found in the car was error, the error was not so egregious as to warrant a mistrial, and the court’s subsequent curative instruction was sufficient to obviate any prejudice to the defendant (see, People v Santiago, 52 NY2d 865 ; People v Jalah, 107 AD2d 762 ).

1989Moreover, while the inadvertent introduction of the testimony of one of the arresting officers that marihuana was found in the car was error, the error was not so egregious as to warrant a mistrial, and the court’s subsequent curative instruction was sufficient to obviate any prejudice to the defendant (see, People v Santiago, 52 NY2d 865 ; People v Jalah, 107 AD2d 762 ).

1986I acknowledge that the officers had the right to stop the car in which defendant was riding as a passenger and to order the defendant and his two companions out of the car for inquiry (Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US 106 ; People v Russ, 61 NY2d 693, 695 ; People v Landy, 59 NY2d 369, 376 ).

1964Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Christ and Brennan, JJ., concur; Kleinfeld, J., dissents and votes to affirm the order with the following memorandum: The complaint and affidavits, submitted in support of an attachment, must be liberally construed in plaintiff’s favor; and all legitimate inferences must be drawn for the purpose of establishing a prima facie cause of action (Coakley v. Rickard, 136 App. Div. 489 ; Stewart v. Lyman, 62 App. Div. 182 ; Brandly v. American Butter Co., 130 App. Div. 410 ; Zale Jewelry Co. v. Laine, 37 Misc 2d 39 ).

1964Plaintiffs’ contention that the said defendant, having leased the car, is liable even where the renter allows another to use the car in violation of the rental contract, docs not appear to be in accord with Iowa decisional law (cf. Krausnick v. Haegg Roofing Co., 236 Iowa 985, 989 ; Heavilin v. Wendell, 214 Iowa 844, 848 ; McLain v. Armour & Co., 205 Iowa 343 ).

1964Plaintiffs’ contention that the said defendant, having leased the car, is liable even where the renter allows another to use the car in violation of the rental contract, docs not appear to be in accord with Iowa decisional law (cf. Krausnick v. Haegg Roofing Co., 236 Iowa 985, 989 ; Heavilin v. Wendell, 214 Iowa 844, 848 ; McLain v. Armour & Co., 205 Iowa 343 ).

1964Plaintiffs’ contention that the said defendant, having leased the car, is liable even where the renter allows another to use the car in violation of the rental contract, docs not appear to be in accord with Iowa decisional law (cf. Krausnick v. Haegg Roofing Co., 236 Iowa 985, 989 ; Heavilin v. Wendell, 214 Iowa 844, 848 ; McLain v. Armour & Co., 205 Iowa 343 ).

1964Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Christ and Brennan, JJ., concur; Kleinfeld, J., dissents and votes to affirm the order with the following memorandum: The complaint and affidavits, submitted in support of an attachment, must be liberally construed in plaintiff’s favor; and all legitimate inferences must be drawn for the purpose of establishing a prima facie cause of action (Coakley v. Rickard, 136 App. Div. 489 ; Stewart v. Lyman, 62 App. Div. 182 ; Brandly v. American Butter Co., 130 App. Div. 410 ; Zale Jewelry Co. v. Laine, 37 Misc 2d 39 ).

1964Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Christ and Brennan, JJ., concur; Kleinfeld, J., dissents and votes to affirm the order with the following memorandum: The complaint and affidavits, submitted in support of an attachment, must be liberally construed in plaintiff’s favor; and all legitimate inferences must be drawn for the purpose of establishing a prima facie cause of action (Coakley v. Rickard, 136 App. Div. 489 ; Stewart v. Lyman, 62 App. Div. 182 ; Brandly v. American Butter Co., 130 App. Div. 410 ; Zale Jewelry Co. v. Laine, 37 Misc 2d 39 ).

1964Beldock, P. J., Ughetta, Christ and Brennan, JJ., concur; Kleinfeld, J., dissents and votes to affirm the order with the following memorandum: The complaint and affidavits, submitted in support of an attachment, must be liberally construed in plaintiff’s favor; and all legitimate inferences must be drawn for the purpose of establishing a prima facie cause of action (Coakley v. Rickard, 136 App. Div. 489 ; Stewart v. Lyman, 62 App. Div. 182 ; Brandly v. American Butter Co., 130 App. Div. 410 ; Zale Jewelry Co. v. Laine, 37 Misc 2d 39 ).

1934If the defendant had not interfered in the matter and the Ford car had been delivered to the plaintiff, and thereafter Winet had failed to complete his contract, the plaintiff would have become the absolute owner of the car under the doctrine of Genovese v. Lenobel ( 154 Misc. 91 , revg. 148 id. 548).

1926In Glens Falls Insurance Company v. Stewart (supra) the defendant and his wife were living separate and apart and the wife appropriated the car under a claim of right and the court held that it was never intended by a theft policy to indemnify against the taking of an automobile under such circumstances.

1909Co., 179 U. S. 658 .) In accordance with these views we think that the order of the Appellate Division must be reversed and that the judgment of the Trial Term dismissing plaintiff’s complaint must be affirmed, with costs in both courts.

1909But it was held on the other hand that as to the line operating the other car under the rule of res ipsa loquitur a presumption of negligence did not arise; that said defendant, not being the carrier, was bound only to the exercise of ordinary care in the management of its cars, and that it could not be said “ that in the ordinary course of things a car does not collide with vehicles or persons except when there has been carelessness in the management of the car.” (P. 386.) (See, also, Rende v. N. Y. & Texas S. S. Co., 187 N. Y. 382 ; Starrer v. Stern, 100 App. Div. 393 ; Moran v. Mulligan, 11

1909But it was held on the other hand that as to the line operating the other car under the rule of res ipsa loquitur a presumption of negligence did not arise; that said defendant, not being the carrier, was bound only to the exercise of ordinary care in the management of its cars, and that it could not be said “ that in the ordinary course of things a car does not collide with vehicles or persons except when there has been carelessness in the management of the car.” (P. 386.) (See, also, Rende v. N. Y. & Texas S. S. Co., 187 N. Y. 382 ; Starrer v. Stern, 100 App. Div. 393 ; Moran v. Mulligan, 11

1909But it was held on the other hand that as to the line operating the other car under the rule of res ipsa loquitur a presumption of negligence did not arise; that said defendant, not being the carrier, was bound only to the exercise of ordinary care in the management of its cars, and that it could not be said “ that in the ordinary course of things a car does not collide with vehicles or persons except when there has been carelessness in the management of the car.” (P. 386.) (See, also, Rende v. N. Y. & Texas S. S. Co., 187 N. Y. 382 ; Starrer v. Stern, 100 App. Div. 393 ; Moran v. Mulligan, 11