firefighter rule in New York

2013In the 1988 decision in Santangelo ( 71 NY2d at 397-398 ), the Court of Appeals, for the first time, extended the firefighter rule to police officers (see Cooper v City of New York, 81 NY2d 584 [1993]).

2013In the 1988 decision in Santangelo ( 71 NY2d at 397-398 ), the Court of Appeals, for the first time, extended the firefighter rule to police officers (see Cooper v City of New York, 81 NY2d 584 [1993]).

2015We affirm on the ground that the action was barred by the firefighter rule. “[T]he firefighter rule provides that ‘[p]olice and firefighters may not recover in common-law negligence for line-of-duty injuries resulting from risks associated with the particular dangers inherent in that type of employment’ ” (Gammons v City of New York, 109 AD3d 189 , 193 [2013], affd 24 NY3d 562 [2014], quoting Wadler v City of New York, 14 NY3d 192, 194 [2010]). “[T]he rule bars an officer’s . . . recovery ‘when the performance of his or her duties increased the risk of the injury happening, and did not merely

2015The firefighter rule provides that police and firefighters may not recover in common-law negligence for line-of-duty injuries resulting from risks associated with the particular dangers inherent in that type of employment (see Wadler v City of New York, 14 NY3d 192, 194 [2010]; Gammons v City of New York, 109 AD3d 189 , 193 [2013], affd 24 NY3d 562 [2014]). “[T]he rule bars an officer’s . . . recovery ‘when the performance of his or her duties increased the risk of the injury happening, and did not merely furnish the occasion for the injury’ ” (Wadler v City of New York, 14 NY3d at 194-195 , q

2015We affirm on the ground that the action was barred by the firefighter rule. “[T]he firefighter rule provides that ‘[p]olice and firefighters may not recover in common-law negligence for line-of-duty injuries resulting from risks associated with the particular dangers inherent in that type of employment’ ” (Gammons v City of New York, 109 AD3d 189 , 193 [2013], affd 24 NY3d 562 [2014], quoting Wadler v City of New York, 14 NY3d 192, 194 [2010]). “[T]he rule bars an officer’s . . . recovery ‘when the performance of his or her duties increased the risk of the injury happening, and did not merely

2015The firefighter rule provides that police and firefighters may not recover in common-law negligence for line-of-duty injuries resulting from risks associated with the particular dangers inherent in that type of employment (see Wadler v City of New York, 14 NY3d 192, 194 [2010]; Gammons v City of New York, 109 AD3d 189 , 193 [2013], affd 24 NY3d 562 [2014]). “[T]he rule bars an officer’s . . . recovery ‘when the performance of his or her duties increased the risk of the injury happening, and did not merely furnish the occasion for the injury’ ” (Wadler v City of New York, 14 NY3d at 194-195 , q

2013In Carro v City of New York ( 89 AD3d 1049 [2011]), we addressed a set of facts that were similar to those that are presented herein.

2013In Carro v City of New York ( 89 AD3d 1049 [2011]), we addressed a set of facts that were similar to those that are presented herein.

2013In 1989, the legislature enacted General Municipal Law § 205-e in direct response to Santangelo v State of New York ( 71 NY2d 393 [1988]), which, as discussed above, had extended the firefighter rule to police officers (see Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d at 79 ; Williams v City of New York, 2 NY3d 352, 363 [2004]; see also General Obligations Law § 11-106; L 1989, ch 346).

2013In 1989, the legislature enacted General Municipal Law § 205-e in direct response to Santangelo v State of New York ( 71 NY2d 393 [1988]), which, as discussed above, had extended the firefighter rule to police officers (see Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d at 79 ; Williams v City of New York, 2 NY3d 352, 363 [2004]; see also General Obligations Law § 11-106; L 1989, ch 346).

1995With that rationale undermined by Basso v Miller ( 40 NY2d 233 ), subsequent cases retained the firefighter rule by reliance on the doctrine of assumption of risk — i.e., that persons who accept employment as firefighters or police assume the risks of fire-related or crime-fighting-related injuries, including the risk that property owners and occupants may negligently maintain their premises (McGee v Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 AD2d 186, 190 , affd 20 NY2d 921 ).

1995This remedial section of the General Municipal Law was enacted to ameliorate the harsh effects of the firefighter rule’s bar to recovery in common-law negligence by imposing "liability in any case where there is any practical or reasonable connection between a [statutory or code] violation and the injury or death of a fire[fighter]” (McGee v Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 AD2d 186, 195 , affd 20 NY2d 921 , supra).

2010Supreme Court granted summary judgment to defendants ( 2008 NY Slip Op 30572[U] ), relying on the firefighter rule, and the Appellate Division affirmed ( 57 AD3d 333 [2008]).

2010Supreme Court granted summary judgment to defendants ( 2008 NY Slip Op 30572[U] ), relying on the firefighter rule, and the Appellate Division affirmed ( 57 AD3d 333 [2008]).

2010We granted leave to appeal ( 12 NY3d 779 [2009]), and now affirm.

2010We granted leave to appeal ( 12 NY3d 779 [2009]), and now affirm.

2010For example, in Olson v City of New York ( 233 AD2d 488 [2d Dept 1996]), the firefighter rule did not apply where a firefighter, after responding to a fire alarm, returned to the fire station, stepped down from a fire truck and was injured when he fell into a pothole in the driveway of the firehouse.

2010Likewise, the firefighter rule did not apply in Delio v City of New York ( 8 AD3d 325 [2d Dept 2004]).

2010Likewise, the firefighter rule did not apply in Delio v City of New York ( 8 AD3d 325 [2d Dept 2004]).

2003The appellants failed to abide by these procedures, leaving the petitioner with no means of redress under the CBA and depriving him of the due process to which he was entitled (see Matter of Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562, IAFF, AFL-CIO v City of Cohoes, 94 NY2d 686 [2000]; Local 589, Intl.

2003In other words, where some {** 2 Misc 3d at 858 }act taken in furtherance of a specific police . . . function exposed the officer to a heightened risk of sustaining the particular injury, he or she may not recover damages for common-law negligence." ( Id . at 439.) In the matter at bar, the plaintiff contends that the defendant's common-law negligence is based on its failure to remove the drug dealers from the premises.

1995To fall within the protective scope of the statute and defeat a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff seeking recovery under General Municipal Law § 205-a must identify the statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply, describe the manner in which the firefighter was injured, and set forth those facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant’s negligence directly or indirectly caused the harm to the firefighter (Brophy v Generoso, 137 AD2d 478, 479 ).

1995Corp., 152 AD2d 358, 361 ).

1995(See also, Cottone v City of New York, 206 AD2d 345 [2d Dept 1994].) The cause of action based upon violation of General Municipal Law § 205-a must be dismissed because the violation of Multiple Dwelling Law § 78 is not of the type contemplated by General Municipal Law § 205-a.

1995With that rationale undermined by Basso v Miller ( 40 NY2d 233 ), subsequent cases retained the firefighter rule by reliance on the doctrine of assumption of risk — i.e., that persons who accept employment as firefighters or police assume the risks of fire-related or crime-fighting-related injuries, including the risk that property owners and occupants may negligently maintain their premises (McGee v Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 AD2d 186, 190 , affd 20 NY2d 921 ).

1995This remedial section of the General Municipal Law was enacted to ameliorate the harsh effects of the firefighter rule’s bar to recovery in common-law negligence by imposing "liability in any case where there is any practical or reasonable connection between a [statutory or code] violation and the injury or death of a fire[fighter]” (McGee v Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 AD2d 186, 195 , affd 20 NY2d 921 , supra).

1995With that rationale undermined by Basso v Miller ( 40 NY2d 233 ), subsequent cases retained the firefighter rule by reliance on the doctrine of assumption of risk — i.e., that persons who accept employment as firefighters or police assume the risks of fire-related or crime-fighting-related injuries, including the risk that property owners and occupants may negligently maintain their premises (McGee v Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 AD2d 186, 190 , affd 20 NY2d 921 ).

1995With that rationale undermined by Basso v Miller ( 40 NY2d 233 ), subsequent cases retained the firefighter rule by reliance on the doctrine of assumption of risk — i.e., that persons who accept employment as firefighters or police assume the risks of fire-related or crime-fighting-related injuries, including the risk that property owners and occupants may negligently maintain their premises (McGee v Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 AD2d 186, 190 , affd 20 NY2d 921 ).

1995Additionally, in Raquet v Braun, the Appellate Division dismissed the statutory claims against all defendants, holding that violations of building codes do not give rise to liability pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-a because they do not " 'create hazards additional to those that firefighters already face in their profession’ (Kenavan v City of New York, [ 70 NY2d 558 ,] 567).” (201 AD2d, at 911.) We affirm the dismissal of the negligence claims in all three cases.

1993NOTES [*] The bar to plaintiff's claim in Buckley v City of New York ( 176 AD2d 207 , lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 757 ), also cited by the majority ( see , majority opn, at 589) was ultimately based not on the firefighter rule, but on the fact that the alleged act of negligence involved the exercise of poor judgment by a superior, which is not actionable under Kenavan v City of New York ( supra ).

1993The bar to plaintiffs claim in Buckley v City of New York ( 176 AD2d 207 , lv denied 79 NY2d 757 ), also cited by the majority (see, majority opn, at 589) was ultimately based not on the firefighter rule, but on the fact that the alleged act of negligence involved the exercise of poor judgment by a superior, which is not actionable under Kenavan v City of New York (supra).