firefighter rule in Connecticut

2017I suggest that Levandoski 's incorrect distinction between ordinary negligence and premises liability cases, which is reaffirmed in the majority opinion in the present case, is rooted in dictum in footnote 12 in Lodge , which initially cited Furstein v. Hill , supra, 218 Conn. at 615 -16 , 590 A.2d 939 , for the otherwise unremarkable proposition that "the firefighter rule ... gives a firefighter the status of a licensee in a personal injury action against a landowner for harm sustained during the course of duty." Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp. , supra, 246 Conn. at 580 n.12, 717 A.2d 215 .

2017I suggest that Levandoski 's incorrect distinction between ordinary negligence and premises liability cases, which is reaffirmed in the majority opinion in the present case, is rooted in dictum in footnote 12 in Lodge , which initially cited Furstein v. Hill , supra, 218 Conn. at 615 -16 , 590 A.2d 939 , for the otherwise unremarkable proposition that "the firefighter rule ... gives a firefighter the status of a licensee in a personal injury action against a landowner for harm sustained during the course of duty." Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp. , supra, 246 Conn. at 580 n.12, 717 A.2d 215 .

2017I suggest that Levandoski 's incorrect distinction between ordinary negligence and premises liability cases, which is reaffirmed in the majority opinion in the present case, is rooted in dictum in footnote 12 in Lodge , which initially cited Furstein v. Hill , supra, 218 Conn. at 615 -16 , 590 A.2d 939 , for the otherwise unremarkable proposition that "the firefighter rule ... gives a firefighter the status of a licensee in a personal injury action against a landowner for harm sustained during the course of duty." Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp. , supra, 246 Conn. at 580 n.12, 717 A.2d 215 .

2017I suggest that Levandoski 's incorrect distinction between ordinary negligence and premises liability cases, which is reaffirmed in the majority opinion in the present case, is rooted in dictum in footnote 12 in Lodge , which initially cited Furstein v. Hill , supra, 218 Conn. at 615 -16 , 590 A.2d 939 , for the otherwise unremarkable proposition that "the firefighter rule ... gives a firefighter the status of a licensee in a personal injury action against a landowner for harm sustained during the course of duty." Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp. , supra, 246 Conn. at 580 n.12, 717 A.2d 215 .

2001Kaminski v. Fairfield, 216 Conn. 29 , 578 A.2d 1048 (1990).

2001Kaminski v. Fairfield, 216 Conn. 29 , 578 A.2d 1048 (1990).

2001"In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Waters v. Autuori, 236 Conn. 820 , 825 , 676 A.2d 357 (1996).

2001"In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Waters v. Autuori, 236 Conn. 820 , 825 , 676 A.2d 357 (1996).

2001Jainchill and the city of Hartford argue that Jainchill's claim falls within an exception to the firefighter rule, namely, that the police officer had invitee status because the incident occurred in Keney Park, property held open for the use of the general public. 1 Jainchill and the city of Hartford also argue that the defendant's claim should have been raised by means of a special defense rather than a motion to strike. 2 I "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [complaint] . . . to state a claim on which relief can be granted."

2001Jainchill and the city of Hartford argue that Jainchill's claim falls within an exception to the firefighter rule, namely, that the police officer had invitee status because the incident occurred in Keney Park, property held open for the use of the general public. 1 Jainchill and the city of Hartford also argue that the defendant's claim should have been raised by means of a special defense rather than a motion to strike. 2 I "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [complaint] . . . to state a claim on which relief can be granted."

2001II In Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn. 110 , 148 A.2d 142 (1959), the Supreme Court adopted the firefighter rule and held that since the plaintiff entered the premises "in the performance of a public duty under a permission created by law," the defendant property owners owed the plaintiff, a firefighter, "no greater duty than that due a licensee." Id., 113 .

2001II In Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn. 110 , 148 A.2d 142 (1959), the Supreme Court adopted the firefighter rule and held that since the plaintiff entered the premises "in the performance of a public duty under a permission created by law," the defendant property owners owed the plaintiff, a firefighter, "no greater duty than that due a licensee." Id., 113 .

1998Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. Mark Ford, Inc., 182 Conn. 437, 442 , 438 A.2d 705 (1980) (legislature is sole arbiter of public policy when it speaks).

1998Laurel Bank & Trust Co. v. Mark Ford, Inc., 182 Conn. 437, 442 , 438 A.2d 705 (1980) (legislature is sole arbiter of public policy when it speaks).