Strickland prejudice analysis in Pennsylvania

2014See Brief of Appellee Daniels at 33-35, discussing Smith v. Cain, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 627 , 181 L.Ed.2d 571 (2012); Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 , 100 S.Ct. 1108 , 63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980); and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329 , 966 A.2d 523 (2009).

2014See Brief of Appellee Daniels at 33-35, discussing Smith v. Cain, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 627 , 181 L.Ed.2d 571 (2012); Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 , 100 S.Ct. 1108 , 63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980); and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329 , 966 A.2d 523 (2009).

2014See Brief of Appellee Daniels at 33-35, discussing Smith v. Cain, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 627 , 181 L.Ed.2d 571 (2012); Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 , 100 S.Ct. 1108 , 63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980); and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329 , 966 A.2d 523 (2009).

2014See Brief of Appellee Daniels at 33-35, discussing Smith v. Cain, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 627 , 181 L.Ed.2d 571 (2012); Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 , 100 S.Ct. 1108 , 63 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980); and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329 , 966 A.2d 523 (2009).

2020As more fully discussed below, because the PCRA court misapplied the Strickland/Pierce prejudice test, we address only Johnson’s fourth issue and remand to allow the court below to apply the proper prejudicial-impact test in the first instance. 6 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressly adopted the Strickland prejudice standard in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 976-77 (Pa. 1987) (concluding that “the identical textual and policy considerations” in Pennsylvania precedent and Strickland “logically lead us to hold that together they constitute an identical rule of law in this Commonweal

2016Invoking a Strickland prejudice standard, the court determined that Appellants’ allegations of inadequate representation by the OPD attorneys did not create circumstances that are “so likely [to create prejudice] that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost.” Flora, 103 A.3d at 137 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2062 ).

2020Summarizing Johnson, our Supreme Court concluded that the Strickland prejudice standard for claims of ineffectiveness of counsel aligned with the prejudice standard put forth in the fourth prong of the test for after- discovered evidence, that is that the new witnesses’ testimony would “would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.” Small, supra. Therefore, in each situation the PCRA court must considered the credibility of the new evidence proffered when determining if the petitioner established the requisite prejudice before granting post-conviction relief.

2020Summarizing Johnson, our Supreme Court concluded that the Strickland prejudice standard for claims of ineffectiveness of counsel aligned with the prejudice standard in the fourth prong of the test for after-discovered evidence, i.e., that the new witnesses’ testimony would “would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were granted.” Small, supra. Therefore, in each situation the PCRA court must considered the credibility of the new evidence proffered when determining if the petitioner established the requisite prejudice before granting post-conviction relief.

2026Cf. Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86, 95 (2025) (per curiam) (reaffirming that “certain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt”) (citations omitted); id. at 94– 95 (recognizing the overlap between general legal principle underlying state prisoner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and “the Eighth Amendment principle that a sentence may not be grossly disproportionate to the offense”) (citation omitted). [J-31-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 5 378, 390–393 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534–538; Williams,

2026Cf. Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86, 95 (2025) (per curiam) (reaffirming that “certain principles are fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier rule will be beyond doubt”) (citations omitted); id. at 94– 95 (recognizing the overlap between general legal principle underlying state prisoner’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and “the Eighth Amendment principle that a sentence may not be grossly disproportionate to the offense”) (citation omitted). [J-31-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 5 378, 390–393 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534–538; Williams,

2016Invoking a Strickland prejudice standard, the court determined that Appellants’ allegations of inadequate representation by the OPD attorneys did not create circumstances that are “so likely [to create prejudice] that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost.” Flora, 103 A.3d at 137 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2062 ).

2008Applying the Strickland prejudice standard, the Hill Court concluded that the “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 .

2008Applying the Strickland prejudice standard, the Hill Court concluded that the “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 59 , 106 S.Ct. 366 .

2005See Hook v. Iowa, 307 F.3d 756, 758 (8th Cir.2002) (given strength of evidence, no Strickland prejudice when counsel failed to object to admission of testimony that appellant had exercised right to remain silent after being read Miranda rights, so court did not reach question of whether counsel's performance was deficient); Pitts v. Anderson, 122 F.3d 275 (5th Cir.1997) (analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland and concluding that prosecutor's questions, used to impeach defendant with post-arrest silence, did not violate Doyle , so court did not reach question of prej

2005See Hook v. Iowa, 307 F.3d 756, 758 (8th Cir.2002) (given strength of evidence, no Strickland prejudice when counsel failed to object to admission of testimony that appellant had exercised right to remain silent after being read Miranda rights, so court did not reach question of whether counsel’s performance was deficient); Pitts v. Anderson, 122 F.3d 275 (5th Cir.1997) (analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland and concluding that prosecutor's questions, used to impeach defendant with post-arrest silence, did not violate Doyle , so court did not reach question of prej

2002In so doing, that court did not pass upon the question of counsel ineffectiveness, which the court assumed, but instead concluded that Williams had failed to prove prejudice under Strickland in light of the modification of the Strickland prejudice test that it gleaned from the U.S. Supreme Court's later decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 , 113 S.Ct. 838 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).

2002In so doing, that court did not pass upon the question of counsel ineffectiveness, which the court assumed, but instead concluded that Williams had failed to prove prejudice under Strickland in light of the modification of the Strickland prejudice test that it gleaned from the U.S. Supreme Court's later decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 , 113 S.Ct. 838 , 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).