Strickland prejudice analysis in Texas

2024“When a defendant has been deprived of the right to testify by his attorney, the usual Strickland prejudice analysis applies: ‘the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different had his attorney not precluded him from testifying.’” Ruffin v. State, No. 03-18-00013-CR, 2019 WL 4180767 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 4, 2019, pet. ref’d) (quoting Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 239 (Tex. Crim.

2019Bar Ass’n 2018)). 8 held that because a complete denial of the right to testify at trial is not a structural defect but is the type of violation that can be subjected to a harm/prejudice inquiry, “the usual Strickland prejudice analysis applies: the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different had his attorney not precluded him from testifying.” Id. at 239 .

2022More recently, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted “[t]he ‘ultimate focus’ of the Strickland prejudice standard is the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.” Miller, 548 S.W.3d at 499 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 ).

2019When a defendant has been deprived of the right to testify by his attorney, “the usual Strickland prejudice analysis applies: the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different had his attorney not precluded him from testifying.” Johnson, 169 S.W.3d at 238 ; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring appellant to show prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance); Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 308 (Tex. Crim.

2015In Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59 , the Supreme Court recognized what is sometimes called -24- a narrow exception to the Strickland prejudice analysis for situations where "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." The exception applies when "there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable." Id. at 659 .

2015In Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59 , the Supreme Court recognized what is sometimes called -24- a narrow exception to the Strickland prejudice analysis for situations where "counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." The exception applies when "there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable." Id. at 659 .

2018MILLER DISSENT — 3 an ineffective-assistance claim was to be conducted.7 The Court explained that “structural error” is the kind of error that, if preserved, results in reversal without a harm analysis.8 The Court concluded, however, that the structural nature of an error did not necessarily dictate a deviation from the usual Strickland prejudice analysis.9 The Court assumed, but did not decide, that the structural nature of an error might affect the Strickland prejudice analysis if one of the rationales for labeling a particular error as structural was that it rendered a trial fundamentally u

2018MILLER DISSENT — 3 an ineffective-assistance claim was to be conducted.7 The Court explained that “structural error” is the kind of error that, if preserved, results in reversal without a harm analysis.8 The Court concluded, however, that the structural nature of an error did not necessarily dictate a deviation from the usual Strickland prejudice analysis.9 The Court assumed, but did not decide, that the structural nature of an error might affect the Strickland prejudice analysis if one of the rationales for labeling a particular error as structural was that it rendered a trial fundamentally u

2017See id. at 59 .

2015In this context, the Strickland prejudice requirement “focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 , 57–58 (1985).

2019When a defendant has been deprived of the right to testify by his attorney, “the usual Strickland prejudice analysis applies: the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different had his attorney not precluded him from testifying.” Johnson, 169 S.W.3d at 238 ; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring appellant to show prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance); Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 308 (Tex. Crim.

2018Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.2d 223, 231-322 (Tex. Crim.

2017See Ex parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tex. Crim.

2015See, e.g., Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (“[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”); Roe v. Flores- Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486 , 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1036, 1039 , 145 L.Ed.2d 985 23 (2000).

2015In Padilla, as well as in two more recent cases considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations—Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1405—the Court recognized the significance of negotiated pleas to defendants in the contemporary criminal justice system.

2015See, e.g., Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (“[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”); Roe v. Flores- Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486 , 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1036, 1039 , 145 L.Ed.2d 985 23 (2000).

2015See, e.g., Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (“[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”); Roe v. Flores- Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480, 486 , 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1036, 1039 , 145 L.Ed.2d 985 23 (2000).