15 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lagrone v. Stategreen2 sentences2025App. 1997), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a defendant’s presentation of psychiatric testimony on future-dangerousness is a “limited” waiver of Fifth Amendment rights entitling the State to compel the defendant to an examination by the State’s psychiatric expert for rebuttal purposes “provided, however, that the rebuttal testimony is limited to the issues raised by the defense expert.” Lagrone, 942 S.W.2d at 610, 611 (Tex. Crim. 2025Point of Error 25: Scope of Rebuttal In her twenty-fifth point of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting Dr. Timothy Proctor, one of the State’s rebuttal experts, to testify about (1) the results of the PCL-R “psychopathy checklist” he PARKER — 64 administered to Appellant including Appellant’s above-average score, and (2) Appellant’s purported “psychopathic traits” and potential “full psychopathy.” The State’s rebuttal testimony “is limited to the issues raised by the defense expert.” Lagrone, 942 S.W.2d at 610 (quoting Soria, 933 S.W.2d at 58– 59). “[I]f a defendant | 4 | 7 |
Soria v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Point of Error 25: Scope of Rebuttal In her twenty-fifth point of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting Dr. Timothy Proctor, one of the State’s rebuttal experts, to testify about (1) the results of the PCL-R “psychopathy checklist” he PARKER — 64 administered to Appellant including Appellant’s above-average score, and (2) Appellant’s purported “psychopathic traits” and potential “full psychopathy.” The State’s rebuttal testimony “is limited to the issues raised by the defense expert.” Lagrone, 942 S.W.2d at 610 (quoting Soria, 933 S.W.2d at 58– 59). “[I]f a defendant 2025Based on the testimony in the record, Dr. Proctor’s testimony was “limited to the issues raised by the defense expert[s].” Lagrone, 942 S.W.2d at 610 (quoting Soria, 933 S.W.2d at 58–59). | 2 | 8 |
Bradford v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 609-612 (Tex.Cr.App.1997) (defendant's presentation of psychiatric testimony on future-dangerousness is a “limited" waiver of Fifth Amendment rights entitling State to compel defendant to an examination by State’s psychiatric expert for rebuttal purposes “provided, however, that the rebuttal testimony is limited to the issues raised by the defense expert”) (emphasis supplied); Bradford v. State, 873 S.W.2d 15, 24-27 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (Campbell, J., dissenting) (same). 4 . 2007See Lagrone v. State , 942 S.W.2d 602, 609-612 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997) (defendant's presentation of psychiatric testimony on future-dangerousness is a "limited" waiver of Fifth Amendment rights entitling State to compel defendant to an examination by State's psychiatric expert for rebuttal purposes " provided, however, that the rebuttal testimony is limited to the issues raised by the defense expert ") (emphasis supplied); Bradford v. State , 873 S.W.2d 15, 24-27 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993) (Campbell, J., dissenting) (same). 4. | 2 | 3 |
Wilkens v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Point of Error 25: Scope of Rebuttal In her twenty-fifth point of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting Dr. Timothy Proctor, one of the State’s rebuttal experts, to testify about (1) the results of the PCL-R “psychopathy checklist” he PARKER — 64 administered to Appellant including Appellant’s above-average score, and (2) Appellant’s purported “psychopathic traits” and potential “full psychopathy.” The State’s rebuttal testimony “is limited to the issues raised by the defense expert.” Lagrone, 942 S.W.2d at 610 (quoting Soria, 933 S.W.2d at 58– 59). “[I]f a defendant 2025Because Appellant “introduce[d] psychiatric evidence in some form, the State [could] also introduce psychiatric evidence in some form.” Wilkens, 847 S.W.2d at 552 . | 1 | 1 |
Buchanan v. Kentuckygreen1 sentence2025App. 1992) (first citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 , 465–66 (1981); then citing Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422 (1987)). i. Evidence At trial, Appellant introduced testimony from three experts: (1) Dr. Siddhartha Nadkarni, a neurologist; (2) Dr. Edward Gripon, a psychiatrist; and (3) Laura Elmore, a licensed master social worker. | 1 | 1 |
Muennink v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Adanandus, 866 S.W.2d at 220 ; see also Muennink v. State, 933 S.W.2d 677 , 683–84 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1996, pet. ref’d). 23 her body was discovered in the closet. | 1 | 1 |
Adanandus v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Adanandus, 866 S.W.2d at 220 ; see also Muennink v. State, 933 S.W.2d 677 , 683–84 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1996, pet. ref’d). 23 her body was discovered in the closet. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Vestgreen2 sentences1996The State’s only effective means of rebutting appellant’s constructive testimony was by presenting independent psychiatric testimony. 16 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra; Byers; United States v. Vest, 905 F.Supp. 651, 653 (W.D.Mo.1995); Schneider, supra. We accordingly hold that when the defendant initiates a psychiatric examination and based thereon presents psychiatric testimony on the issue of future dangerousness, the trial court may compel an examination of appellant by an expert of the State’s or court’s choosing 17 and the State may present rebut tal testimony of that expert based upon his ex 1996The State's only effective means of rebutting appellant's constructive testimony was by presenting independent psychiatric testimony. [16] See, e.g., Buchanan, supra; Byers ; United States v. Vest, 905 F.Supp. 651, 653 (W.D.Mo.1995); Schneider, supra. We accordingly hold that when the defendant initiates a psychiatric examination and based thereon presents psychiatric testimony on the issue of future dangerousness, the trial court may compel an examination of appellant by an expert of the State's or court's choosing [17] and the State may present rebuttal *58 testimony of that expert based upo | 1 | 1 |
Anthony Charles Williams v. James A. Lynaugh, Interim Director, Texas Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences1996The State’s only effective means of rebutting appellant’s constructive testimony was by presenting independent psychiatric testimony. 16 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra; Byers; United States v. Vest, 905 F.Supp. 651, 653 (W.D.Mo.1995); Schneider, supra. We accordingly hold that when the defendant initiates a psychiatric examination and based thereon presents psychiatric testimony on the issue of future dangerousness, the trial court may compel an examination of appellant by an expert of the State’s or court’s choosing 17 and the State may present rebut tal testimony of that expert based upon his ex 1996The State's only effective means of rebutting appellant's constructive testimony was by presenting independent psychiatric testimony. [16] See, e.g., Buchanan, supra; Byers ; United States v. Vest, 905 F.Supp. 651, 653 (W.D.Mo.1995); Schneider, supra. We accordingly hold that when the defendant initiates a psychiatric examination and based thereon presents psychiatric testimony on the issue of future dangerousness, the trial court may compel an examination of appellant by an expert of the State's or court's choosing [17] and the State may present rebuttal *58 testimony of that expert based upo | 1 | 1 |
Etheridge v. Stategreen2 sentences1991See Etheridge v. State, 76 Tex.Crim. 198 , 173 S.W. 1031, 1032-1035 (1915). 1991See Etheridge v. State, 76 Tex.Crim. 198 , 173 S.W. 1031, 1032-1035 (1915). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Estelle v. Smith
green
1 sentence2025App. 1992) (first citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 , 465–66 (1981); then citing Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 422 (1987)). i. Evidence At trial, Appellant introduced testimony from three experts: (1) Dr. Siddhartha Nadkarni, a neurologist; (2) Dr. Edward Gripon, a psychiatrist; and (3) Laura Elmore, a licensed master social worker. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In re R. R.
green
1 sentence2020In its briefing, the Department represents that Father was appointed possessory conservator, but the associate judge’s order and the de novo order expressly state that no parent was appointed possessory conservator. 6 But see In re R.R., 537 S.W.3d 621 , 623–24 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, orig. proceeding) (describing de novo hearing before referring court as “new and independent action on those issues raised” in request for hearing and collecting cases in which “courts treat the de novo hearing as a new trial, in which the parties are permitted to present witnesses to testify as to the issues rai | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Wilkerson v. State
green
1 sentence2014Therefore, in addition to summarizing the relevant portions of the trial, a “synopsis of the relevant evidence presented at the hearing [on appellant’s motion for new trial] is [also] appropriate.” Id. at 548 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Pete Vardas v. W.J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences1996The State’s only effective means of rebutting appellant’s constructive testimony was by presenting independent psychiatric testimony. 16 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra; Byers; United States v. Vest, 905 F.Supp. 651, 653 (W.D.Mo.1995); Schneider, supra. We accordingly hold that when the defendant initiates a psychiatric examination and based thereon presents psychiatric testimony on the issue of future dangerousness, the trial court may compel an examination of appellant by an expert of the State’s or court’s choosing 17 and the State may present rebut tal testimony of that expert based upon his ex 1996The State's only effective means of rebutting appellant's constructive testimony was by presenting independent psychiatric testimony. [16] See, e.g., Buchanan, supra; Byers ; United States v. Vest, 905 F.Supp. 651, 653 (W.D.Mo.1995); Schneider, supra. We accordingly hold that when the defendant initiates a psychiatric examination and based thereon presents psychiatric testimony on the issue of future dangerousness, the trial court may compel an examination of appellant by an expert of the State's or court's choosing [17] and the State may present rebuttal *58 testimony of that expert based upo | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Michael Edwin Schneider v. James A. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences1996The State’s only effective means of rebutting appellant’s constructive testimony was by presenting independent psychiatric testimony. 16 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra; Byers; United States v. Vest, 905 F.Supp. 651, 653 (W.D.Mo.1995); Schneider, supra. We accordingly hold that when the defendant initiates a psychiatric examination and based thereon presents psychiatric testimony on the issue of future dangerousness, the trial court may compel an examination of appellant by an expert of the State’s or court’s choosing 17 and the State may present rebut tal testimony of that expert based upon his ex 1996The State's only effective means of rebutting appellant's constructive testimony was by presenting independent psychiatric testimony. [16] See, e.g., Buchanan, supra; Byers ; United States v. Vest, 905 F.Supp. 651, 653 (W.D.Mo.1995); Schneider, supra. We accordingly hold that when the defendant initiates a psychiatric examination and based thereon presents psychiatric testimony on the issue of future dangerousness, the trial court may compel an examination of appellant by an expert of the State's or court's choosing [17] and the State may present rebuttal *58 testimony of that expert based upo | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Mincey v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1996We emphasize that the State’s expert may only testify on the basis of state-mente made during such examination that were the “product of a rational intellect and a free will.” 19 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2416 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)(while statements made by defendant in violation of Miranda are admissible against defendant for impeachment purposes, such statements must be “the product of a rational intellect and free will”). 1996We emphasize that the State’s expert may only testify on the basis of state-mente made during such examination that were the “product of a rational intellect and a free will.” 19 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2416 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)(while statements made by defendant in violation of Miranda are admissible against defendant for impeachment purposes, such statements must be “the product of a rational intellect and free will”). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.