102 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stepp v. SAIF Corp.green2 sentences2002At the time, however, aggravation claims were determined according to a two-part inquiry: “In order to prevail on an aggravation claim under the statute, a worker must show (1) a worsening of the compensable condition since the last award or arrangement of compensation and (2) a causal connection between the worsening and the compensable condition.” Stepp v. SAIF, 78 Or App 438, 441 , 717 P2d 216 (1986), aff'd 304 Or 375 , 745 P2d 1207 (1987). 2002At the time, however, aggravation claims were determined according to a two-part inquiry: “In order to prevail on an aggravation claim under the statute, a worker must show (1) a worsening of the compensable condition since the last award or arrangement of compensation and (2) a causal connection between the worsening and the compensable condition.” Stepp v. SAIF, 78 Or App 438, 441 , 717 P2d 216 (1986), aff'd 304 Or 375 , 745 P2d 1207 (1987). | 2 | 4 |
SAIF Corp. v. Walkergreen2 sentences2011See SAIF v. Walker, 330 Or 102, 118 , 996 P2d 979 (2000) (explaining what a worker must show to establish an aggravation claim). 2011See SAIF v. Walker, 330 Or 102, 118 , 996 P2d 979 (2000) (explaining what a worker must show to establish an aggravation claim). | 2 | 3 |
SAIF Corp. v. Walkergreen2 sentences2001In Walker , we interpreted the relevant language of ORS 656.273(1) and concluded that the legislature did not intend for the term “actual worsening” to include symptomatic worsening and that proof of a pathological worsening was required to sustain an aggravation claim. 145 Or App at 305 . 2000Two judges dissented, asserting that an aggravation claim may be proved by evidence of increased symptoms “greater than those that were contemplated in the prior award.” Id. at 310 (Armstrong, J., dissenting). | 2 | 3 |
Krieger v. Future Logginggreen2 sentences2011See Krieger v. Future Logging, 116 Or App 537, 540 , 842 P2d 428 (1992), rev den, 316 Or 528 (1993); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Seney, 124 Or App 450, 454 , 863 P2d 528 (1993). 2011See Krieger v. Future Logging, 116 Or App 537, 540 , 842 P2d 428 (1992), rev den, 316 Or 528 (1993); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Seney, 124 Or App 450, 454 , 863 P2d 528 (1993). | 2 | 2 |
Haret v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.green2 sentences1986In Haret v. SAIF, 72 Or App 668, 671-72 , 697 P2d 201 , rev den 299 Or 313 (1985), we stated: “ORS 656.273(3) provides: “ ‘A physician’s report indicating a need for further medical services or additional compensation is a claim for aggravation.’ “That statute replaced former ORS 656.271(1) (repealed by Or Laws 1973, ch 620, § 4), which provided that an aggravation claim ‘must be supported by a written opinion from a physician that there are reasonable grounds for a claim.’ The purposes of the statutory change were to make the physician’s report itself the claim and to delete any requirement t 1986In Haret v. SAIF, 72 Or App 668, 671-72 , 697 P2d 201 , rev den 299 Or 313 (1985), we stated: “ORS 656.273(3) provides: “ ‘A physician’s report indicating a need for further medical services or additional compensation is a claim for aggravation.’ “That statute replaced former ORS 656.271(1) (repealed by Or Laws 1973, ch 620, § 4), which provided that an aggravation claim ‘must be supported by a written opinion from a physician that there are reasonable grounds for a claim.’ The purposes of the statutory change were to make the physician’s report itself the claim and to delete any requirement t | 1 | 3 |
Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Watkinsgreen2 sentences2011Corp., Inc., 347 Or at 694 (“[W]e conclude that a claimant cannot [through a CDA] dispose of‘all matters’ and ‘all rights to compensation, attorney fees and penalties potentially arising out of claims’ where those matters and rights involve medical services.”). 8 ORS 656.273(1) sets forth the causation standard for an aggravation claim and the affirmative defense: “After the last award or arrangement of compensation, an injured worker is entitled to additional compensation for worsened conditions resulting from the original injury. * * * However, if the major contributing cause of the worsened 2011Corp., Inc., 347 Or. at 694 , 227 P.3d 1134 ("[W]e conclude that a claimant cannot [through a CDA] dispose of `all matters' and `all rights to compensation, attorney fees and penalties potentially arising out of claims' where those matters and rights involve medical services."). [8] ORS 656.273(1) sets forth the causation standard for an aggravation claim and the affirmative defense: "After the last award or arrangement of compensation, an injured worker is entitled to additional compensation for worsened conditions resulting from the original injury. * * * However, if the major contributing c | 1 | 2 |
SAIF Corp. v. Januarygreen2 sentences2006Id. at 625 . 2004SAIF v. Walker, 330 Or 102, 118-19 [, 996 P2d 979 ] (2000); SAIF v. January, 166 Or App 620, 624 [, 998 P2d 1286 ] (2000) (if medical evidence — i.e., a physician’s expert opinion — establishes that the symptomatic worsening represents an actual worsening of the underlying condition, then such evidence may carry the worker’s burden). | 1 | 2 |
| Petock v. Asantegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rogers v. Meridian Park Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Uris v. State Compensation Departmentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| SAIF Corp. v. Christensengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Campos v. Hood River Care Centergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. Craiggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gwynn v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bauman v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.
green
2 sentences1985The Board held that Jeld-Wen’s acceptance of the aggravation claim and payment of benefits barred it from later denying the claim, citing Bauman v. SAIF, 295 Or 788 , 670 P2d 1027 (1983). 1985The Board held that Jeld-Wen’s acceptance of the aggravation claim and payment of benefits barred it from later denying the claim, citing Bauman v. SAIF, 295 Or 788 , 670 P2d 1027 (1983). | 6 | 1985–1995 |
Silsby v. State Accident Insurance Fund
green
2 sentences1993Before it was amended, ORS 656.273(6) required an employer to begin payment of compensation on an aggravation claim “no later than the 14th day after the subject employer has notice or knowledge of medically verified inability to work resulting from the worsened, condition.” (Emphasis supplied.) Relying on that language and the statute’s reference to ORS 656.262(4), which, in 1979, required payment of benefits no later than the 14th day after the employer had notice or knowledge of an injury claim, we held in Silsby v. SAIF, 39 Or App 555 , 592 P2d 1074 (1979), that a worker making an aggravat 1993Before it was amended, ORS 656.273(6) required an employer to begin payment of compensation on an aggravation claim “no later than the 14th day after the subject employer has notice or knowledge of medically verified inability to work resulting from the worsened, condition.” (Emphasis supplied.) Relying on that language and the statute’s reference to ORS 656.262(4), which, in 1979, required payment of benefits no later than the 14th day after the employer had notice or knowledge of an injury claim, we held in Silsby v. SAIF, 39 Or App 555 , 592 P2d 1074 (1979), that a worker making an aggravat | 4 | 1982–1993 |
Johansen v. SAIF Corp.
green
2 sentences2015We conclude that the legislative history of the new or omitted conditions statute, ORS 656.267, which the legislature enacted in response to Johansen v. SAIF, 158 Or App 672 , 976 P2d 84 (1999), demonstrates that the legislature intended that an aggravation claim is one involving the worsening of an underlying condition identified in a notice of acceptance. 2015We conclude that the legislative history of the new or omitted conditions statute, ORS 656.267, which the legislature enacted in response to Johansen v. SAIF, 158 Or App 672 , 976 P2d 84 (1999), demonstrates that the legislature intended that an aggravation claim is one involving the worsening of an underlying condition identified in a notice of acceptance. | 3 | 1999–2020 |
Deaton v. State Accident Insurance Fund
neutral
2 sentences1987Deaton v. SAIF, 33 Or App 261 , 576 P2d 35 (1978). 1987Deaton v. SAIF, 33 Or App 261 , 576 P2d 35 (1978). | 3 | 1986–1987 |
Clark v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.
neutral
2 sentences1986The physician’s report need not ‘adduce facts sufficient to show an aggravation; it need only show the need for further treatment of the injury. ’ Clark v. SAIF, 50 Or App 139, 143 , 622 P2d 759 (1981).” (Emphasis supplied; footnote omitted.) Each of the doctors’ reports indicated a need for further *447 treatment. 3 The claim was timely filed. 4 *448 In order to establish an aggravation claim, claimant must show “worsened conditions resulting from the original injury.” ORS 656.273. 1986The physician’s report need not ‘adduce facts sufficient to show an aggravation; it need only show the need for further treatment of the injury. ’ Clark v. SAIF, 50 Or App 139, 143 , 622 P2d 759 (1981).” (Emphasis supplied; footnote omitted.) Each of the doctors’ reports indicated a need for further *447 treatment. 3 The claim was timely filed. 4 *448 In order to establish an aggravation claim, claimant must show “worsened conditions resulting from the original injury.” ORS 656.273. | 3 | 1984–1986 |
Jacobson v. State Accident Insurance Fund
green
2 sentences1983As Judge Buttler succinctly stated in Jacobson v. SAIF, 36 Or App 789, 793 , 585 P2d 1146 (1978): “ * * It is better to encourage prompt payment than it is to discourage it by holding that the insurer who makes payment of medical expenses under ORS 656.245 is estop-ped to contest coverage with respect to an aggravation claim under ORS 656.273. 1983As Judge Buttler succinctly stated in Jacobson v. SAIF, 36 Or App 789, 793 , 585 P2d 1146 (1978): “ * * It is better to encourage prompt payment than it is to discourage it by holding that the insurer who makes payment of medical expenses under ORS 656.245 is estop-ped to contest coverage with respect to an aggravation claim under ORS 656.273. | 3 | 1980–1983 |
Kassahn v. Publishers Paper Co.
green
2 sentences2019App. 105 , 109, 708 P.2d 626 ] (1985), rev. den. , 300 Or. 546 , 715 P.2d 93 (1986) (Board correctly concluded that complex medical questions must be answered through expert medical opinion in the context of an aggravation claim.); Randy S. Gehrs , 64 Van Natta 2094 (2012). 2004See Uris v. Compensation Department, 247 Or 420, 424 , 427 P2d 753 (1967) (“where injuries complained of are of such character as to require skilled and professional persons to determine the cause and extent thereof, the question is one of science and must necessarily be determined by testimony of skilled, professional persons” (internal citation omitted)); Kassahn v. Publishers Paper Co., 76 Or App 105, 109 , 708 P2d 626 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 546 (1986) (board correctly concluded that complex medical questions must be answered through expert medical opinion in the context of an aggravation | 2 | 2004–2019 |
Drews v. EBI Companies
green
2 sentences2015After establishing that the claim before the court was the claimant’s 1984 claim for aggravation — not his 1980 injury claim — the court concluded that “no finality has yet been accorded the aggravation claim opened in 1984,” because the October 7, 1985 order, which awarded TTD, and the subsequent decisions reviewing that order, “are but separate parts of the same aggravation claim, i.e., the orders were entered in the same administrative proceeding now before us on judicial review” to which “[t]he finality required to invoke claim preclusion has not yet attached [.]” 310 Or at 149-50 . 1992It held that, because the worker’s aggravation claim had not been closed and the time to appeal that claim had not elapsed, he could challenge the wage rate that would apply to that claim. 310 Or at 150 . | 2 | 1992–2015 |
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Seney
green
2 sentences2011See Krieger v. Future Logging, 116 Or App 537, 540 , 842 P2d 428 (1992), rev den, 316 Or 528 (1993); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Seney, 124 Or App 450, 454 , 863 P2d 528 (1993). 2011See Krieger v. Future Logging, 116 Or App 537, 540 , 842 P2d 428 (1992), rev den, 316 Or 528 (1993); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Seney, 124 Or App 450, 454 , 863 P2d 528 (1993). | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Cutright v. Weyerhaeuser Co.
green
2 sentences2005In Cutright v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 299 Or 290 , 702 P2d 403 (1985), the court determined that “[a]s applied to aggravation claims, former ORS 656.325(5) (1983)] dictates that a worker receiving [temporary total disability] benefits must not refuse wage earning employment prior to the aggravation claim determination if the worker is capable of working. 2005In Cutright v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 299 Or 290 , 702 P2d 403 (1985), the court determined that “[a]s applied to aggravation claims, former ORS 656.325(5) (1983)] dictates that a worker receiving [temporary total disability] benefits must not refuse wage earning employment prior to the aggravation claim determination if the worker is capable of working. | 2 | 1990–2005 |
Stanley Smith Security v. Pace
neutral
2 sentences1999We made an analogous holding in Stanley Smith Security v. Pace, 118 Or App 602 , 848 P2d 1218 , rev den 317 Or 272 (1993), where we considered whether interim compensation must be paid on an aggravation claim that is ultimately determined not to be compensable. 1999We made an analogous holding in Stanley Smith Security v. Pace, 118 Or App 602 , 848 P2d 1218 , rev den 317 Or 272 (1993), where we considered whether interim compensation must be paid on an aggravation claim that is ultimately determined not to be compensable. | 2 | 1994–1999 |
Smith v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.
green
2 sentences1993Because the Board disposed of the aggravation claim by holding that claimant was not more disabled from working, it did not determine whether the need for medical services was the result of the injury. 5 Smith v. SAIF, supra, 302 Or at 402 . 1993Because the Board disposed of the aggravation claim by holding that claimant was not more disabled from working, it did not determine whether the need for medical services was the result of the injury. [5] Smith v. SAIF, supra, 302 Or. at 402 , 730 P.2d 30 . | 2 | 1993–1998 |
Matter of Compensation of Grable
green
2 sentences1994In Grable v. Weyerhaeuser Company, 291 Or. 387 , 631 P.2d 768 (1981), the Supreme Court considered an aggravation claim in which the claimant's compensable injury became worse after an off-the-job injury. 1994In Grable v. Weyerhaeuser Company, 291 Or. 387 , 631 P.2d 768 (1981), the Supreme Court considered an aggravation claim in which the claimant's compensable injury became worse after an off-the-job injury. | 2 | 1986–1994 |
Krajacic v. Blazing Orchards
neutral
2 sentences1992In Krajacic v. Blazing Orchards, 84 Or App 127 , 733 P2d 113 , mod 85 Or App 477 , 737 P2d 617 , rem’d 304 Or 436 (1987), aff’d 90 Or App 593 , 752 P2d 1299 , rev den 306 Or 155 (1988), the same issue was raised under the same statutory provisions. 1992In Krajacic v. Blazing Orchards, 84 Or App 127 , 733 P2d 113 , mod 85 Or App 477 , 737 P2d 617 , rem’d 304 Or 436 (1987), aff’d 90 Or App 593 , 752 P2d 1299 , rev den 306 Or 155 (1988), the same issue was raised under the same statutory provisions. | 2 | 1988–1992 |
State v. Lissy
neutral
2 sentences1992In Krajacic v. Blazing Orchards, 84 Or App 127 , 733 P2d 113 , mod 85 Or App 477 , 737 P2d 617 , rem’d 304 Or 436 (1987), aff’d 90 Or App 593 , 752 P2d 1299 , rev den 306 Or 155 (1988), the same issue was raised under the same statutory provisions. 1988Krajacic v. Blazing Orchards, 84 Or App 127 , 733 P2d 113 , on reconsideration 85 Or App 477 , 737 P2d 617 , remanded for reconsideration on other grounds, 304 Or 436 , 746 P2d 218 (1987). | 2 | 1988–1992 |
Krajacic v. Blazing Orchards
neutral
2 sentences1992In Krajacic v. Blazing Orchards, 84 Or App 127 , 733 P2d 113 , mod 85 Or App 477 , 737 P2d 617 , rem’d 304 Or 436 (1987), aff’d 90 Or App 593 , 752 P2d 1299 , rev den 306 Or 155 (1988), the same issue was raised under the same statutory provisions. 1988Krajacic v. Blazing Orchards, 84 Or App 127 , 733 P2d 113 , on reconsideration 85 Or App 477 , 737 P2d 617 , remanded for reconsideration on other grounds, 304 Or 436 , 746 P2d 218 (1987). | 2 | 1988–1992 |
Hoke v. Libby, McNeil & Libby
neutral
2 sentences1986Hoke v. Libby, McNeil & Libby, 73 Or App 44, 46 , 697 P2d 993 (1985). 1986Hoke v. Libby, McNeil & Libby, 73 Or App 44, 46 , 697 P2d 993 (1985). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Miller v. SAIF Corp.
green
2 sentences1986See Stepp v. SAIF, 78 Or App 438 , 717 P2d 216 (decided this date); Miller v. SAIF, 78 Or App 158 , 714 P2d 1105 (1986). 1986See Stepp v. SAIF, 78 Or App 438 , 717 P2d 216 (decided this date); Miller v. SAIF, 78 Or App 158 , 714 P2d 1105 (1986). | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Wetzel v. Goodwin Bros.
neutral
2 sentences1986We held in Wetzel v. Goodwin Brothers, 50 Or App 101 , 622 P2d 750 (1981), that a medical chart note sent to the insurer at its request did not constitute an aggravation claim. 1986We held in Wetzel v. Goodwin Brothers, 50 Or App 101 , 622 P2d 750 (1981), that a medical chart note sent to the insurer at its request did not constitute an aggravation claim. | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Stevens v. Champion International
neutral
2 sentences1986ORS 656.273(2); Stevens v. Champion International, 44 Or App 587 , 606 P2d 674 (1980). 1986ORS 656.273(2); Stevens v. Champion International, 44 Or App 587 , 606 P2d 674 (1980). | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Brewer v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.
neutral
2 sentences1986Brewer v. SAIF, 59 Or App 87, 89 , 650 P2d 947 (1982). 1986Brewer v. SAIF, 59 Or App 87, 89 , 650 P2d 947 (1982). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Oakley v. State Accident Insurance Fund Corp.
green
2 sentences1984In Oakley v. SAIF, 63 Or App 433, 436 , 664 P2d 431 (1983), we noted: “An aggravation claim based solely on a claimant’s statement that his condition has deteriorated is statutorily insufficient. 1984In Oakley v. SAIF, 63 Or App 433, 436 , 664 P2d 431 (1983), we noted: “An aggravation claim based solely on a claimant’s statement that his condition has deteriorated is statutorily insufficient. | 2 | 1984–1984 |
Bowser v. Evans Product Company
green
2 sentences1981He felt that he was precluded from going behind the March, 1976, order by Virtue of our opinion in Bowser v. Evans Products Co., 17 Or App 542 , 522 P2d 1405 , reversed and remanded on other grounds 270 Or 841 , 530 P2d 44 (1974). 1981He felt that he was precluded from going behind the March, 1976, order by Virtue of our opinion in Bowser v. Evans Products Co., 17 Or App 542 , 522 P2d 1405 , reversed and remanded on other grounds 270 Or 841 , 530 P2d 44 (1974). | 2 | 1981–1981 |
| Sexton v. Sky Lakes Medical Center neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Olson v. Safeway Stores, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Schleiss v. SAIF Corp. green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Nacoste v. Halton Co. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Drews v. EBI Companies neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| SAIF Corp. v. Batey green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Jordan v. SAIF Corp. neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Cummings v. SAIF Corp. neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Johanesen green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Buddenberg v. Southcoast Lumber neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Kephart neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Morales v. SAIF Corp. neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Frasure v. Agripac, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Stapleton v. Liberty Northwest Insurance neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Armstrong v. Asten-Hill Co. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Hiner v. Crawford Health & Rehabilitation neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Stepp v. SAIF Corp. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.