aggravation rule in District of Columbia

2017Code § 32-1501 (12). 19 Cf. McCamey, 947 A.2d at 1200-01 (concluding that the aggravation rule could be read into the CMPA where differences in the statutes‟ language “d[id] not materially alter the analysis”). 10 Finally, in recognizing a difference between cases with a discrete injury and cases with cumulative trauma, this court has never held that all aggravations must be discrete injuries.20 III.

2017Cf. McCamey, 947 A.2d at 1200-01 (concluding that the aggravation rule could be read into the CMPA where differences in the statutes’ language ”d[id] not materially alter the analysis”). .

1998This court in Ferreira v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 531 A.2d 651, 660 (D.C.1987), took note of the aggravation rule in remanding the case to enable the employer to rebut the presumption of compensability.

1995“The fact that other, nonemployment related factors may also have contributed to, or additionally aggravated [petitioner’s] malady, does not affect [the] right to compensation under the aggravation rule.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Hensley v. Washington Metro.

2020See, e.g., Wheatley, 407 F.2d at 313 (to rebut the presumption of causation on an aggravation theory, one “at least” would have “to articulate that this 9 The court in Wheatley acknowledged that “[c]omplaints have been voiced against the aggravation rule as applied to cardiac cases” but noted that precedent nonetheless dictated its application and that any desired change in the rule would be “appropriately addressed to Congress.” 407 F.2d at 312 .

2020See, e.g., Wheatley, 407 F.2d at 313 (to rebut the presumption of causation on an aggravation theory, one “at least” would have “to articulate that this 9 The court in Wheatley acknowledged that “[c]omplaints have been voiced against the aggravation rule as applied to cardiac cases” but noted that precedent nonetheless dictated its application and that any desired change in the rule would be “appropriately addressed to Congress.” 407 F.2d at 312 .

2013Area Transit Auth., 655 F.2d 264, 268 (D.C.Cir.1981))).

1995Area Transit Auth., 210 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 155 , 655 F.2d 264, 268 (1981)).

2017Cf. King, 742 A.2d at 468-69 (“The difference between the typical case of a discrete accident causing an injury (including an aggravating injury) and a cumulative trauma case is merely that in the latter case it is not possible to identify a discrete event occurring at a particular date and time that causes (or aggravates) the injury.

2008“It is well-settled that ‘an aggravation of a preexisting condition may [also] constitute a compensable accidental injury under the Act.’ ” King, supra, 742 A.2d at 468 (quoting Ferreira, supra, 531 A.2d at 660 ) (internal quotation omitted).

2013Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 667 A.2d 310, 312-13 (D.C.1995) (“The fact that other, nonemployment related factors may also have contributed to, or additionally aggravated [petitioner’s] malady, does not affect [the] right to compensation under the aggravation rule.” (quoting Hensley v. Washington Metro.

2009See Croskey v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters’ Ret. & Relief Bd., 596 A.2d 988, 992 (D.C.1991) (concluding government successfully rebutted a prima facie showing with evidence of a pre-existing condition); Baumgartner, supra, 527 A.2d at 317 (reversing Retirement Board’s decision because flimsy evidence by the government is insufficient to rebut claimant’s prima facie showing); Kirkwood v. District of Columbia Police & Firemen’s Ret. & Relief Bd., 468 A.2d 965 , 969 n. 2 (D.C.1983) (failing to report an initial injury may limit recoveries under an aggravation claim).

2009See Croskey v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters’ Ret. & Relief Bd., 596 A.2d 988, 992 (D.C.1991) (concluding government successfully rebutted a prima facie showing with evidence of a pre-existing condition); Baumgartner, supra, 527 A.2d at 317 (reversing Retirement Board’s decision because flimsy evidence by the government is insufficient to rebut claimant’s prima facie showing); Kirkwood v. District of Columbia Police & Firemen’s Ret. & Relief Bd., 468 A.2d 965 , 969 n. 2 (D.C.1983) (failing to report an initial injury may limit recoveries under an aggravation claim).

2009See Croskey v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters’ Ret. & Relief Bd., 596 A.2d 988, 992 (D.C.1991) (concluding government successfully rebutted a prima facie showing with evidence of a pre-existing condition); Baumgartner, supra, 527 A.2d at 317 (reversing Retirement Board’s decision because flimsy evidence by the government is insufficient to rebut claimant’s prima facie showing); Kirkwood v. District of Columbia Police & Firemen’s Ret. & Relief Bd., 468 A.2d 965 , 969 n. 2 (D.C.1983) (failing to report an initial injury may limit recoveries under an aggravation claim).

2008See Spartin, supra, 584 A.2d at 570 (“[A]n employee with a predisposition to mental illness is not precluded from recovering under Dailey.

2008See Spartin, supra, 584 A.2d at 570 (“[A]n employee with a predisposition to mental illness is not precluded from recovering under Dailey.

1999Area Transit Auth. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 704 A.2d 295, 297-99 (D.C.1997) (discussing the policies underlying § 36-308(6)); Daniel v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 673 A.2d 205, 207-08 (D.C.1996).

1999Area Transit Auth. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 704 A.2d 295, 297-99 (D.C.1997) (discussing the policies underlying § 36-308(6)); Daniel v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 673 A.2d 205, 207-08 (D.C.1996).

1998Under that rule, “[t]he aggravation of a preexisting condition may justify compensation.” Baker v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 611 A.2d 548, 550 (D.C.1992) (citation omitted); see Whittaker v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 668 A.2d 844, 845 (D.C. 1995).

1998Under that rule, “[t]he aggravation of a preexisting condition may justify compensation.” Baker v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 611 A.2d 548, 550 (D.C.1992) (citation omitted); see Whittaker v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 668 A.2d 844, 845 (D.C. 1995).