Metro immunity in Texas

2019See id. (holding that if evidence raises fact issue regarding jurisdiction, plea cannot be granted and fact finder must resolve issue).

2018See Miranda, 133 S. W.3d at 228 (if evidence is undisputed or fails to raise fact issue, plea must be determined as matter of law); see also Poland v. Willerson, No. 01-07-00198-CV, 2008 WL 660334 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 13, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (physician’s affidavit stating that he was salaried employee of state-owned hospital “carried 7 When asked where her paychecks, issued by First Transit, actually came from, Eubanks responded: “First Transit?

2005See id. at 255 .

2005See id. at 255 .

2004See City of LaPorte v. Barfield , 898 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. 1995) (stating that clear-and-unambiguous requirement for waiving immunity applies to governmental entities other than the state).

2004See City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex.1995) (stating that clear-and-unambiguous requirement for waiving immunity applies to governmental entities other than the state).

2023See City of North Richland Hills v. Friend, 370 S.W.3d 369 , 371–72 (Tex. 2012); Stamos v. Houston Indep.

2023See City of North Richland Hills, 370 S.W.3d at 371–73; Stamos, 2020 WL 1528047 , at *2. 16 Although the trial court granted Metro’s jurisdictional plea, on appeal Kownslar has not requested a remand for an opportunity to replead his Negligent Activity Claim.

2021See Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 771 ; Carter, 2021 WL 126687 , at *4.

2018See Marino v. Lenoir, 526 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. 2017) (“The statutory definition of employee of a governmental unit requires that the defendant ‘is in the paid service’ of the 7 claimed governmental unit.”); Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex. 2003) (affirming appellate court’s holding that physician not in state university’s “paid service” was not entitled to summary judgment as employee of UT); Harris Cnty. v. Dillard, 883 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1994) (under “plain language” of TTCA section 101.021(1), governmental unit is not liable for actions of person who is not its paid employee);

2018See Marino v. Lenoir, 526 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. 2017) (“The statutory definition of employee of a governmental unit requires that the defendant ‘is in the paid service’ of the 7 claimed governmental unit.”); Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex. 2003) (affirming appellate court’s holding that physician not in state university’s “paid service” was not entitled to summary judgment as employee of UT); Harris Cnty. v. Dillard, 883 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1994) (under “plain language” of TTCA section 101.021(1), governmental unit is not liable for actions of person who is not its paid employee);

2018See Marino v. Lenoir, 526 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. 2017) (“The statutory definition of employee of a governmental unit requires that the defendant ‘is in the paid service’ of the 7 claimed governmental unit.”); Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex. 2003) (affirming appellate court’s holding that physician not in state university’s “paid service” was not entitled to summary judgment as employee of UT); Harris Cnty. v. Dillard, 883 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1994) (under “plain language” of TTCA section 101.021(1), governmental unit is not liable for actions of person who is not its paid employee);

2018See Marino v. Lenoir, 526 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. 2017) (“The statutory definition of employee of a governmental unit requires that the defendant ‘is in the paid service’ of the 7 claimed governmental unit.”); Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex. 2003) (affirming appellate court’s holding that physician not in state university’s “paid service” was not entitled to summary judgment as employee of UT); Harris Cnty. v. Dillard, 883 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1994) (under “plain language” of TTCA section 101.021(1), governmental unit is not liable for actions of person who is not its paid employee);

2018See Marino v. Lenoir, 526 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. 2017) (“The statutory definition of employee of a governmental unit requires that the defendant ‘is in the paid service’ of the 7 claimed governmental unit.”); Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex. 2003) (affirming appellate court’s holding that physician not in state university’s “paid service” was not entitled to summary judgment as employee of UT); Harris Cnty. v. Dillard, 883 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1994) (under “plain language” of TTCA section 101.021(1), governmental unit is not liable for actions of person who is not its paid employee);

2018See Marino v. Lenoir, 526 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. 2017) (“The statutory definition of employee of a governmental unit requires that the defendant ‘is in the paid service’ of the 7 claimed governmental unit.”); Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex. 2003) (affirming appellate court’s holding that physician not in state university’s “paid service” was not entitled to summary judgment as employee of UT); Harris Cnty. v. Dillard, 883 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1994) (under “plain language” of TTCA section 101.021(1), governmental unit is not liable for actions of person who is not its paid employee);

2018See Marino v. Lenoir, 526 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. 2017) (“The statutory definition of employee of a governmental unit requires that the defendant ‘is in the paid service’ of the 7 claimed governmental unit.”); Murk v. Scheele, 120 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Tex. 2003) (affirming appellate court’s holding that physician not in state university’s “paid service” was not entitled to summary judgment as employee of UT); Harris Cnty. v. Dillard, 883 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. 1994) (under “plain language” of TTCA section 101.021(1), governmental unit is not liable for actions of person who is not its paid employee);

2015Lacy v. Bassett, 132 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see Willie v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, No. 01-11-00428-CV, 2012 WL 761241 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

2004Dist., 123 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (Education Code provides that school district trustees may sue and be sued — immunity not waived). [3] Accordingly, we hold that section 451.054 of the Transportation Code clearly and unambiguously waives METRO's immunity from suit.

2003See Lampasas v. Spring Ctr , Inc ., 988 S.W.2d 428, 436 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (finding plaintiff could not defeat a no-evidence motion for summary judgment by pleadings instead of proof because the purpose of a summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings” and “assess the proof” in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial).