102 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
ACS Investors, Inc. v. McLaughlingreen2 sentences2015ACS Investors v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W. 2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997). 2006ACS Investors Inc. v. McLaughlin , 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997). | 12 | 12 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2015Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 318 – 19 (1979); Lacour v. State, 8 S.W.3d 670, 671 (Tex. Crim. 2015Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). | 8 | 25 |
Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Engineers and Contractors, Inc.green2 sentences2011Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex.1998) (sub. op.). 2011Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex.1998) (sub. op.). | 5 | 5 |
Gollihar v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Id., 46 S.W.3d at 249 (“We have not been consistent in requiring materiality, but have sometimes reversed upon a finding of variance without exploring the further question of materiality.”) The court explained why a materiality component is appropriate in a legal insufficiency claim that is based upon a variance: A materiality or harmless error-type requirement is not generally a component in traditional sufficiency of the evidence analysis, and we have never addressed why it has been required in the context of a variance-insufficiency claim. 2010Id., 46 S.W.3d at 249 (“We have not been consistent in requiring materiality, but have sometimes reversed upon a finding of variance without exploring the further question of materiality.”) The court explained why a materiality component is appropriate in a legal insufficiency claim that is based upon a variance: A materiality or harmless error-type requirement is not generally a component in traditional sufficiency of the evidence analysis, and we have never addressed why it has been required in the context of a variance-insufficiency claim. | 4 | 6 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalezgreen2 sentences2006Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez , 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998). 2002Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez , 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998). | 3 | 3 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cancholagreen2 sentences2004Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola , 121 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003). 2004Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex.2003). | 3 | 3 |
Dowling v. NADW Marketing, Inc.green2 sentences2002Dowling v. NADW Mktg., Inc., 631 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex. 1982). 2002Dowling v. NADW Mktg., Inc., 631 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tex. 1982). | 3 | 3 |
Leitch v. Hornsbygreen2 sentences2001Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex.1996). 2001Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex.1996). | 3 | 3 |
Catalina v. Blasdelgreen2 sentences1997See id. 1997See id. | 3 | 3 |
City of Keller v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2020Id. (citing Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 810 ). 2020City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005). | 2 | 6 |
NICHE OILFIELD SERVICES, LLC v. Cartergreen2 sentences2012Id. at 810 ; Niche Oilfield Servs., LLC v. Carter, 331 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). 2012Id. at 810 ; Niche Oilfield Servs., LLC v. Carter, 331 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Hunter v. FORD MOTOR CO., INC.green2 sentences2010See Hunter v. Ford Motor Co., 305 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.). 2010See Hunter v. Ford Motor Co., 305 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Wilson v. State , 7 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. Crim. 2002Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). | 2 | 2 |
Price Pfister, Inc. v. Moore & Kimmey, Inc.green2 sentences2004Price Pfister, Inc. v. Moore & Kimmey, *439 Inc., 48 S.W.3d 341, 347 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). 2004PricePfister, Inc. v. Moore & Kimmey, Inc. , 48 S.W.3d 341, 347 (Tex. App. C Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). | 2 | 2 |
Narvaiz v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 ,- 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975 , 113 S.Ct. 1422 , 122 L.Ed.2d 791 (1993). 1998See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975 , 113 S.Ct. 1422 , 122 L.Ed.2d 791 (1993). | 2 | 2 |
Stafford v. Staffordgreen2 sentences1999Stafford, 726 S.W.2d at 16 . 1992Id. | 1 | 3 |
Garza v. Alviargreen2 sentences1998Id. ; Juliette Fowler Homes , Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc. , 793 S.W.2d 660, 666 (Tex. 1990). 1983Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.1965); 2) In a factual insufficiency claim, appellant must prove to the appellate court that considering all of the evidence, the jury’s verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. | 1 | 3 |
In Re JFCgreen2 sentences2017When reviewing a legal insufficiency claim, a court looks at “all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 . 2017To give appropriate deference, “a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its findings if a reasonable factfinder could do so.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
Moore v. Lillebogreen1 sentence2020Insofar as legal sufficiency is concerned, I believe that the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Lillebo supports the argument that evidence of a close familial bond is sufficient in its own right to support the existence of some compensable injury, if not its amount. 722 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. 1986).2 As a result, barring any further evidence of the amount, we would be obliged to avoid a reversal and rendition and should, instead, move on to consider factual sufficiency, which Gregory and New Prime also challenge. | 1 | 1 |
Holloway v. Skinnergreen1 sentence2019Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tex. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Lacour v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 318 – 19 (1979); Lacour v. State, 8 S.W.3d 670, 671 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Brooks v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902, 912 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Croucher v. Crouchergreen1 sentence2015Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W. 2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983) If the record contains any evidence of probative force to support the finding, the legal insufficiency challenge must be overruled. | 1 | 1 |
Cain v. Baingreen1 sentence2015When reviewing a jury verdict for factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider and weigh all the evidence and only set aside the verdict “if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.” Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986) (per cu-riam). | 1 | 1 |
| Hernandez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mason v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Powell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clewis v. Statered | 1 | 1 |
| Board of Law Examiners of Texas v. Coulsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vannerson v. Vannersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zavala v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mosley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roise v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Associates, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Steves Sash & Door Co. v. Ceco Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Geesa v. Statered | 1 | 1 |
| Salinas v. Fort Worth Cab & Baggage Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner
green
2 sentences2008Id. 3 *785 Cancel made no allegation that he was subjected to quid pro quo harassment, rather, Cancel contended that Martinez’s sexual harassment created a hostile or abusive work environment. 2008Id. | 4 | 2004–2008 |
Heritage Housing Development, Inc. v. Carr
green
2 sentences2016Id. 2016Id. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Samuel v. Estelle
green
2 sentences1999See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 ,- 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975 , 113 S.Ct. 1422 , 122 L.Ed.2d 791 (1993). 1998See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975 , 113 S.Ct. 1422 , 122 L.Ed.2d 791 (1993). | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Conrade v. United States
green
2 sentences1999See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 ,- 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975 , 113 S.Ct. 1422 , 122 L.Ed.2d 791 (1993). 1998See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 423 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975 , 113 S.Ct. 1422 , 122 L.Ed.2d 791 (1993). | 2 | 1998–1999 |
Glover v. Texas General Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1991Glover, 619 S.W.2d at 401 . 1990Glover v. Texas General Indemnity Company, 619 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.1981). | 2 | 1990–1991 |
Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo
green
2 sentences2015As explained in Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 444 S.W.3d 616 (Tex.2014), a legal insufficiency challenge will be upheld if the record illustrates either 1) a complete absence of a vital fact, 2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, 3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or 4) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. 2015Id. at 620 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Norman Communications v. Texas Eastman Co. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Lane v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Otis Elevator Co. v. Joseph green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Cecil v. Smith green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.